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ABSTRACT
KNOWLEDGE CODIFICATION, PROCESS ROUTINIZATION, AND THE 
CREATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES: 
Post-Acquisition Management in the US Banking Industry
Maurizio Zollo 
Harbir Singh
How do firms create strategically relevant capabilities ? In this study, insights from 
evolutionary economics and organizational learning theories are combined to explore the 
mechanisms behind the creation of organizational capabilities in the context of 
infrequent, heterogeneous, and complex administrative tasks. More specifically, the 
investigation covers the effects of both tacit and codified knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms on the development of a practice specialized in the management o f post­
acquisition integration processes. Hypotheses about the performance implications of pre­
acquisition resources, post-acquisition integration decisions, and knowledge 
accumulation and codification processes are tested with primary data collected from a 
sample of 51 bank holding companies in the United States and Canada, for a total of 577 
completed acquisitions. Results show that codification and routinization processes play a 
key role in shaping the evolution of post-acquisition integration practices, and that both 
mechanisms have a positive influence on acquisition performance, within specific 
limitations. The effectiveness o f tacit knowledge accumulation is constrained by the 
degree of homogeneity o f past experiences, whereas knowledge codification impacts
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performance only when high levels o f  integration are to be achieved. Results also show 
that greater level o f integration have positive implications for acquisition performance 
and that decisions to replace top management affect performance negatively. 
Conclusions are drawn about necessary refinements o f current theoretical approaches to 
accommodate complex learning conditions, and the potential implications for the 
management of acquisitions, as well as other infrequent and complex organizational 
events, such as strategic alliances and internal reorganizations, are discussed.
(Keywords: organizational learning, evolutionary economics, organizational knowledge, 
codification, routinization, capabilities, corporate development, corporate strategy, 
strategy implementation, mergers, acquisitions, post-acquisition, integration, banking)
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1. INTRODUCTION
“E ' cosa veramente molto naturale e 
ordinaria desiderare di acquistare; 
e sempre quando gli uomini lo fanno 
che possono, saranno laudati, o non 
biasimati; ma quando non possono, e 
vogliono farlo in ogni modo.
(The desire to acquire is a very common 
and natural thing; and when a man who 
is capable o f doing it makes the attempt, 
he will generally be praised, or at least 
not blamed; error and blame arise when 
a man lacks the necessary ability and
qui e ' lo errore e il biasimo ” still wants to make the attempt at all costs)
Niccolo’ Macchiavelli, De Principatibus 
Ch. Ill - De Principati Misti
During 1996, US firms invested $495 billion, or about 7% of their country’s gross 
domestic product, in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. By comparison, the total 
private investment in R&D by US firms in 1996 was $185 billion. US corporations seem 
to be investing more in mergers and acquisitions than they do in internal growth 
activities, even before other external development channels such as joint ventures and 
strategic alliances are taken into account. Moreover, the trend appears to be 
strengthening; in the first six months o f  1997. deal volume increased by 37% and the 
number o f deals increased by 29% in comparison with the same period o f the previous
The potential impact o f  mergers and acquisitions on firms’ ability to achieve, 
sustain, or lose competitive advantage is important not just because of the sheer 
magnitude of the financial commitment, but also because such ventures have immediate
1 Computations by Mergerstat.
year .
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consequences for the quality o f  resources and capabilities within the acquiring firm.
“With the stroke o f a pen,” firms not only “add billions in size, get a front-page story, and 
create excitement in the markets” (Porter, 1987), but also redefine their endowments o f 
resources and capabilities. Depending on the decisions made during, and the outcomes 
of, the integration process, firms can transfer, leverage, recombine, and even create 
strategically relevant resources. If poorly conceived or executed, however, the 
integration process can result in resources being depleted, damaged, or lost to the 
competition and in capabilities remaining underutilized or forgotten.
Despite the empirical relevance o f M&A events, and the importance o f the 
dynamics of resources and capabilities to the field o f strategic management, surprisingly 
little effort has been made to explain how acquisition performance might be influenced 
by both the characteristics of the integration process and the acquiring firm’s c a p a b il ity  to 
devise and implement cogent integration strategies. There are, however, a number of 
sensible explanations for this gap.
First, we currently have a limited understanding o f whether and how 
organizations can develop capabilities from events that are relatively infrequent, typically 
unpredictable, and highly complex. Mergers and acquisitions, along with other 
organizational phenomena such as joint ventures and reorganizations, constitute a 
formidable challenge for organizational learning mechanisms as we know them today 
(March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991, p. 1).
Second, despite a solid tradition that has explained capabilities in the context o f 
technological innovation and production activities (Schumpeter, 1934; Clark & Fujimoto,
2
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1990; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992), researchers have rarely 
examined the evolution o f  “softer” administrative practices, such as post-acquisition 
integration processes. One reason for the implicit prioritization o f production and R&D 
activities over everything else that takes place inside a firm has to do with the well- 
known measurement problems connected with such phenomena. Another explanation 
might be that economics, which is the prevailing theoretical lens in strategic 
management, is still ill-equipped to analyze business activities that are not strictly 
identified or identifiable with a production function. Clearly, however, the rewards for 
progress in this area are every bit as great as the theoretical and methodological 
challenges before the researcher.
Third, the M&A literature has evolved during the last three decades in a highly 
segmented fashion, and only recently have scholars begun to consider the plausibility of 
an integrative view o f the process, which is crucial for a capability-based explanation.
The literature was created originally by contributions from scholars in the economics and 
corporate finance domains, who typically focused on explanations derived from the 
characteristics of the negotiation process. More recently, strategy scholars have 
emphasized the importance o f the characteristics of the pre-acquisition resources 
controlled by the two firms that are merging. The possibility o f explaining acquisition 
processes, as well as the outcomes o f acquisitions, with a capability argument has 
surfaced only in the last few years, advanced by scholars rooted in the behavioral 
tradition. Even their efforts, however, have been hampered by the limited applicability of 
organizational learning mechanisms (see discussion above) and the lack o f an integrative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
framework combining the internal rigor o f economic analysis with the descriptive power 
of behavioral models.
The objective o f this dissertation is to combine some basic insights from 
evolutionary economics and organizational learning theories in an initial exploration o f 
the mechanisms behind the creation o f organizational capabilities in the context of 
infrequent, complex administrative processes. More specifically, the investigation covers 
the effects o f  both tacit and codified knowledge accumulation mechanisms on the 
development o f a specialized capability in the management o f post-acquisition integration 
processes. The US banking industry, the context o f  the study, is a good example of an 
extremely turbulent environment, as the tight coupling o f deregulation, disintermediation, 
and technological evolution processes has generated an unprecedented wave of mergers, 
acquisitions, and internal reorganizations. That industry is therefore well suited for 
testing whether the evolution o f a post-acquisition management capability can partially 
explain the characteristics and the outcomes o f the integration process and, more broadly, 
whether and how an expert acquirer can extract and defend the rents from its own 
administrative wisdom.
After a review and critique o f the relevant literature in Chapter 2, the presentation 
of the key theoretical arguments are set forth in Chapter 3 and the consequent modeling is 
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes the research design and the measurement of 
the key constructs. The analysis is reported in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the results 
and their implications, as well as the study’s limitations. Chapter 8 summarizes the 
findings and suggests possible extensions of the research.
4
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter summarizes the theoretical objectives o f the dissertation and the 
empirical results o f  relevant streams o f research. It also highlights the gaps in our current 
understanding, and explains the approach chosen for developing new, empirically 
testable, theory.
Three streams o f scholarly work are addressed. First, the evolution of strategic 
management thinking is tracked from the original resource-based approaches to the more 
current refinement focusing on the dynamics of organizational knowledge. Then the 
voluminous literature on mergers and acquisitions is summarized to clarify the current 
understanding of the drivers o f performance in the context o f  choice. Finally, the limited 
amount of theoretical and empirical work on the post-acquisition integration process is 
surveyed, as it constitutes the main support for both the theoretical framework introduced 
in Chapters 3 and 4 and the interpretation of the results of the analysis.
2.1 Resources, Capabilities, and the Knowledge-based View of the Firm
Heterogeneity in the distribution of organizational resources among a population
o f firms has long been considered a key prerequisite for firms’ attainment o f Ricardian
rents (Penrose, 1959). However, resource heterogeneity is not sufficient to guarantee the
permanence of those rents, as changes in the environmental contexts in which firms
operate constantly affect the capacity o f resources to generate rents. Managerial activity,
5
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in the presence o f sufficient resource slack, is viewed in Penrose’s work as the 
fundamental mechanism by which firms are able to adjust their internal resource 
endowments to adapt to new environmental conditions, thereby securing their survival 
and growth.
During the last decade, renewed interest in the conditions under which 
heterogeneous resources can enable a firm to achieve and sustain competitive advantage 
has resulted in a set of fundamental contributions to the strategic management Held 
(Wemerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Barney, 1986). That body o f work, labeled as the 
“resource-based view o f the firm”, shifted the attention of strategic management scholars 
from external, industry-level sources o f competitive advantage to internal, firm-level 
ones. Dierickx and Cool (1989), in particular, contributed to the stream of research by 
viewing the interaction o f organizational activities and resources as flows of the former 
constantly increasing or depleting the stock of the latter. O f particular interest is their 
notion o f “time-compression diseconomies,” which emphasizes that the development o f 
such resources is constrained by temporal and, one might add, cognitive limitations. The 
latter are exemplified by the availability o f managerial time and attention, slack resources 
in Penrose’s terms, in which a firm must invest to develop new resources of strategic 
relevance. More generally, however, one might argue that cognitive limitations constrain 
the development o f  firm resources at every level o f  its organizational structure. The 
mechanism underlying the creation and destruction o f firm resources, then, might be the 
execution and marginal fine-tuning of day-to-day activities.
Such activities, which appear to be essential if  organizations are to build rent- 
generating resources and to achieve and sustain competitive advantage, have been studied
6
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in several ways and from different theoretical angles. In the first formal exploration 
rooted in the non-neoclassical economics domain, Nelson and Winter (1982) spoke o f 
organizational routines as stable, detailed, and predictable patterns o f  quasi-automatic 
behavior developed and constantly refined at the margin by firms in their ordinary 
productive activities. Routines therefore differ and should be distinguished from other 
types o f organizational activities, such as group problem-solving and strategic decision­
making, because o f their limited cognitive content (i.e., the latter activities do not 
represent a quasi-automatic response to recognizable stimuli). They also differ from 
rules o f thumb and heuristics because they are relatively complex and detail-oriented 
(Winter, 1995; Cohen, Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien and Winter, 1996).
Routines are a neutral but critical construct in that they can generate both 
organizational capabilities and “rigidities'’ (Leonard Barton, 1992), depending on the 
quality o f the performance feedback and of the updating mechanisms in the particular 
part o f the organization. Further, routines can be responsible for the development of 
organizational capabilities only to the extent that improvements are limited to the current 
process components and to the current overall structure o f the production process. Such 
incremental typically is replaced by higher order types of learning, which have been 
labeled “modular” learning at the component level (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996) and “architectural” learning at the production process level (Henderson 
& Clark, 1990). When the improvements occur at both the component and the 
production process levels, we generally speak o f radical or revolutionary reorientations 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1986; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).
7
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The higher orders o f  learning activities are justified and defined on the basis o f a
common view o f organizational capabilities as the product o f recombinations o f current,
lower order activities. For example, modular learning recombines operational routines by
adapting them to new product components, and architectural learning recombines new
product components (and consequently the sets of routines attached to their production)
in the redesign o f production processes for new generations o f final products. Consistent
with this view is Kogut and Zander’s (1992 p.392) statement that:
Knowledge advances by recombinations because a Arm’s capabilities cannot be separated 
from how it is currently organized.
Grant (1996) reconfirms that view of organizational capabilities as recombination,
or (in his words) “integration,” o f existing knowledge. He views them as (p. 116):
...the outcome o f  knowledge integration: complex, team-based productive activities.... 
dependent upon the firm’s ability to harness and integrate the knowledge o f many 
individual specialists [underlining added].
Importantly, the emphasis in the “recombinatory” view o f organizational 
capabilities is on the integration or harnessing o f existing knowledge, as opposed to the 
creation of collective understanding of how things are or ought to be done. One could 
infer from Kogut and Zander’s (1992) quotation that the rationale for such prioritization 
is based on our limited capacity to distinguish between the accumulation o f knowledge 
and the organizational arrangements connected to the accumulation processes. Others 
scholars, however, are more optimistic: Teece, Pisano, and Schuen (1997, p. 518), for 
example, clearly distinguish between “the coordination/integration (a static concept); 
learning (a dynamic process); and reconfiguration (a transformational concept)” notions 
o f organizational capabilities, and join all three concepts in their definition o f dynamic
8
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capabilities. Coordinating, integrating, or “harnessing” current knowledge therefore is 
distinguishable and ought to be distinguished from the creation o f  new organizational 
knowledge, even though the individuals or the groups who are the repository o f that 
knowledge are only partially aware o f its existence, its magnitude, and its usefulness.
The current thinking in strategic management has evolved significantly from the 
seminal pieces on the role o f internal resources. It has moved from a definitional 
discourse focused on the conditions necessary for internal resources to create defensible 
rents (Barney 1986, Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991) to a more sophisticated debate 
about the mechanisms responsible for the creation of those resources or o f the rents 
connected to them (Winter, 1995; Teece et al. 1997). The refinements come primarily 
from theoretical arguments rooted in disciplines partially outside strategic management 
field, such as organizational learning and evolutionary economics. However, several 
issues are still open and must be addressed to further our understanding o f organizational 
capabilities and their impact on competitive advantage:
•  Much of the discourse comes from research that builds on Schumpeter’s pioneering 
work on technological innovation. Organizational knowledge has been considered 
primarily production-related2, and the defined capabilities are either explicitly or 
implicitly “tailored” to the technological innovation process and the corresponding 
R&D/manufacturing functions. That is why we can talk o f  a recombination process 
as the basis o f multiple levels o f learning (from production routines, to component-
2 This is in part due to a restrictive interpretation o f Schumpeter’s work. His definition o f “development", 
in fact, includes non technical components, such as the identification o f new markets and o f new 
opportunities created by the formation or destruction o f monopolies (Schumpeter, 1934)
9
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based modules, to process architectures, and so on). To develop the dynamics of 
capabilities as drivers o f  competitive advantage, however, we must enlarge our 
scope of analysis to non-manufacturing, or administrative, types o f knowledge. 
Doing so will enable us to contemplate more opportune, perhaps more 
generalizable, mechanisms at the basis o f  their inception and evolution.
•  Present understanding o f organizational capabilities does not facilitate the empirical 
investigation of their origins. It is not immediately apparent how one could identify 
when a '‘combinative” capability might be present inside an organization, let alone 
measure it. Measuring process outcomes is not an option, for doing so creates the 
tautology of defining a capability as “the presence of superior performance.” The 
problem is compounded when, instead o f trying to measure only a 
coordination/integration capability, one adds learning and a reconfiguration 
dimensions of the construct, as Teece et al. (1997) suggest.
• Not surprisingly given the difficulties, we still do not have a good understanding of 
how organizational capabilities are created. How does one organization learn to 
recombine the knowledge o f individuals or groups more effectively than its 
competitors? A deeper understanding of the knowledge-based mechanisms 
underlying the evolution o f capabilities is essential and needs to be refined, at least 
in the context o f our interest: infrequent, heterogeneous, and highly complex tasks.
The various approaches to the study o f organizational capabilities summarized 
above are based on the implicit assumption that the task to be mastered occurs in a 
reasonably frequent and homogeneous way. Unfortunately, as March, Sproull, and
10
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Tamuz (1991) note, some of the most important events in the life o f an organization do 
not happen with the frequency (and similarity) implicitly assumed in the current theories. 
Developing organizational capabilities from rare and heterogeneous events therefore 
represents an ongoing challenge for both scholars and practitioners.
2.2 Research on M&A Performance
Extensive research has been done on the performance implications o f
acquisitions. Research in economics and corporate finance has focused primarily on
whether acquisitions create value on average. Scholars using event-study methodologies
to proxy acquisition performance report some level o f consensus that significant value is
created for the target firm’s shareholders, whereas the acquirer’s shareholders experience
no abnormal gains or losses (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Weston & Chung, 1983; Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, 1988; Franks, Harris & Titman, 1991; Loderer & Martin, 1992).
Other scholars, however, have reached less optimistic conclusions on the acquirer’s
ability to earn at least normal returns: Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) computed an
average 10% value deterioration over five years in a very large sample of acquisitions.
Using accounting measures o f performance o f  about 6,000 acquisitions in the 1960 and
1970, Ravenscrafi and Scherer (1987) found that even acquired firms exhibit worsening
performance, on average, after the acquisition.
The subset o f literature specializing in bank mergers also has produced mixed
results. In his review of 40 empirical studies, Rhoades (1194) found no evidence of
either value creation or value destruction from bank mergers on average. Overall, a
consensus is emerging that more thorough investigation o f the conditions under such
transactions create and destroy value is needed (Pilloff & Santomero, 1997). Possibly,
1 1
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there are certain conditions under which acquirers are able to create value consistently. 
The quest is then better defined as a search for an explanation o f the variance o f 
acquisition performance rather than the assessment o f  the mean o f the performance 
distribution.
Since the work o f Rumelt (1974), the degree o f  resource relatedness between the 
divisions o f a firm has been viewed by strategic management scholars as an important 
antecedent o f  firm performance. The same logic applied to the M&A context implies that 
acquirers should be able to generate higher value when there is a higher degree o f 
relatedness between their resources and those o f their targets. A substantial amount o f 
empirical work has explored that perspective in the context o f acquisitions (Chatteijee, 
1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Fowler & Schmidt. 
1989). Later work refined and extended the earlier studies (Seth, 1990a and 1990b;
Datta, 1991; Chatteijee et al, 1992; Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992). Unfortunately, the 
empirical evidence from that extensive body o f work is not unambiguous. Although 
many researchers found that the degree of product/market relatedness (as a proxy for 
resource relatedness) had a positive effect on acquisition performance (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Healy, Palepu & Ruback,
1992), others found the opposite (Chatteijee, 1986) or discerned no significant impact 
(Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990b).
A more careful reading o f the resource relatedness hypothesis, however, takes 
into account the fact that the degree o f relatedness can be priced out during negotiations, 
consequently weakening its value-creation potential. Once that argument is factored into
12
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the model, the condition under which value can be created from acquisitions becomes 
significantly more restrictive. In fact, value creation will arise only when the 
combination between the two firms that complete the transaction results in synergies 
superior to those created by the combination o f the target with any of the other bidders. 
Acquirers therefore are ‘‘forced” to form a uniquely highly valued combination o f  their 
resources with those o f the target firm to earn positive abnormal returns (Barney, 1988). 
On the basis o f that argument, Barney (1988) expects that the bidders in most related 
acquisitions will not obtain higher abnormal returns than bidders in unrelated 
acquisitions. The argument can be extended from the resource relatedness hypothesis to 
other characteristics o f the resources within the two firms. As long as they are known 
and quantifiable at the time o f the negotiation, they are likely to be included in the pricing 
o f the transaction. In more general terms, the power o f performance explanations based 
on the pre-acquisition characteristics o f the two firms is likely to be weaker than many 
would expect.
One possible source o f value creation in acquisitions that might be less sensitive 
to the preceding argument is the degree to which the acquiring firm develops a specific 
ability to manage the post-acquisition integration process effectively. The rationale for 
that speculation is relatively straightforward. Given the tacit and complex nature o f such 
administrative capability, it will be particularly difficult for the target firm (as well as the 
market) to identify its presence, articulate its characteristics, and assess the potential 
impact on the performance o f the entire transaction. Organizational capabilities, 
particularly the “soft” type, are subject to a high degree o f causal ambiguity (Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982), in that the relationship between firm performance and their magnitude is
13
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often obscure even to the firm itself (let alone the counterparts negotiating the acquisition 
agreement or the financial analysts assessing the potential for value creation from the 
transaction). To clarify the potential value o f the causal ambiguity argument, the 
literature on post-acquisition management is reviewed to identify what is known about 
the complexities o f post-acquisition integration processes. The two streams o f literature, 
then are merged to advance an explanation of post-acquisition integration decisions and 
o f acquisition performance based on our understanding of the mechanisms for the 
creation and evolution of organizational capabilities.
2.3 Research on Post-Acquisition Management
The origins o f the post-acquisition management literature can be found in the 
behavioral and HRM traditions, which generally emphasize the negative consequences o f 
post-acquisition integration processes on the organizational conditions o f the two firms 
(see Hogan & Overmyer-Day, 1994 or Shanley, 1998 for a good overview).
Contributions focus on the negative impact of cultural clashes (Nahavandi &
Malekzadeh, 1988; Buono & Bowditch, 1989), top management conflict (Mirvis, 1985). 
top management turnover (Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Cannella & Hambrick,
1993), poor handling o f communication processes (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991), and the 
effects o f post-acquisition integration processes on individual attitudes and behaviors 
(Astrachan, 1990; Joyce-Covin etal., 1996).
Those contributions shed significant light on the challenges firms face when they
attempt to translate their initial objectives and their post-acquisition integration strategies
into specific action steps while trying to minimize the negative consequences of
14
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organizational disruption and psychological resistance to change. However, by focusing 
primarily on the negative implications o f the post-acquisition integration phase, the work 
provides only a partial view o f the M&A process, stopping short of considering the 
conditions that determine the potential for value creation in mergers and acquisitions.
Are all integration processes inherently destructive, or do the various forms and degrees 
o f organizational disruption depend on the characteristics o f  the transaction and on the 
two firms involved? I f  the latter is true, the negative consequences highlighted in these 
studies may be the “price” firms must pay to achieve economic benefits. In any case, 
studying only some aspects o f the performance equation in isolation from the others leads 
to a partial and potentially biased understanding o f acquisition processes.
The so-called “process view” o f acquisitions (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986;
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Haspeslagh & Farquhar, 1994; Pablo, 1994) attempts to 
bridge the gap between the two streams o f literature by highlighting the need to include 
both value creation potential and implementation complexities in a sound theoretical 
treatment o f acquisition processes. It thus affords a process perspective that analyzes the 
alternatives and challenges in the various steps o f the process and provides particularly 
useful taxonomies of possible integration approaches, given pre-acquisition conditions in 
the two firms. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest a taxonomy with two dimensions: 
the levels o f strategic interdependence between the firms, and the levels o f organizational 
autonomy given to the acquired firm. It considers the combinations created by varying 
levels o f strategic interdependence with the varying levels o f  organizational autonomy 
needed to preserve the core capabilities embedded in the cultural environment o f  the 
acquired entity, and prescribes three possible integration approaches. From a modeling
15
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point o f view, the framework suggested can be condensed into one type of post­
acquisition decision-making variable (the type of organizational integration) and two 
explanatory constructs based on the pre-acquisition characteristics o f  the two firms 
(degree o f strategic fit and degree o f organizational fit). Importantly, the framework 
includes the quality o f the acquired firm’s resources and the (absolute and relative) 
transaction size as relevant factors.
Large-scale empirical analyses o f post-acquisition decisions are rare. Datta and 
Grant (1990) found a significant correlation between the degree o f resource relatedness 
and the level of integration. They also found a partial moderating role o f relatedness 
between integration and acquisition performance: in unrelated acquisitions, the level of 
integration hurt acquisition performance, but the impact was not statistically significant in 
related transactions. Pablo (1994) examined the contextual and organizational 
explanations of the decision about the level o f integration between the firms involved in 
an acquisition. She used a set o f  scenarios that varied along the dimensions o f strategic 
fit, organizational disruption potential, buyer’s multiculturalism, goal conflicts, and 
power differentials, and evaluated their effect on the degree to which the acquiring firm 
would integrate the target. Also. Pablo, Sitkin, and Jemison (1996) advanced the notion 
of the acquirer’s attitude toward risk to explain several types of acquisition-related 
decisions, including the level o f  post-acquisition integration.
The degree to which the two organizations involved in the acquisition process are 
integrated is only one of the dimensions of the post-acquisition management process that 
can be relevant in explaining the overall performance of the transaction. A high level of 
integration between the two firms can be achieved in several ways. For example, the
16
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acquiring firm can decide to retain key resources of the acquired firm and try to align 
resource use across the two organizations through a consensus-building process. 
Conversely, it can decide to substitute or dismiss part o f the acquired firm’s pre-existing 
resources (human or physical) to accomplish a faster, unambiguous, and eventually more 
effective level o f  integration.
One variable that has received some degree o f attention in the literature as a way 
to approximate the use of consensus building is the degree of replacement o f the top 
management team of the acquired firm. The “market for corporate control” theory, for 
example, suggests that inefficient management teams will be replaced by more competent 
ones in a market where teams compete for the control of productive assets (Manne, 1965; 
Singh, 1975; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The strategic management literature often 
contrasts that view to one in which the top managers of the acquired entity might own 
firm-specific and uniquely valuable talents and skills; the disruption o f those “managerial 
rents” (Castanias and Helfat, 1991) could significantly harm the performance of the 
acquisition process. Empirically, Cannella and Hambrick (1993) showed that the 
departure o f managers from the target firm has a negative impact on acquisition 
performance, and that the co-optation of the target’s managers in the acquirer’s 
organization might help achieve better results. Krishnan’ Miller and Judge (1997) 
reached similar conclusions, adding that the degree of complementarity between the two 
top management teams positively influences performance and should therefore be 
protected, when possible.
Although that the degree o f substitution of the target firm’s top management team 
appears to be important in our understanding of M&A performance, theoretical and
17
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empirical work to explain the drivers o f  the substitution decision is still at an embryonic 
stage. In Cannella and Hambrick’s (1993) study, for instance, the issue was not explicitly 
addressed: interestingly, however, neither the degree o f resource relatedness nor the 
target’s pre-acquisition performance (objectively measured as an ROE ratio) correlated 
with the degree o f executive departure (p. 147; Table 2). In the only studies specifically 
dedicated to explanation of the replacement decision, Walsh (1989) and Walsh and 
Ellwood (1991) found explanations o f turnover based on characteristics of the negotiation 
process and, interestingly, on the pre-acquisition profitability o f the acquirer, but none 
based on the target’s pre-acquisition performance. That almost anecdotal evidence about 
the importance o f the characteristics o f the acquiring firm foreshadows some o f the 
premises o f the present work, which also focuses on the acquirer’s attributes and how 
they influence the post-acquisition management process.
The notion of resource deployment, which is used in the most recent treatments of 
acquisitions by strategy scholars (Anand & Singh, 1997; Capron et al., 1997), is related to 
the resource substitution construct. Yet it is arguably less precise in that it is generally 
confounded with the decision about the level of integration. Resources can be deployed 
at low levels of integration, such as the transfer of key personnel in a LBO transaction 
completed by specialized financial acquirers. In contrast, they can be retained by both 
organizations in a higher level o f  integration mode whereby same resources are simply 
used in a similar and coordinated way.
Shanley (1994) provided the first empirical work in which the complexity o f the 
post-acquisition decision-making process was examined in many o f its numerous aspects. 
The study of 51 large acquisitions factor analyzed 16 types o f decisions, reducing them to
18
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four broad categories, and found that they had different antecedents and, most 
importantly, different performance consequences. Interestingly, the factor including the 
replacement of the CEO and the turnover o f the top management team was related 
negatively to performance, whereas operational changes in the structure, control, and 
compensation systems o f the acquired firm were associated with improved post­
acquisition performance. Shanley (1994) also found a significant and positive 
performance effect o f  the acquirer’s acquisition experience on performance. No 
elaboration was offered on the knowledge mechanisms underlying the learning process or 
on the type of acquisition experience accumulated, but the result is at least suggestive of 
the possibility of organizational learning effects even in the context o f acquisitions.
19
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3. THEORY BUILDING
This chapter proposes to provide a theoretical answer to some o f the issues raised 
in the preceding discussion of the literature on organizational capabilities. The objective 
is first to offer some definitional support for the notion o f organizational capabilities, 
then to introduce the knowledge-based mechanisms that might help explain the creation 
o f those capabilities. Finally, the chapter explores how such mechanisms might operate 
in contexts where the task to be mastered occurs with low and generally unpredictable 
frequency and with high levels o f interdependence between numerous simultaneous 
tasks.
3.1 The Object of Study: Organizational Capabilities
Scholars have conceptualized organizational capabilities (or competencies) in 
several ways (see section 2 .1). The approach that views them as deriving from an act o f  
recombination (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) or of modular construction 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990, Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) o f 
current knowledge is an important element of the theory o f organizational capabilities. 
Other researchers have introduced additional elements inspired by search behaviors 
(March & Simon, 1958), such as the process by which firms fine-tune current routines by 
using knowledge accumulated from past experiences and feedback mechanisms (Winter,
20
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1987; Cohen et al. 1996, i.e. “local search”), or the more radical reconfigurations o f 
resources and routines (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Teece, Pisano & Schuen, 1997).
In an effort to balance the trade-off between simplicity and thoroughness, two
elements can be singled out that seem essential for conceiving o f the formation o f
organizational capabilities. Firms have to: (1) accumulate knowledge from direct
experiences related to the task in question and (2) rationalize, or make sense, o f  the
accumulated knowledge, thereby transforming the raw data into actionable information
(“know-how”) or, at an even higher level of abstraction, into awareness of causal
relationships (“know-why”). The following definition is therefore proposed:
Definition 1. An organizational capability is the outcome o f  a process o f accumulation 
and rationalization o f  knowledge derivedfrom past experiences.
Any reference to performance, either at the firm or at the task level, is purposely 
excluded from the definition to avoid the well-known tautology of defining a capability 
as an improvement in performance. The definition is centered on knowledge-based 
phenomena, which hypothetically correlate with improved quality in process and 
organizational outcomes, but that association is neither necessary to the definition nor 
required for theorizing on how firms build their stock of competencies. Several 
convincing arguments have been made about the possible negative performance 
consequences o f capability building. They include superstitious (Levitt & March, 1988) 
and myopic (Levinthal & March, 1993) learning, as well as negative transfer effects o f 
lessons learned in one context to a different one (Cormier & Hagman, 1987; Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994; Haleblian, 1997).
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The definition also excludes any form o f vicarious learning, be it imitative o f 
competitors or acquired through external experts (consultants, etc.)- Far from doubting 
the existence o f mimetic behavior, however, the formulation is based on the observation 
that the complexity o f an organizational capability cannot be accessed “as is” outside the 
organizational boundaries, but has to be nurtured and developed through direct 
experience. Although firms might try to copy the practices o f  competitors perceived as 
superior performers, the “import” o f such ideas will not translate into an organizational 
capability unless it is supported by both direct experience and cognitive efforts directed 
toward the adaptation, integration, and fine-tuning o f  the new practice within the set o f 
current routines.
With respect to Teece et al.’s (1997) definition, the focus is restricted to the 
learning (i.e., the “dynamic”) element, leaving the static and transformational elements 
out o f the analysis and the scope of the study.
The notion of knowledge accumulation is derived from decades of research on 
learning curves and organizational learning processes; here, however, knowledge 
accumulation refers specifically to the tacit absorption o f wisdom provided by the simple 
exposure to several relatively similar events. The relevance o f the construct is based on 
Polanyi’s (1962, 1966) work, which shows how human beings know much more than 
they are able to articulate and explain.
... knowledge is deeply ingrained in patterns o f behavior which are difficult to articulate 
(and therefore to teach or transfer) even by the people who are depository and habitual 
users o f that knowledge [Polanyi, 1962].
Examples at the individual level abound. We cannot gain much skill in driving a
car, touch-typing, or playing tennis by consulting manuals, books or experts’; direct
22
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experience is essential. Similarly, an organization or group develops a high level o f  task 
comprehension and implementation deftness (McGrath, MacMillan, Venkataraman,
1995) without being aware o f it or explicitly mentioning or codifying it.
The other key notion, rationalization, incorporates and builds on the tradition of 
sense-making (Weick, 1979) as a necessary (albeit not sufficient) prerequisite for the 
creation o f competence. It is also somewhat related to the notion o f a capability as a 
recombination of existing knowledge. Here, however, the scope o f the construct is 
limited to the cognitive part; only explicit efforts to understand the causal mechanisms 
behind the correct or improved execution o f  a  certain task are considered. Examples 
include a group of individuals tackling an unresolved issue, brainstorming on the 
complex performance outcome o f a recently completed task, or drafting a new procedure 
to simplify the future executions o f a certain task.
The primary goal o f definition 1 is to disentangle the “semi-automatic” 
knowledge accumulation mechanism from the cognitive effort o f  reflecting on and 
analyzing accumulated experience to generate higher levels o f understanding of a certain 
task or phenomenon. In that sense, organizational capabilities differ from routines 
because they contain the cognitive element, and differ from the standard notions of 
problem-solving or strategy-making activities because they can also be developed 
without an explicit cognitive effort. The extent to which the two elements o f definition 1 
vary in their relative impact on the creation o f a new capability is the subject o f the rest o f 
this chapter.
One final point about definition 1 is worth noting. By defining a capability on the 
basis o f  simple knowledge accumulation and rationalization mechanisms, one can avoid
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function-specific lingo (i.e., “modular” capabilities) and generalize from well-studied 
manufacturing or innovative processes to a more “holistic” concept o f  organizational 
capability, which includes both administrative and productive knowledge.
3.2 Knowledge Accumulation and Knowledge Codification
Definition 1 requires that we evaluate how knowledge accumulates in a firm, and 
how it is “rationalized” by the individuals or groups operating on a certain task. Note the 
fundamental difference between Arrow’s (1962b, 1974) notion of information as a 
costless, transferable, and usable public good and the type o f organizational knowledge 
examined here, which emphasizes the understanding of how highly complex and 
heterogeneous organizational processes should be carried forward in a timely, cost- 
effective, and precise way. Such knowledge is difficult to observe and assess even for its 
holder (Polanyi, 1962; Rogers, 1980), is “sticky” (Szulanski, 1993 and 1997), is highly 
system-dependent (Winter, 1987), and is only partially codifiable (Kogut & Zander, 1992 
and 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995). Consequently, far from being a free good with no 
potential for value creation, organizational knowledge might be the cornerstone o f firms' 
ability to create and sustain competitive advantage.
Critical to our understanding of knowledge accumulation is the notion o f “path
dependence,” which describes the strength o f the causal relationship between the state of
a certain system at time t and the state o f the same system at time t -1 . The relationship is
much more complex in a real organizational environment, where the actions and
decisions performed at any time are the result o f  a mix o f several factors, such as: (1) the
replication o f stable patterns o f behavior, (2) the development of new ones along a
relatively well-known trajectory, and (3) the introduction of radically new elements or
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patterns o f action (internally driven or imported from the external environment) resulting 
from creative or problem-solving efforts. According to evolutionary economics, the last 
type of event is much more rare than generally assumed by management scholars.
The vast majority o f  what happens within an organization can be explained by either 
habitual execution o f  well-known routines or by routinized impulse reactions to 
recognized stimuli. The space o f  will-driven behavior, such as strategy-making or 
strategic reorientation, is much more limited than most management scholars tend to 
assume [Winter, 1987; p. 163].
The assumption that past activities and decisions have a great influence on present
ones is at the foundation o f the behavioral theory o f the firm (March & Simon, 1958;
Cyert & March, 1963). It is driven by the generally accepted conditions o f bounded
rationality on the part o f  decision-makers, which imply a primarily local character for
organizational search behavior. Hence, organizational knowledge can be assumed to
accumulate through relatively small, marginal additions to the current stock of
knowledge, and is most likely to be produced along a determined evolutionary trajectory
(Dosi, 1982). It is important to distinguish between the replication o f known processes
which establishes and maintains organizational routines (process routinization), and the
patterns of local search along one trajectory (path-dependent or constrained evolution).
The important characteristic that both have in common, however, is a relatively low level
o f cognitive effort; actors learn without realizing that they are doing so. The main
prerequisites for tacit knowledge accumulation are continuity o f use o f the task and
stability of the personnel who tacitly accumulate the expertise.
The following formal definition is proposed.
Definition 2. Process routinization is the degree to which knowledge from previous 
experiences accumulates in tacit forms (i.e. in the minds o f  human actors) and results in 
quasi-automatic, uniform, response behavior to varied stimuli.
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According to definition 1, the other precursor o f organizational capabilities is the 
explicit codification o f the wisdom extracted from previous experiences into ad-hoc tools. 
Such tools can take the form o f manuals, blueprints, computer models, guidelines, and 
other means of describing what to do in a certain situation (“know-what”). If sufficiently 
evolved, the tools might also provide a description of how to do it (“know-how”) and 
eventually o f why it makes sense to do it that way (“know why,” Seely Brown & Duguid, 
1991). Codified tools are generally available to multiple individuals and therefore 
facilitate the diffusion (and, in part, the imitation) of accumulated knowledge (Kogut & 
Zander 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Zander & Kogut, 1995).
For our purposes, the salient characteristics of codified knowledge are in the use 
and the diffusion o f its outputs, but in the process through which the outputs are created, 
that is, the time and effort invested in analyzing the firm’s past experiences, abstracting to 
some stable causal relationships, and incorporating the new wisdom in newly created or 
updated tools. Thus, codification not only serves as a reference for learning, reviewing, 
and spot-checking the execution o f a certain task, but also facilitates the creation o f 
organizational capabilities, as the codification process itself increases the level o f 
awareness of the cause-effect relationships, thereby promoting the emergence of 
solutions and the improvement o f collective competence.
The following definition is proposed.
Definition 3. Knowledge codification is the degree to which the accumulated experience 
is analyzed, abstracted, and incorporated in check-lists, manuals, blueprints, computer 
programs, etc., that provide the content ( “know-what"), the methodology ( “know-how ”), 
and eventually the rationale ( “know-why") for the execution o f a certain task.
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Process routinization and knowledge codification are clearly not orthogonal constructs, 
and some degree of correlation can be expected between the two. It is difficult to 
conceive o f an organization in which only one o f  the two mechanisms is active.
However, the two mechanisms are separable in their distinctive loci o f accumulation o f 
knowledge (human brain in one case, paper or electronic files in the other). Studying 
them on that basis seems to be correct from a theoretical point of view, and might be 
particularly useful for the normative aspects o f  the theory on the creation and evolution o f 
organizational capabilities.
The well-known dichotomy o f tacit versus explicit forms of knowledge can be 
used to theorize on the mechanisms that might underlie the accumulation of knowledge 
and the creation o f specific capabilities inside an organization. Given a certain degree of 
tacitness or (vice-versa) of codifiability o f the knowledge as the basis o f a certain 
process, one should not expect the actual degree o f codification applied by all the firms 
using the process to be uniform. Nor should one assume that all the firms will codify the 
process to the maximum extent allowed by the nature of the underlying knowledge. One 
possible contribution of the present work is the demonstration that the degree of actual 
codification o f a process under study depends on both the intrinsic characteristics 01  the 
process (i.e., its “codifiability”) (Winter, 1987; Kogut & Zander, 1992) and the deliberate 
cognitive efforts o f  firms.
The preceding arguments can be viewed as an effort to expand the traditional 
evolutionary economics discourse by partially integrating the cognitive elements 
necessary for a more thorough understanding o f how certain organizations become more
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or less proficient than others at certain tasks. Gavetti and Levinthal’s (1997) simulation 
work on cognition in rugged landscapes can be viewed as promoting a similar set of 
arguments if  the cognitive effort to simplify the dimensional space o f a complex (highly 
interdependent) multi-dimensional environment is interpreted in the creation and 
development of codified tools such as manuals, blueprints, and internal reports.
3.3 Organizational Learning Through Infrequent and Heterogeneous 
Events
Two fundamental and often implicit assumptions made in both the organizational 
learning and the evolutionary economics literature are that the task (1) can be 
experienced with sufficiently high frequency and (2) presents itself in sufficiently 
comparable ways that knowledge accumulated from previous experiences can be 
transferred to the present execution in a fairly easy and semi-automatic way. At the core 
of this work is the theorization of what might happen when those assumptions are 
relaxed.
Fig. 3.1 maps the most important organizational learning mechanisms onto the 
two dimensions of interest: task frequency and comparability/
3 Frequency is defined conventionally as number o f events within a unit o f  time (e.g., one year in contexts 
such as acquisitions). Comparability is defined as the degree o f  similarity with which the task presents 
itself each time; in exploratory tasks, comparability is by definition low.
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Fig. 3.1 O rgan iza t iona l  Learning 
M echan ism s
H e te ro g e n e o u s T ria l & 
E rro rP ilo tin g
C O M P A R A B I L I T Y
V ic a rio u s
L ea rn in g -b y -d o in
H o m o g e n e o u s
L o w High
F R E Q U E N C Y
Different forms o f vicarious learning are present in possibly every combination o f 
task frequency and complexity levels. A firm can decide at any moment to solicit the 
help and advice o f some specialized consulting agency or to imitate some type o f best 
practice developed by a successful competitor. Until such action translates into first-hand 
experience that leads to the accumulation of internally generated (and embedded) 
knowledge, it will be difficult to assume that the organization has been able to develop 
any capability or internalize any best practice. As defined and assumed in definition 1, 
an organizational capability can be developed only through the accumulation and 
rationalization of direct experience.
Trial and error mechanisms typically are used in exploratory learning contexts 
where highly frequent events can be experienced at relatively low cost per event (e.g., 
search for new chemical compounds). Such learning mechanisms are not feasible, 
however, when the costs attached to the “errors” are particularly high (e.g., unsuccessful
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acquisitions, joint ventures, or reorganization processes) and the availability of the 
“trials” is low.
Learning by doing is probably the most highly studied mechanism in both 
theoretical and empirical work. However, it is also the mechanism that depends most on 
the two assumptions o f high frequency and comparability o f  the experienced events. We 
currently do not know how it performs once the two assumptions are relaxed.
When an unfamiliar task is relatively complex and highly expensive, a more 
efficient way to accumulate knowledge is by execution o f  a pilot project or in-depth 
analysis o f a prototypical event before (March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991) the commitment 
is scaled up. Such arrangements seem to be able to combine the tacit knowledge 
accumulation component necessary in even such a rare (i.e., unique) experience, and the 
cognitive activity necessary to analyze and extract all possible experiential value from 
that one event.
The last mechanism seems to be the most likely candidate for explaining the 
mechanics o f organizational learning in the context considered here. To build 
competencies under these “extreme” conditions, firms might have to rely more on the 
cognitive rationalization mechanism and less on tacit knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms. The difference in the effectiveness o f the two knowledge-based 
mechanisms is a matter o f degree, as both co-exist within the firm at any point in time. 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the intuition:
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Fig. 3.2 - Task Frequency and Learning 
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At high frequency levels, we witness the world Nelson and Winter (1982) 
described. In it, capabilities are created mainly through tacit knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms, and codified knowledge is either non-influential, because operators do not 
use the manuals or other codified supports and prefer to rely on their own experience, or 
counterproductive, as it might inhibit attempts to adapt the procedures to new 
requirements that have emerged through simple practice and performance feedback 
loops.
At low frequency levels, however, the relationship between the two mechanisms
could be inverted with respect to their relative ability to facilitate learning and create
organizational capabilities. The rationale for this advantage of codification processes
over tacit knowledge accumulation can be argued on three grounds. First, tacit
knowledge accumulation cannot account for the problem o f transferring past experience
to domains characterized by superficially similar but essentially different conditions; only
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a deliberate cognitive effort to extract the generalizable causal relationships between 
conditions and performance can avoid that frequent mistake. Some very recent 
contributions (Haleblian, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1997) show that negative 
transfer effects can significantly impact the performance o f rare and heterogeneous 
events, such as corporate acquisitions. The second acquisition experience leads to a 
systematically worse performance than the first one if  it is inherently different (e.g., a 
different degree of resource relatedness).
Second, many authors (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1993; Iansiti,
1995) have concluded that relying on tacit knowledge accumulation can be very risky in 
turbulent environments. When low frequency and high task heterogeneity create high 
barriers to knowledge accumulation, the context can be likened to a highly turbulent 
environment in which the usefulness of past experiences is significantly reduced. Again, 
an explicit effort directed toward in-depth analysis o f the few available experiences, and 
the consequent appreciation of some of the action-performance relationships, might result 
in an improved way to handle the complexities o f  infrequent and diverse tasks.
Third, in the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997 both strategic choice 
and competitive advantage are explained by the allocation of managerial attention among 
a large number o f potential priorities. Knowledge codification can be a strategic variable, 
as it depends partially on the willingness o f the firm to invest time and effort (i.e. 
attention) to extract the most valuable lessons from its previous experiences, and 
therefore can lead to higher process and organizational performance.
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4. MODELS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
This chapter presents the formal treatment o f the arguments advanced above, and 
the submission o f testable hypotheses derived from the received literature and from the 
preceding theoretical. The structure o f the chapter is based on the nested nature o f the 
dependent variables analyzed. As Figure 4.1 shows, the factors that explain the key 
decisions being made in a post-acquisition integration scenario will be modeled and 
tested first. Then the factors explaining the decisions and the decisions themselves can 
be used to study the variation in the performance of the post-acquisition integration 
process and of the overall transaction. Finally, the analysis steps up from the process 
level to the firm level to determine what impact the factors studied have on the long-term 
performance of the acquiring firm.
F i g .  4 . 1  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  A n a l y s i s
F i r m P e r f o r m a n c e
P o s t  - A c q u i s i t i o n  P e r f o r m a n c e
P o s t  - A c q u i s i t i o n
D e c i s i o n s
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To introduce the theoretical perspective used and the characteristics o f the 
empirical context to which it is applied, Figure 4.2 illustrates the post-acquisition 
integration process in terms o f some fundamental evolutionary mechanisms.4
Fig. 4.2 - An Evolutionary View o f the 
Post-Acquisition Integration Process
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The core insight consists in applying evolutionary reasoning, traditionally 
developed to analyze changes at the industry or, at best, the firm level, to an intra- 
organizational dimension consisting of a specific process (see also Burgelman, 1991). 
Post-acquisition integration can be then viewed as a process initialized and shaped by a 
set o f pre-acquisition activities (screening, evaluation, and negotiation, primarily). Those 
activities act as a variation mechanism to produce the two pools o f resources and routines 
(“quasi-genetical traits” in Winter, 1995) that constitute the two firms signing the
4 Zollo (1996) provides a more detailed account o f the theoretical underpinnings of this interpretation.
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agreement to purchase or to merge. The two pools o f organizational resources and 
routines are then subject to a selection process aimed at deciding which ones are to be 
kept within the future (integrated) organization and which are to be disposed of. A subset 
of the resources and routines retained by the selection mechanisms is then subject to 
replication mechanism that describes the transferred or shared across the two 
organizations in an effort to replicate them as precisely as possible in the recipient.
Finally, the organizational traits that have been replicated across the old organizational 
boundaries are subject to a retention process which, if all goes well, allows them to be 
thoroughly absorbed into the new organizational context. Each evolutionary mechanism 
obviously is fraught with specific complexities and risks (see Szulanski, 1993 for a sound 
treatment of the retention problem, for example). The present study, which begins 
modeling part o f this comprehensive framework, only considers a subset o f them.
The following Section 4.1 will address the theoretical issues pertaining to two 
important elements o f the selection mechanism described above. Section 4.2 takes then a 
broader perspective in addressing the performance of the entire process using, as 
explanatory variables, elements of the variation and selection mechanisms described 
above, in conjunction with the administrative capability to manage the replication and 
retention challenges.
4.1 Modeling Post-acquisition Decisions
The post-acquisition management literature shows the importance o f decisions
about both the level o f integration and the degree of replacement o f key resources
(including, but not limited to, the top management team) for understanding acquisition
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processes and performance. The study of the determinants o f those decisions, however, 
remains at an embryonic stage. The focus here is therefore on those two dimensions o f 
the decision-making process that takes place immediately after the completion o f  the 
transaction. Several other dimensions o f the post-acquisition integration process, such as 
the timing o f the implementation steps or the extent to which the target company is 
involved in the formulation o f the integration plan, could be important elements in our 
understanding o f that complex process. In addition to considerations o f parsimonious 
modeling though, the two constructs have been chosen also because they are likely to 
correlate strongly with the excluded dimensions o f  the integration process. For example, 
a high-speed implementation approach might correlate with the decision to attain a high 
level of resource replacement, whereas high involvement o f the acquired entity implies a 
low level o f resource replacement. Focusing on the decisions about the degree o f 
integration o f the two firms and the replacement o f current resources may capture at least 
part of the explanatory power o f important non-included decisions.
The two variables studied are defined as follows.
Definition 4. Level o f  integration is the degree to which processes are linked (connected 
in terms o f logistics or information flows), aligned (changed to make them similar), or 
centralized across the two organizations.
Definition 5. Level o f  replacement is the degree to which pre-existing processes and 
resources in either one o f  the two organizations involved are maintained intact, rather 
than substituted or eliminated.
The definition integration level builds on Thompson’s (1967) taxonomy o f the
mechanisms for achieving organizational integration, and argues for the existence o f a
continuum encompassing the three constructs o f organizational linkage, alignment, and
centralization. The degree to which each function o f the two organizations is integrated
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places the specific acquisition on the continuum between complete independence and 
centralization.
The degree o f resource replacement follows a similar logic, but begs two 
questions: (1) Has that particular resource been substituted or disposed o f?  (2) Has that 
particular process or organizational routine been discontinued or replaced with another 
transferred from the other organization ? Again, the combination o f the replacement 
decisions in each function o f  the merging firms determines a general degree of 
replacement o f current resources implemented in a specific acquisition.
Clearly, the two key decisions are not completely independent o f each other. 
Process centralization, for example, which can be considered the highest form of 
integration, also implies a certain degree o f resource substitution and disposition. Still, 
examples of acquisitions with both high levels o f  replacement and low levels of 
integration (e.g. restructuring-driven acquisitions of failed savings and loans associations) 
and high levels of integration with low levels o f  resource replacement (e.g. consensus- 
based integration approaches such as Banc One’s) have been frequently observed. The 
two dimensions, therefore, seem to be good indicators o f the type o f post-acquisition 
integration strategy adopted by the acquiring firm. A post-acquisition integration strategy 
can be defined as a vector o f decisions necessary to accomplish the value creation 
objectives during the integration process. Hence, a simple dichotomization of the two 
decisional dimensions generates a 2 x 2 matrix that identifies four strategic approaches to 
the integration process, as shown in Figure 4.3.
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Fig. 4.3 - Post-Acquisition Decisions
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The four labels used to describe the strategic approaches defined by the matrix 
synthesize the result o f the combination o f the two decisions. The “preservation” 
approach is characterized by a large degree o f autonomy left to the acquired firm and by 
limited attempts to change the current set o f  resources and processes. The “restructuring” 
approach entails greater use o f the replacement lever to achieve the value creation 
objectives. The restructuring strategy is exemplified by acquisitions completed by 
financial buyers (e.g. Hanson Pic.), or by acquisitions when the poor profitability of the 
acquired firm demands a heavy emphasis on the success of the turnaround process before 
the acquiring firm can consider any integration o f the two organizations. At higher levels 
of integration, the acquirer has the choice o f pursuing a consensus-based approach, 
labeled “convergence,” whereby the two pools o f resources are substantially retained and 
guided toward an aligned use through similar processes across the two organizations.
The alternative for the acquiring firm is to couple high integration with high replacement
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through a “replication” strategy where, typically, its own processes are transferred and 
replicated within the acquired organization.
The preceding discussion simply describes a  portfolio o f  integration approaches 
available for the acquirer. With respect to Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) prescriptive 
framework, then, it does not imply any causal relationship between pre-acquisition 
resource conditions and post-acquisition decisions, or between decisions and 
performance. The objective is to show how, through the use o f  the two dimensions of 
choice, a set o f integration scenarios can be generated that covers a good portion o f the 
strategic options available to an acquiring firm.
Let us now turn to the formal modeling of the two post-acquisition decisions.
4.1.1 The Level of Integration
As observed in section 2.3, the degree of resource relatedness between the two 
organizations is expected to be positively associated with the level o f integration. Value 
creation from economies o f scale and scope can take place only under the condition that 
at least a certain level o f integration between the two firms is achieved. For instance, 
staff functions have to be centralized, management information systems have to be 
converted, and the geographic location o f  facilities, salesforce, and distribution channels 
has to be rationalized.
Another characteristic o f  the pre-acquisition resource endowment o f the two firms
that might influence the level o f  integration pursued is the overall quality of the resources
purchased with the transaction. Two opposing effects can be hypothesized. Resource-
based arguments imply a positive impact of resource quality on the level o f integration:
the higher the quality o f the acquired resources, the greater the incentive to integrate them
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into the acquiring organization so that their value creation potential can be leveraged over
the combined entity. However, the integration process is fraught with complexities that
might actually endanger the persistence o f those resources. Hence, the higher the quality,
the lower the probability that the acquiring firm will risk a high-integration decision,
opting instead for a relatively high degree o f autonomy (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
The theoretical perspective taken in this study favors the latter argument, as it assumes
the acquirer recognizes the potential for the integration process to disrupt high-quality
routines in the acquired organization.
These arguments can be expressed more formally with the following hypotheses.
HI Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f  relatedness between the acquirer 
and the target, the higher the level o f  integration.
H2 Resource Quality: The higher the quality o f  pre-acquisition resources in the 
acquiredfirm, the lower the level o f  integration
In addition to the resource-based explanations, however, the capability approach 
advanced in Chapter 3 suggests a role for the degree o f  routinization and of knowledge 
codification achieved by the acquirer in the management o f the integration process. The 
arguments in support to that claim follow.
High levels o f integration (and of replacement) create correspondingly high 
disruption in the routines and structures o f the organizations involved, and therefore 
should be associated with greater complexity in the post-acquisition phase (Amburgey, 
Kelly, and Bamett, 1993; Haveman, 1992 and 1993). Such type of complexity might be 
labeled “structural”, as it depends upon the existence and strength of barriers to changes 
in organizational structures.
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High levels o f integration also imply a large number o f highly interdependent
decision processes, as more parts and functions of the organizations become involved.
Additional data must be gathered and processed to ensure informed decisions, and more
frequent and time-consuming political interaction is necessary to arrive at the required set
o f decisions. Such complexity might be labeled “decisional”, as it depends upon the
cognitive barriers to the effective completion o f interdependent decision processes.
The structural and cognitive challenges to successful integration can be addressed
through the creation o f an organizational capability that specializes in the management of
those types o f processes. According to the theory developed in Chapter 3, such capability
is created and evolves through two main mechanisms. One leverage the tacit
accumulation of knowledge from past experiences, which translates into path-dependent
and routinized decision-making behavior, and the other relies on the explicit
rationalization of the possible cause-effect relationships between past actions and
performance outcomes, and on the consequent codification o f past experience into ad-hoc
tools. The more routinized and codified the acquirer’s practice is, then, the more likely
the acquirer will be to strive for higher levels of integration, as the degree of competence
and of confidence in its own ability to manage and neutralize the negative consequence of
higher integration levels, will be correspondingly high.
The preceding arguments can be expressed as formal hypotheses.
H3 Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f  codification o f  the integration
process, the higher the level o f  integration.
H4 Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f  routinization in the integration
process, the higher the level o f  integration.
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4.1.2 The Level of Replacement o f the Top Management Team
The decision about the level replacement o f the top management team is 
hypothesized to be a function of the resource characteristics o f the acquired organization 
and o f the degree of development o f a post-acquisition integration management capability 
at the acquiring organization. Specifically, the quality of the target’s current resources 
and routines is suggested to be related inversely to the level of replacement implemented 
by the acquirer. The rationale for tha* conjecture is consistent with basic principles of 
rational choice: the worse the performance feedback, the higher the likelihood o f an 
intervention that changes the elements on which the process operates (resources) and/or 
the process itself (routines). In the context o f prior M&A research, the hypothesis 
captures the essence o f the “market for corporate control” view o f such events, whereby 
acquisitions are believed to be a policing mechanism that can resolve, or at least reduce, 
agency problems due to imperfect incentive alignments between management and 
ownership o f the target firm.
Perhaps less obvious is the effect o f resource relatedness on the decision to 
replace the top management team o f the acquired firm. If we assume that the knowledge 
domain o f an organization is bounded by the cognitive capabilities o f its members, then 
the knowledge domains of the management teams in two highly related organizations are 
likely to be redundant. If the team o f the acquiring firm is, or believes itself to be, 
equally knowledgeable of the products and markets o f the acquired firm, it has a low 
incentive to retain the acquired team. The higher the degree o f relatedness, then, the 
higher the probability o f replacement o f the top management team.
More formally, the preceding discussion results in the following hypotheses:
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H5 Resource Quality: The better the quality o f  pre-acquisition resources in the
acquired organization, the lower the level o f replacement.
H6 Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f  resource relatedness between the 
two organizations, the higher the level o f  replacement.
In addition to those “baseline” resource-based explanations, other hypotheses for
the impacts of knowledge-based mechanisms can be derived from arguments similar to
those made for the level o f integration. In this case, though, the rationale for the impact
o f knowledge accumulation mechanisms depends primarily on the increasing ability,
provided by experiential learning, to manage the level o f conflict resulting from
disruptive change introduced in the organizations involved (structural complexity). The
decisional complexity argument advanced for the level o f integration model is somewhat
weaker, and might actually work against the hypothesis (i.e. integration strategies might
be simpler to implement through resource replacement than through consensus-building
processes). In particular, that possibility might attenuate the ability o f the codification
mechanism to reduce the complexity o f both the decision-making and the implementation
phases: in essence, an organization might not need to write many manuals and computer
models to more effectively lay off top managers. Comparatively speaking, then, one
might expect the tacit knowledge accumulation component o f the integration
management capability to have a stronger impact than the explicit one.
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses.
H7 Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f knowledge codification, the 
higher the level o f  replacement.
H8 Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f process routinization, the higher 
the level o f  replacement.
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4.2 Modeling Acquisition Performance
Equipped with the notion that integration decisions are a function o f both pre­
acquisition resources and the degree o f  development of an integration capability within 
the acquiring firm, we can now expand the analysis to consider the performance of the 
post-acquisition integration process.
Fig. 4.4 provides a summary representation o f the proposed theoretical 
framework. It comprises four classes o f variables:
1) Pre-acquisition resource characteristics that influence both post-acquisition decisions 
and performance.
2) Post-acquisition decisions that are both endogenously determined, as described in 
section 4.1, and precursors o f acquisition performance.
3) Knowledge accumulation mechanisms responsible for the creation o f an integration 
capability that are exogenously modeled to affect both post-acquisition decisions and 
performance.
4) The performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, as well as that o f the 
acquiring firm, endogenously determined as a function of all o f the three preceding 
factors.
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Fig. 4.4 - The Theoretical Framework
Pre-acq. Post-acq. Strategies
Resources + ^fc^Tntegratioir^ Performance
I i ClReplacemenT^j 
R e la te d n e ss  i * ^
Quality
Codification
ntegrauon 
Process
C^Routinizatioir^ ) 
Org. Knowledge
CScquIrm gx Firm J
The definition of acquisition performance is discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
which addresses methodological and operationalization issues. A working definition is 
based on the degree to which the post-acquisition integration process generates the 
expected levels of value creation in terms of cost rationalization and revenue 
enhancement for the combined entity.
4.2.1 Performance Effects o f Pre-acquisition Resources
The strategy literature on corporate diversification and resource relatedness has 
been unequivocally clear on the expected sign o f the impact of relatedness on acquisition 
performance. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the presence o f exploitable economies of scale 
and scope implies stronger performance in highly related acquisitions. Therefore,
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H9 Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f  resource similarity between the 
acquired and the acquiring organizations, the higher the expected level o f  
acquisition performance.
The M&A literature has been significantly less clear about the performance 
implications o f resource quality. Value can in fact be created, via different mechanisms, 
in instances o f both high quality and low quality resources within the acquired firm. In 
the case o f high quality resources, the combined entity benefits from the transfer o f 
superior routines or the sharing o f superior resources from within the acquired firm. That 
mechanism has been labeled “inverse learning” (Haspesiagh & Jemison, 1991), and is 
generally considered a strong challenge to the success of the integration process, as it 
requires a humble, realistic attitude on the part o f the acquirer to appreciate the benefits 
o f its learning from the target firm. In the case of low quality resources and routines 
within the acquired firm, the mechanism for creating value is the opposite, consisting o f 
both the redeployment o f internal resources and the replication o f routines present in the 
acquiring organization within the acquired one. Recent work shows that the resource 
redeployment effect is expected to be superior to the “inverse learning” one (Capron. 
Dussauge, &Mitchell. 1997). Therefore:
HIO Resource Quality: The higher the level ofpre-acquisition performance o f the 
acquiredfirm, relative to its competitors, the lower the expected level o f  
acquisition performance.
Both H9 and HIO indicate potential conditions for the creation of value from 
acquisitions in that they rely on mechanisms (economies o f scale/scope and resource 
redeployment) that are not triggered automatically by the completion of the acquisition. 
The potential for value creation to materialize from resource relatedness and resource
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quality is contingent upon a post-acquisition integration process that is (1) sufficiently 
precise in the selection o f resources and routines to be acted on and (2) effective in the 
implementation o f the transfer and replication processes. The former condition is based 
on the characteristics o f  the post-acquisition decision-making process (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), while the latter has to do with the development o f 
the particular type o f organizational capability studied here.
4.2.2 Performance Effects of Post-Acquisition Decisions
The effects o f levels o f  integration and replacement on acquisition performance 
are also influenced by conflicting considerations. On the one hand, organizational inertia 
arguments (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Haveman, 1992, 1993) imply that if  
high levels o f integration and/or replacement create high levels of short-term disruption 
in the routines and structures o f the organizations involved, they should be associated 
with low acquisition performance. In addition, high levels of integration and replacement 
may result in high levels o f  complexity in the decision-making processes, as more parts 
and functions of the organizations become involved, additional data must be gathered and 
processed, and more political maneuvering is necessary to develop the required set o f 
decisions. Finally, a high integration decision may necessitate high resource 
commitments (in financial and human terms) and high coordination costs during the 
implementation phase.
On the other hand, strong arguments support positive performance implications
for both decisions. The level o f  integration is the main channel through which economies
o f scale and scope can be manifested. Without alignment or concentration o f processes
across the two organizations, cost structures cannot be rationalized and revenue
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enhancement goals, such as cross-selling activities o f the two merging sales forces and
distribution networks, cannot materialize.
Similarly, the degree o f replacement o f  the top management team o f the acquired
firm is considered, according to agency theory (Manne, 1965; Jensen & Ruback, 1983),
to be a precondition for an acquisition event to deliver the expected performance. In an
extreme version o f  the argument, acquisitions are defined and studied as a policing
mechanism for replacing the target’s top management team and for redesigning and
realigning the incentive structure to reduce the impact o f  agency costs and to facilitate the
pursuit o f  cost efficiencies. The conclusion is that the replacement o f the top
management team will facilitate the achievement o f the acquisition goals, or at least that
the team’s retention might lower the likelihood that the acquiring firm can implement its
integration plans with sufficient speed and effectiveness.
The preceding arguments suggest competing hypotheses:
HI la  Level o f  Integration: Ceteris paribus, the higher the level o f  integration 
implemented, the lower the acquisition performance
HI lb Level o f  Integration: Ceteris paribus, the higher the level o f  integration 
implemented, the higher the acquisition performance
HI 2a Degree o f  Replacement: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree o f replacement o f  
the top management team, the lower the acquisition performance
HI 2b Degree o f  Replacement: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree o f replacement o f  
the top management team, the higher the acquisition performance
4.2.3 Performance Impact of Knowledge Mechanisms
The degree to which the acquiring firm has developed a post-acquisition 
integration capability should positively influence the performance outcome of the
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acquisition process both directly and indirectly. The direct impact can be understood 
with the use o f a simple microeconomic analysis that adapts a  transformation curve 
model to the problem o f maximizing overall acquisition performance through two value 
creation mechanisms: the achievement o f cost efficiencies and the enhancement of 
revenue generation capacity. That stylized problem is assumed to be subject to the 
constraint o f a capability building function (defined by the magnitude o f tacit and 
codified experience accumulated by the acquiring firm) which determines the boundaries 
to the effectiveness o f the two mechanisms, and the types o f trade-off between them. The 
reason for expecting a trade-off between cost efficiency and revenue enhancement for a 
given level o f integration is that during the downsizing process, the employees o f the 
acquired firm will spend more time searching for new employment than they will 
generating new business. In contrast, an approach based on creating value by achieving 
strong sales growth (through cross-selling, new product generation, multiple distribution 
channels, etc.) will require correspondingly strong investments in training, incentives, 
morale building and other initiatives, which will hinder the achievement o f cost 
efficiencies. One way to relax the constraint,5 and thus pursue a higher levels of both 
cost efficiency and revenue enhancement, is to develop a task-specific capability by 
accumulating and rationalizing past acquisition integration experiences. Fig. 4.5 provides 
a graphical representation o f that organizational learning process.
5 Under the stylized conditions defined above, organizational learning is actually the only way to relax the 
constraint imposed by the capability-building function.
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Further, the path-dependent nature o f the evolution o f organizational capabilities suggests 
that firms might tend to specialize in the pursuit o f one o f the two drivers for value 
creation. For instance, acquirers might see themselves as following a certain approach 
that prioritizes either cost efficiency or revenue enhancement as value creation 
mechanisms, and therefore might proceed for some time along a trajectory o f capability 
building based on that mechanism. Recent experience suggests that it is much easier for 
firms to learn how to achieve cost efficiencies (through downsizing, re-engineering, etc.) 
than it is for them to develop new avenues of revenue growth. Hence, as confirmed by 
field observations (reported in section 6.1), firms would develop their integration 
capability through an evolutionary pattern that first relies on the achievement o f cost 
efficiencies (the “low-hanging fruits”). Once the easier paths for value creation are fully 
exploited, the acquirer would develop its integration capability by prioritizing the 
creation of value through revenue enhancement (the “higher fruits”). Fig. 4.6 traces that 
evolutionary pattern.
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Fig. 4.6 - Evolution of a Post-Acquisition 
Integration Capability
Stage 3
Stage 2
Stage I
Cost Efficiency
The extent to which acquiring firms are capable of developing a post-acquisition 
integration capability yielding value creation advantages based on both mechanisms, 
rather than just one, can be considered a function of the strength o f the path dependence 
underlying the evolution o f the organizational capability.6 When the tie between current 
and past decision-making activity is strong, acquirers are more likely to pursue 
improvements along the same type o f value creation mechanisms, discounting the other 
tool as a lower priority or as an approach inconsistent with the firm’s integration 
“policy”. At the extreme, exceedingly strong path dependencies will not allow the firm 
to shift priorities and will impose the development of either a cost-efficiency- or a 
revenue-enhancement-driven integration capability. In such cases, one must consider two 
separate, mutually exclusive capabilities that organizations can develop through their 
knowledge accumulation and rationalization activities.
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Fig. 4.7 - Capability Building under Strong 
Path Dependence Assumptions
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So far, only the direct impact of knowledge accumulation and codification 
mechanisms on acquisition performance has been subject to theoretical scrutiny. 
Knowledge might also influence performance indirectly, however, by interacting with the 
types of post-acquisition integration decisions made by the acquiring firm. First, a more 
evolved integration capability, whether tacitly or explicitly accumulated, implies that the 
acquiring firm should be able to manage the integration process in a way that minimizes 
resistance to change (structural complexity) in both organizations. In addition, the degree 
of routinization of the post-acquisition integration process implies, almost by definition, a 
reduction in the level o f complexity of the decision-making process (decisional 
complexity). At the extreme, routinization means the avoidance of detailed decision­
making processes through the selection and execution o f the appropriate routine. The
6 Atkinson & Stiglitz (1969) applied a similar theoretical argument to technical change that is highly
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development o f  an integration capability, then, enhances the value creation potential o f  
the integration decisions by reducing their negative effects (structural and decisional 
complexity) and by allowing the positive ones (economies o f scale and scope, operational 
enhancements, etc.) to be fully exploited.
However, counter-arguments can be made about the capability-complexity effect on 
acquisition performance. First, acquirers with low levels o f expertise and routinization 
can use several alternative mechanisms to avoid or reduce the negative consequences o f  
high integration and replacement levels. They could rely on vicarious learning 
mechanisms, for example, by hiring management consultants, or they could increase the 
levels of control and reactivity to problematic situations by keeping senior managers 
involved throughout the implementation phase. In general, however, the degree o f 
complexity and the heterogeneity o f the task are so high that such mechanisms can hardly 
substitute for direct experience, especially if it is well documented and studied.
A second argument can be advanced against an entirely positive view o f 
capability building at high process complexity levels. What happens when complexity 
levels are kept low by design ? For example, what if  post-acquisition integration is 
maintained at a low level while the acquirer develops its highly codified and routinized 
integration practice ? At some point the integration process might become excessively 
codified and routinized, or “bureaucratic,” and the acquirer could incur diminishing 
returns to the further development o f its integration practice.
localized around the current knowledge domain.
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In terms o f  testable hypotheses, the preceding discussion can be reduced to the
theorization o f two groups o f performance effects. One group incorporates the direct
performance effect o f  the capability argument and leads to the following hypothesis:
HI 3 Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f  routinization o f  the post­
acquisition integration process, the higher the acquisition performance.
H14 Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f  codification o f  the post­
acquisition integration process, the higher the acquisition performance.
The other group can be represented by postulating an interaction effect between
the capability-building process and the degree of complexity o f the integration process.
The following hypothesis reflects both the upside and the downside potential of the
combination o f explanatory factors.
HIS Codification and Integration (interaction effect). The higher the level o f
codification in the context o f  a high level o f  integration, the higher the economic 
performance o f  the acquisition. However, the higher the level o f  codification in 
the context o f  a low level o f  integration, the lower the economic performance o f  
the acquisition.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASURES
This chapter describes the design used to test the models and hypotheses, the 
responses received from the institutions surveyed, the operationalization o f the key 
constructs, and a set o f  analyses related to construct validity issues.
5.1 Research Design
The study o f acquisitions in the commercial banking industry was carried out 
under the supervision o f  the Wharton Financial Institutions Center (WFIC) with the 
financial support of the Sloan Foundation. It was possibly the first large-scale analysis o f 
post-acquisition integration practices in any industry. Consequently, little empirical 
literature was available to guide the measurement efforts. Further, our desire to gain a 
grounded understanding o f the phenomenon under study produced a research design 
characterized by long fieldwork, which took about a year to complete and required the 
help of a group of nine banks (see Fig. 5.1 for the project timeline). Those institutions 
responded to an invitation made to 15 banks by the WFIC in July 1994. Their acquisition 
experience ranged from medium to very high, and their size ranged from $4.5 to over 200 
Billion. The nine banks were (in order o f size): Chase/Chemical, Bank One, PNC Bank, 
Norwest, First Fidelity, First Bank Systems, First Empire State, Old National, and 
Associated Bancorp. In the case o f Chemical and First Fidelity, the contact and meetings
took place when the banks were still independent, and the data gathering was completed
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after their mergers. Additional fieldwork was done with the collaboration of 
Nationsbank, First Union, Southern National/BB&T, and CoreStates. It included 
participant observation o f one systems conversion process at PNC Bank and o f top 
management decision-making processes during the integration o f a recent acquisition by 
Southern National/BB&T. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
individuals involved in various phases o f the acquisition process. The individuals 
responsible for coordinating the post-acquisition integration process were interviewed in 
all the cases when such function was created (6 out o f  13 cases). When this 
responsibility was not explicitly allocated, the interviews were conducted with the key 
M&A executive (four cases), the CFO (two cases), or the CEO (one case). The 
additional interviews were conducted with staff and line representatives who were 
involved, either on a project or on a stable basis, in specific parts of the post-acquisition 
integration process. In four institutions, interviews were done with at least one 
representative in each o f the key sub-processes: the integration of human resources, the 
conversion o f information systems, and the restructuring o f the retail-banking network.
The objective o f  the first part of the research was twofold:
1) To understand the mechanics o f the post-acquisition integration of a bank, including 
the options available for each decision or implementation problem, the possible 
indicators o f an organizational capability, and the performance metrics available.
2) To obtain expert assistance in the design, fine-tuning, and pre-testing o f the survey 
instrument. Because o f the novelty o f the effects explored, most of the survey had to 
be designed ex novo. General guidelines were obtained from the few survey-based
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studies reported in the post-acquisition literature (Datta & Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991, 
Shanley, 1994).
Fig. 5.1 - Project Timeline
1st W orkshop 
for Participants
Phase 2 
Survey 
Confirmatory 
Field Study
Phase I 
Survey
Exploratory 
Field Study
Sum m er Sum m er Summer 3/ 1 4 /1 9 9 7  Sum m er
1994 1995 1996 1997
The results o f  the fieldwork were in many ways surprising (see section 6.1 for a 
summary). The discussions proceeded from general conversations on value creation 
mechanisms and post-acquisition integration approaches, to in-depth probing of decision­
making and implementation issues, to the analysis o f  the large number of codified tools 
that some of the acquirers produce and regularly update. At some point, however, the 
knowledge accumulated from the questioning became redundant and the interaction 
shifted toward the survey-building exercise. That activity involved much more frequent 
contacts by telephone and fax with a group of five highly committed banks among the 
original nine. After most o f the Phase 1 data gathering (see below) was completed and 
preliminary results were elaborated, a round o f visits to the other four highly experienced 
acquirers was initiated. The purpose o f the second round was to validate the responses
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received and cross check the interpretations o f  the preliminary analyses (the confirmatory 
fieldwork in Fig. 5.1).
Finally, a mini-conference for all the participating banks was held on March 14, 
1997 to share the results o f  the bulk o f the analyses and to receive feedback on the final 
rounds of Phase 1 results.
The large-scale data gathering part o f  the study consisted o f the administration of 
a two-phase questionnaire survey o f the 250 largest bank holding companies in the 
United States. As in any survey-based research, a key challenge was the management of 
the trade-off between breadth and depth o f the observations gathered. It was not obvious 
how to build a data set that would have enough observations to ensure sufficient 
generalizability and statistical power, and would also provide the kind of measures 
needed to test the models. Out o f the four classes of variables in the theoretical 
framework (pre-acquisition resources, post-acquisition decisions, knowledge 
accumulation mechanisms, and post-acquisition performance), only the first (resource 
relatedness and quality) could be measured somewhat accurately with either secondary 
data or relatively well known survey scales. All other constructs, particularly the 
knowledge-based ones, had seldom, if ever, been assessed through a survey instrument, 
and an extensive effort was necessary to generate a sufficient number of alternative 
approximations.
The compromise solution was to design a two-phase survey. The first phase 
provided breadth of observations by sacrificing depth in the measurement o f  the key 
constructs. The second phase focused on a subset o f  the observations recorded with the
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first instrument, and provided a wealth o f measures that could ensure a check of the 
reliability and robustness of the results obtained with the large-scale data set.
Phase I- (Level o f  Analysis: The Acquiring Bank)
Every participant bank was asked to complete the following instruments:
•  One Acquisition History Profile, a spreadsheet-like list o f all the bank acquisitions 
completed since foundation, with basic information on each o f  them. The information 
included asset size, transaction price, name o f the coordinator o f the post-acquisition 
integration process, degree o f geographic overlap o f the two branch networks7, 
quality of the acquired institution, levels o f organizational integration and of 
replacement of the top management team, and qualitative assessments of the 
performance o f the information systems conversion, the human resources affiliation, 
and the overall integration process (see Exhibit A).
• One Acquiring Bank Questionnaire describing the characteristics of the acquisition 
process put in place by the acquiring institution. The characteristics included the 
degree and quality of knowledge codification, the division o f responsibilities for each 
stage of the process, the strategic priorities in implementing the integration, and some 
basic process and performance measures (see Exhibit B).
Phase2 (Level o f  Analysis: The Acquisition)
A sample of the acquisitions completed by the responding banks was selected from those 
included in the Acquisition History Profile. The selection was done by the author, in 
consultation with the key contact at the responding bank, according to criteria of 
feasibility of measures and o f representativeness o f the entire Acquisition History Profile
7 Whether the acquisition in considered “ in-market” or “out-market”, see also section 5.3.4
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in terms o f performance outcomes. In terms o f feasibility, acquisitions that were either 
too old (subject to institutional memory decay) or too new (not enough performance data 
were available) were discarded. To avoid performance biases in the sample, special care 
was taken to include one or two o f the best and one or two o f the worst acquisition 
experiences, as well as some “average performance” ones, as indicated on the 
respondent’s performance assessment recorded in the History Profile.
For each acquisition, the following questionnaires were completed:
•  One questionnaire (labeled “General Part”) to be completed by the coordinator o f the 
post-acquisition phase (eight pages, see Exhibit C);
•  Three Special Parts to be completed by one representative each from the retail 
banking division, the DP systems department, and the human resources department 
who was involved in the post-acquisition phase (five pages each)
The general structure of the questionnaires followed a logical progression. They 
started with a description o f some ex-ante characteristics of the acquired bank (often 
measured in comparison with similar features o f the acquirer) or characteristics specific 
to the transaction. They then gathered data about the type of actions executed by the 
acquirer (due diligence, planning, integration decisions, implementation, etc.), and ended 
with a set o f performance measures, which included process-specific quantitative and 
qualitative data, as well as subjective performance assessments.
The data gathering process required that the key contact person (1) identify the 
best available respondents for each o f the four questionnaires for each of the acquisitions 
analyzed, (2) distribute the questionnaires, explaining to each individual the objectives o f
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the exercise and the key criteria for its completion, and (3) solicit completion and return 
the completed questionnaires to the researcher.
Secondary data were also gathered and utilized for a variety o f purposes. A 
database of financial performance measures (mainly ROA, ROE and efficiency ratios) 
was built for the largest 330 bank holding companies between 1985 and 1996. It was the 
result o f search and cross-referencing work based on three different electronic databases 
(Compustat, Compact Disclosure, and Moody’s), and provided an accurate benchmark 
for the measurement o f relative performance data (see the section 5.3.1 on performance 
measurement). The database for the bank holding companies effectively represents the 
entire commercial banking industry; the remaining 700 institutions account for less than 
3% o f the industry assets and are not recorded in any o f the above mentioned public 
databases.
Also, an electronic M&A database (Datastar), that includes all the deals 
announced in the United States since 1985 was used. It helped in reconstructing the 
acquisition history of non-respondents and o f the entire industry. It was compared with 
several similar sources in both paper form (Mergerstat and M&A Handbook) and in 
electronic form (IDD database) and is considered to be the most reliable and thorough 
source of secondary data.
5.2 Sample Characteristics
O f the 250 bank holding companies invited, 70 did not have any acquisition
experience after 1985 and 16 were acquired during the invitation period. Fifty-one o f the
164 institutions that formed the relevant universe agreed to participate, for a 31.1%
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response rate and coverage o f 44.6% of the industry’s assets. The asset size o f the 
smallest invited institution was about $400 million, which implies very rare acquisition 
activity and very small transaction sizes (usually one or two branches). Further 
extensions o f the sample to smaller institutions were likely to have resulted in very few 
responses, because o f the scarcity of acquisitive events, and in significant loss o f 
comparability between the transactions analyzed.
The experience base o f the banks participating in the study ranged from very low 
(5 o f them have only one acquisition experience) to very high, with 10 o f the 12 largest 
and most active acquirers in the industry represented in the sample. The total number of 
acquisitions completed by the 51 banks was 577, a  sample large enough to ensure that 
routinization o f the acquisition process was possible at least for a subset of the firms. In 
relation to the original population o f the 250 largest institutions, the sample o f 
respondents was biased with respect to their asset size (participants were significantly 
larger than non-participants, p < .05). but the differences in the means o f ROA, ROE, and 
efficiency ratios are not statistically significant.
Great care was taken to single out the best available respondent in each 
participant organization, particularly for the Phase 1 survey. For the large banks, that 
was a difficult task, as roles and functions were often idiosyncratic to these firms’ 
internal organizational arrangements. In some cases, the survey completed by one 
individual (responsible, for example, for the M&A group) was double-checked by a peer 
colleague who had been involved in post-acquisition integration processes. The problem 
was compounded by the fact that the search for the best respondent was typically brought 
to a senior executive who, though generally intrigued by the research project, had a long
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list o f priorities to which he/she had to allocate scarce available time and attention. 
Nonetheless, Phase 1 documents were completed by highly competent individuals. 
Typically, the coordinator o f the post-acquisition integration processes (such a function 
was present in 14 of the firms surveyed) or the manager responsible for the corporate 
development unit or for the M&A group (26 cases) filled out the survey. In the smaller 
and less experienced organizations, the survey was completed by the CFO or controller 
(nine cases), or the CEO himself (three cases), who typically spearhead the M&A process 
when such events occur.
The price paid for the “tailored” survey approach, based on very frequent rounds 
o f telephone contacts to check on both the status (pre-) and on the quality (post-) of 
survey completion was correspondingly high. It took one year, from summer 1995 to 
summer 1996, to complete Phase 1 and another year to complete Phase 2. Also, the 
response rate for Phase 2 was significantly lower than that for Phase 1, as only 30 
institutions completed the much more intense and time-consuming exercise of gathering 
detailed data on several acquisitions from four different organizational functions.
Another explanation for this drop in participation is the long time frame necessary both to 
gather reliable and detailed data and to return the expected benefits (i.e. valuable insights 
about the post-acquisition process) to the participant organizations.
Other causes include the bank being acquired or becoming involved in a merger 
o f equals (three cases). In four other cases the Phase 1 contact left and there was no clear 
substitute who could coordinate the completion o f Phase 2. Another four banks are still 
declaring an interest in completing Phase 2, but have not yet delivered on their 
commitment.
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Table 5.1 summarizes the results of T-tests for differences in the means between 
the Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples computed on all the key variables. The analysis affords 
both a direct and an indirect test. First, it tests for the presence o f  biases between the two 
steps o f the research process. In addition, it can be interpreted as an indirect test o f the 
representativeness o f the entire industry, as banks declining to participate in Phase 2 may 
have been less interested in the study and therefore may be similar in profile to non­
respondents. As the table shows, the two samples are not statistically different on any of 
the dimensions.
Table 5.1 - Tests for mean differences among Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples
Variable Phase 1 
sample
Phase 2 
Sample
T statistic 
(equal variance)
T statistic (non- 
equal variance)
ROA 1996 -.0098 -.0367 -.324 -.277
ROA change 87-96 .0675 -.0761 -.912 -.735
ROA average 85-96 .0378 -.0034 -.571 -.533
ROA ch. 2 yrs after acq vs. I yr before -.0257 -.0570 -.321 -.294
ROA ch. 3 yrs after acq vs. 1 yr before -.0137 -.0478 -.255 -.225
Resource quality -.0642 -.1785 -.484 -.473
Resource relatedness .5975 .6516 .523 .528
Integration 2.693 2.544 -.853 -.943
Replacement 2.147 2.143 -.016 -.017
Codification 7.000 5.931 -1.122 -1.126
Experience in good banks 8.471 7.222 -.456 -.443
Experience in bad banks 2.882 2.852 -.033 -.031
Experience in-mkt 7.471 6.321 -.492 -.468
Experience out-mkt 3.941 4.071 .077 .083
Size buyer yr-1 ($ in billion) 26.41 13.42 -1.573 -1.431
Size o f  acquisition (% o f buyer’s assets) 8.120 8.891 .219 .226
5.3 Operationalization of Key Constructs
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4 highlights the relationships 
between pre-acquisition resource characteristics (relatedness and quality), post­
acquisition decision-making (integration and replacement), knowledge accumulation
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processes (routinization and codification), and performance outcomes, at both the level of 
the integration process and the firm level. These constructs were operationalized on the 
basis of the data gathered in the Phase 1 survey.
Table 5.2 - Descriptive statistics of phase 1 variables
V ariable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Perform ance
ROA ch. 2 yrs after acq vs. I yr before .0045 .6683 -2.81 2.46 371
ROA ch. 3 yrs after acq vs. 1 yr before .0028 .7255 -2.91 2.49 291
Conversion o f information systems .8307 .8777 -2.00 2.00 449
Integration o f  human resources .8069 .9882 -2.00 2.00 435
Overall integration process .6591 .9460 -2.00 2.00 443
Resource C haracteristics
Resource quality -.0035 1.08 -2.00 2.00 466
Resource reiatedness .620 .48 .00 1.00 488
Post-acquisition Decisions
Integration 2.639 .6974 .00 3.00 487
Replacement 1.77 1.27 .00 3.00 475
Integration Capability
Codification .6712 .4207 .00 1.00 516
General experience 11.20 10.17 .00 44.00 574
Experience in good banks 8.580 8.728 .00 35.00 493
Experience in bad banks 2.383 2.976 .00 11.00 493
Experience in-mkt 5.955 6.802 .00 34.00 512
Experience out-mkt 4.996 5.571 .00 25.00 506
5.3.1 Performance
Measuring the performance of acquisition processes is a very complex endeavor. 
The optimal measure probably would be based on a consistent set of pre- and post­
acquisition accounting data for both firms. However, even if issues of confidentiality 
could be overcome, post-acquisition accounting data for the acquired entity are typically 
available ordy when they “matter” less (i.e. when the level o f  integration is so low that 
the acquired unit retains not only its autonomy, but also its identity from an accounting 
standpoint). When banks acquire other banks, the level o f  integration of the acquired unit
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is typically quite high, and it becomes very difficult for the acquirer to keep track o f the 
unit’s performance, particularly after the conversion o f the information systems.
A good second-best measure is the pre- versus post-acquisition change in 
accounting returns for the acquiring firm. It was obtained through the use o f several 
archival sources (see above) and the computation of the two most important and widely 
used performance ratios in the banking industry: the return on (average) assets (ROA) 
and the efficiency ratio8. To control for both industry-level profitability and local 
competitive factors, a performance measure was constructed according to the following 
formula:
ROAj.t = (ROAj.t+3 - ROAa.t+3) - (ROAi.n - ROAa.,.,)
where:
ROAi is the return on average assets o f the acquiring firm i 
ROAa is the average of the return on average assets of all the bank holding 
companies in the same geographic area as the acquiring bank, and 
t is the year when the acquisition was announced 
An identical formula was used to compute the performance measure based on the 
efficiency ratio. Seven geographic areas in United States (New England, North Atlantic, 
South Atlantic, Mid-west, South, Rocky Mountains, and Pacific) and one for Canada 
were used to benchmark the performance ratios. The selection of multi-state regions to 
benchmark the change in performance of responding banks was an attempt to strike a 
balance between a necessary level of detail (national averages might be too coarse) and
8 The efficiency ratio is similar to what a manufacturing firm would term the ratio between SG&A and 
sales. In banking, the numerator is “non-interest expenses” and the denominator is the sum o f “net interest 
income” and “non-interest income”.
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the difficulty o f constructing a reasonable benchmark for both local community and 
“super-regional” banks.
In addition to the accounting measures, the Phase 1 survey collected three 
assessments of the performance o f the acquisition, in comparison with the performance of 
all other acquisitions completed by the same acquirer. The assessments pertained to the 
performance o f (I) the information systems conversion process, (2) the human resources 
affiliation (or integration) process, and (3) the overall post-acquisition integration 
process, as measured by a Likert-type scale with the following anchors: “-2” (“Many 
problems”), “-1” (Some problems), “0” (“Average”), “+1” (“OK”), “+2” (“Great”).
5.3.2 Level of Integration
The first type of post-acquisition integration decision was measured by assessing the 
extent to which the information systems, the operating procedures, and the product lines 
o f the two firms were aligned or centralized. The scale ranged from “0” (“few or no 
features were integrated”), to “3” (“all systems, procedures and products were completely 
integrated”). The frequency o f observ ations loaded on the highest value, as 71.8% of the 
acquisitions were classified as complete integration. That result was expected given the 
focus on horizontal and market extension acquisitions chosen by design. However, the 
aggregation o f the decision along longitudinal patterns reveals a more complex and 
somewhat unexpected evolutionary process (see section 6.1).
5.3.3 Level of Replacement
The other decision was measured by assessing o f “the extent to which the executive 
leadership of the acquired bank has been changed after the acquisition”. The scale
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ranged from “0” (“no substantial change”) to “3” (“virtually all the top management 
team was replaced”). The frequency distribution o f  this decision variable resembles a 
bimodal distribution where about 40% o f the observations are loaded on each o f the two 
extreme values, and very little density remained on the intermediate replacement levels.
5.3.4 Resource Relatedness
The research project was designed to limit the extent o f  variation along the resource 
relatedness dimension. The sample of acquisitions studied included either perfectly 
horizontal (i.e. buying a competitor located in the same geographic area) or market 
extension types of transactions, in which the variation is essentially provided by the 
degree of geographical overlap between the two branch networks. The banking industry 
has developed a clear and universally applied distinction between “in-market” 
(horizontal) and “out-markef ’ (market extension) acquisitions, which the survey used by 
probing for the categorization o f each transaction listed in the acquisition history profile 
into one of the two classes. The measure assesses the degree o f market relatedness 
between the two firms. However, a broader interpretation o f the concept of resources 
assigns a critical competitive role to the geographic location o f the network o f branches, 
in that it constitutes the firm-specific endowment of office locations and influences the 
coverage of the potential customer base. In commercial banking, as well as in all other 
retail industries, geographic location is considered a fundamental source o f firm-specific 
advantage; consequently, the degree of geographic market relatedness can be interpreted 
as a possible proxy for the broader concept o f resource relatedness.
That issue is discussed further in section 5.4, Exhibit D and section 7.4. Here,
limited to the approximation made in the Phase 1 survey, the resource relatedness
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construct was operationalized as the degree o f overlap o f the two networks of branch 
offices. It was coded as “ 1” if  the acquisition was “in-market”, and as “0” if it was “out- 
market”. The frequency distribution is about two thirds “in-market” and one third “out- 
market” acquisitions.
5.3.5 Resource Quality
The pre-acquisition quality o f  the resource endowment o f the acquired firm was 
measured by assessing the performance level of the target bank prior to the acquisition. 
As shown in Appendix A, the Acquisition History Profile asked the respondent to enter, 
under the column “Bank”, an assessment of the pre-acquisition profitability of the target. 
The scale anchors were:“-2” (the acquired institution was in a bankrupt situation), “-1” (it 
was a poor performer), “0” (it was an average performer), “+1” (it was a good performer) 
and “+2” (it was an outstanding performer). The observations distribute in a roughly 
normal way with a mean o f -0.035 and a standard deviation o f  1.08.
5.3.6 Process Routinization
The degree of process routinization was approximated by three sets of measures:
•  The level o f general acquisition experience, a simple count o f the number o f
acquisitions completed by the same acquirer before the one considered, was the most 
superficial approximation o f the routinization construct. The variable (probably) 
represents a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the creation o f a post­
acquisition integration routine. In other words, the level o f  experience testifies only 
to the longitudinal accumulation o f knowledge in the acquiring firms, but not 
necessarily to the persistence o f practices (Helfat, 1994).
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•  The specific type o f  acquisition experience was a more refined concept, as it 
incorporated the specific evolutionary path followed by the bank in its acquisition 
trajectory. It measured the number of a specific type o f  acquisitions completed before 
the one considered. The criteria used were (I) degree o f  relatedness (number of “in­
market” and “out-market” acquisitions) and (2) quality o f  resources o f the target 
(number o f “bad” and “good” institutions purchased). To construct the experience 
trajectories related to the quality o f acquired assets, previous acquisitions were coded 
and counted as “bad asset quality banks” if they had a score o f either “-2” or “-1”, and 
as “good asset quality banks” otherwise.
• The same decision made three acquisitions before. Whereas the first two measures 
approximated the routinization construct with a measure o f experience accumulation, 
this variable attempted to get directly at the core concept of routinization (i.e., the 
replication o f a certain type of decisions across time and under relatively different 
contextual conditions). Routinization is, in other words, a special case of path 
dependency in which current decisions are not only dependent on past ones, but are 
actually similar in kind. Using a decision made in a randomly selected previous 
acquisition affords a more precise approximation o f the routinization effect.
5.3.7 Knowledge Codification
The degree o f  knowledge codification was measured by counting the number of 
manuals and models developed by the acquirer in the year o f the acquisition and dividing 
it by the number available today. The measure approximates the stage in the codification 
o f the integration practice reached by the acquiring bank in the year o f the acquisition.
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The documents for which data were gathered are listed in Table 6.1. The Acquiring Bank 
questionnaire provided the year in which the acquiring firm developed each tool. The list 
o f the types o f manuals and computer support tools developed in the banking industry can 
be considered essentially complete, as only one of the participants mentioned a non-listed 
tool under “other manuals and models” .
5.4 Construct Validity
Data from the Phase 2 survey o f  57 acquisitions were used to provide a validity 
check on key constructs (resource relatedness and quality, integration, replacement, and 
performance assessments). The Phase 2 measures were derived from some of the 
questions in the General Part questionnaire aimed at measuring the same constructs with 
a larger array o f related items (see Exhibit C). Construct validity was assessed through 
three types o f analysis:
1) Cronbach’s alphas were used to assess whether the Phase 2 items were strongly inter­
correlated and hence could be considered indicators o f the same theoretical construct.
2) The correlation between the Phase 1 measure and an index o f the Phase 2 items was 
provided by summing their standardized (z-scored) transformations (Nunnally, 1978).
3) The correlation was calculated between the Phase 1 measure and the main factor on 
which all the Phase 2 items consistently loaded, extracted with a linear regression 
method from a factor analysis o f the Phase 2 items, without rotation.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results o f the analyses. Details of the binary 
correlations and the factor loadings among the Phase 2 indicators are provided in Exhibit 
D. The first encouraging indication was that all the Phase 2 measures connected to a
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given theoretical construct were highly correlated among themselves, as the Cronbach 
alpha levels were consistently high.9 That finding was confirmed by the fact that all the 
items loaded consistently on the main factor extracted with a principal component 
analysis without rotation (see tables in Exhibit D).
Further support for the Phase I items’ representativeness o f the multiple 
indicators measured in Phase 2 was found in the Pearson’s correlation statistics with the 
two types o f indexes constructed. All the correlations were statistically significant at the 
.01 level, with the notable exception of the resource relatedness construct. In the case o f 
relatedness, the Phase 1 measure results were an indication mainly of the “external” 
elements of the two organizations (i.e., the geographic location and the type of customer 
segments served). The internal types o f resources, though loading on the same main 
relatedness factor (eigenvalue = 3.46), did not correlate with the indication of whether the 
acquisition was considered “in-market” or “out-market”. In fact, as reported in section 2 
o f Exhibit D, the distinction between internal and external resources created a second 
factor (eigenvalue = 1.29).
For the post-acquisition integration decisions, Phase 1 items for both the level o f 
integration and replacement o f the top management team correlated well with the indexes 
constructed on the basis o f the Phase 2 indicators. The level o f  integration was probed in 
the Phase 2 questionnaire with two separate questions, one on the degree to which 
functions were centralized and one on the degree to which selected processes were 
aligned (see definition 3 in Chapter 4). The factor analysis showed, however, that the
9 The exception here was represented by the performance indicators o f  the systems conversion process; 
however, the correlational evidence with the Phase 2 indexes indicated that the Phase I item was a good 
representation o f the performance construct.
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Phase 1 proxy for the level o f  integration correlated better with the centralization 
construct than with the alignment one.
The three performance indicators collected during the Phase I survey also 
exhibited strong correlational ties with similar Phase 2 indicators. They correlated in a 
significant way both with the main factor extracted from related performance assessments 
in the Phase 2 survey, and with the sum o f z-scores computed on the Phase 2 items (Table 
5.3, 3rd and 7th column). The analysis identified five Phase 2 items corresponding to the 
performance o f the information systems conversion process and eight items relating to 
the human resources affiliation process. The third Phase 1 measure, meant to capture the 
performance o f the entire integration process, was correlated with the 24 Phase 2 
performance indicators. The indicators include 13 benchmarks relative to pre-acquisition 
expectations for the transaction considered and 11 benchmarks comparing the current 
transaction with all other acquisition experiences o f the acquiring firm (see the two 
questions on page 8 of Exhibit C and Tables D.5 and D.6 in Exhibit D).
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Table 5.3 - Construct Validity of Phase 1 Measures
Phase 1 Measure Cronbach 
Alpha of 
Phase 2 
Items
Correlation 
with Sum of 
Ph. 2 Items’ 
z-scores
#o f  
Phase 2 
Items
# o f
Factors
Extracted
% of 
Variance of 
Main Factor
Correlation 
with Main 
Factor
Target's Resource Features
Resource quality .853 .463*** 11 2 42.1 .482***
Relatedness/all Ph. 2 Items .786 .116 8 2 43.2 .038
Relatedness/extemal factors .631 .520*** 2 1 73.4 .520***
Post-acquisition Decisions
Replacement of TMT .826 .606*** 9 2 64.5 .549***
Integration as centralization .931 .589*** 7 1 74.3 .612***
Integration as alignment .968 .382*** 8 1 83.3 .377***
Level of integration overall .950 .521*** 15 3 61.8 .542***
Post-acq. Performance
Conversion of D.P. systems .516 (ns) .406*** 5 2 40.6 .455***
Affiliation of human resources .739 .450*** 8 3 40.1 .518***
Overall integration process .857 .618*** 24 8 29.0 .626***
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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6. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter describes the set o f analyses performed to empirically test the 
hypotheses submitted in chapter 4. After an initial qualitative report on the major 
findings from the field study conducted with the help o f  a pilot group o f acquirers, the 
study of post-acquisition integration decisions is discussed. The results o f the analysis of 
the performance o f post-acquisition integration processes are then reported, and the 
performance of the acquiring firm, in both the short-term (up to three years after the 
acquisition) and in the long-term is addressed in detail. The final section summarizes the 
key findings of the study.
6.1 Lessons from the Field: Post-acquisition Management in the Banking 
Industry
Several patterns were uncovered during the clinical study o f post-acquisition 
integration practices. The most intriguing ones are described to facilitate the evaluation of 
both the theoretical intuition and the measurement aspects o f the research.
6.1.1 Evolution of Post-acquisition Decisions
The interviews revealed a clear and somewhat surprising pattern o f evolution in the
management of the post-acquisition integration process. Most acquisitions completed
before 1989-1990 were managed in a low replacement and low integration mode.
Acquired banks typically were not integrated, information systems were not converted,
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the top management team was rarely replaced, and product lines were not standardized. 
With the S&L crisis and the consequent spate o f  acquisitions o f failed institutions from 
RTC- or FDIC-led auctions (1989-1992), a different acquisition management mode 
emerged. A higher level o f  replacement o f target management was accompanied by a 
low to medium level o f  integration (at least in the first phases o f the post-acquisition 
process). The higher levels o f  integration, along with higher degrees ofreplacement, 
which one would expect given the context (i.e. horizontal transactions), have become the 
norm only during the last few years. A senior executive in a highly acquisitive bank that 
was part o f the pilot group lamented that when he was hired as a controller (in 1991), 32 
different management information systems were used simultaneously in the various 
divisions and geographic areas controlled by the bank! The bank was at that time in the 
process o f increasing the level o f  integration to address the incompatibility across 
previously acquired but scarcely integrated institutions. Other banks reported a similar, if 
less dramatic, situation at some point in time during their acquisition history. Apparently, 
the acquiring institutions in the industry went through a rapid change in their approach to 
the management o f their acquisitions. Fig 6.1 shows the evolution of the decision about 
the degree to which the acquired bank would be integrated within the acquiring 
organization. It is based on answers to the question posed on page 4 o f the Acquiring 
Bank questionnaire (Exhibit B).
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Fig. 6.1 - Evolution of Integration Decisions
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Respondents selected one o f five scenarios describing the decisions characterizing 
the degrees of integration with which the acquisitions were managed at three points in 
time. The proportion of respondents managing bank acquisitions with either no or a 
minimal level of integration dropped from 40% to 5%, whereas the proportion o f those 
integrating their acquisitions either extensively or completely increased from 42% to 78% 
of the sample.
6.1.2 Firm Effects.
In addition to the longitudinal effect, wide dispersion o f  the cross-sectional 
distribution of post-acquisition integration practices was evident from the interviews. 
There seemed to be a firm effect in the choice o f post-acquisition management 
approaches. In other words, on a case basis, some banks clearly managed very
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5211454
comparable transactions in very different ways. Some particularly striking examples of 
firms with comparable levels o f  acquisition expertise follow:
Banc One created a highly sophisticated, routinized, and codified integration 
process. Information systems were converted (but not centralized) and human resources 
were '‘affiliated” (extensively trained and socialized), but product lines were not 
standardized. In addition, a large degree o f decisional autonomy was left to the top 
management team o f the acquired entity, which was never replaced and was often “co­
opted” to key roles at the corporate level o f the acquiring organization. As of 1995, Banc 
One’s organization chart listed 81 CEOs, and the corporate-wide product line included 
about 400 different deposit products (20 is considered a reasonable number). Banc One’s 
process can be characterized as low replacement and medium-level integration.10
Norwest, in contrast, had an equally routinized and codified process that enabled 
it to achieve a higher level o f integration, with the data processing systems centralized 
and the product line standardized. The top management team o f the target was typically 
kept in place and actively contributed to the integration process, which was coordinated 
at the local level with limited supervision from the corporate development team. 
Norwest’s approach can be characterized as a high level o f integration and a low to 
medium level o f replacement o f key resources.
NationsBank aimed at similarly high degrees o f centralization o f information 
systems and standardization o f product lines, but was more aggressive in terms o f 
substituting top managers and keeping a tight control o f the integration process from the
10 Since 1995, Banc One has undertaken an extensive reorganization process to reach a much higher level 
o f integration among all its affiliated banks, centralizing information systems and decision-making
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
corporate headquarters, with limited decision input from the target’s managers. Also, a 
specialized post-acquisition integration group was permanently placed at corporate 
headquarters and endowed with high visibility and institutional power. It coordinates all 
the simultaneous and multi-divisional post-acquisition integration tasks. NationsBank 
implemented a post-acquisition integration decision characterized by high levels o f  both 
integration and replacement of current resources.
One possible explanation for the persistence o f varied and idiosyncratic 
approaches to the management of integration processes lies in the presence of strong path 
dependencies, which force the routinized replication o f decisions almost independently 
from the variation in contexts. Far from being associated with poor performance, 
however, routinized behavior is characteristic o f  the way acquirers with smooth, 
seemingly highly effective processes operate.
6.1.3 Codification of Post-acquisition Integration Practices
Coupled with strong longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in post-acquisition 
integration decisions was a similarly strong variation in the extent to which acquiring 
banks developed specific tools to facilitate the completion of the various simultaneous 
tasks making up the post-acquisition integration process. A strikingly high level o f 
sophistication was achieved by some o f the acquiring firms in their handling o f complex 
tasks, such as the conversion of information systems, the standardization o f product lines, 
and the training and socialization o f the workforce. Equally striking, however, was the 
relatively limited diffusion of those tools even in cases o f high acquisition experience.
authority while trying to maintain a strong market presence. The most recent acquisitions have been 
managed in a significantly different way, according to the new guidelines.
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Many relatively experienced acquirers did not develop the most “advanced” manuals and 
models, and the ones that did develop them waited many years after the first acquisition 
experiences to do so, and invested heavily with time, money, and energy. One highly 
experienced participant bank created increasingly complex manuals and computerized 
tools, over the course of the three years of the study. From the first tools specific to the 
management o f the information systems conversion phase, it developed specialized 
systems for the management o f the human resources affiliation process (monitoring the 
fate o f the acquired workforce on a daily basis). More recently the same acquirer was 
involved in an attempt to measure and consistently monitor the customer impact o f the 
integration process. Table 6.1 summarizes the diffusion patterns o f the acquisition tools 
in the sample studied with the Phase 1 survey.
Table 6.1 Evolution of the Acquisition Tools
ACQUISITION TOOL Diffusion in 
Sample
Year of 1" 
Creation in 
Any Bank
Avg. Yrs from 
Creation of Fin. 
Evaluation Tool
Selection/Negotiation Process
Financial evaluation spreadsheets 89.6% 1975 0.00
Due Diligence check-list 91.7% 1976 0.72
Due Diligence manual 39.6% 1986 0.85
Conversion o f Info. Systems
Info systems conversion manual 54.2% 1982 0.74
Info systems training manual 45.8% 1982 0.37
Human Resources Integration
Affiliation/integration manual 41.7% 1986 1.53
Branch staffing models 50.0% 1985 2.05
Training/ Self-training packages 41.7% 1985 2.29
Sales/Product Integration
Products training manual 54.2% 1980 0.71
Product mapping models 52.1% 1982 1.27
Project management packages 50.0% 1976 2.00
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The columns report the frequency o f observation o f the tools in the sample, the year in 
which each tool was created for the first time by a bank in the sample, and the average 
number of years between the creation o f financial evaluation models (typically the most 
basic M&A tool) and the creation o f each integration tool. Acquirers in the banking 
industry appear to have evolved their post-acquisition integration practices by developing 
increasingly complex tools. From simple due diligence check-lists, some acquirers 
created due diligence and post-acquisition integration manuals (for the conversion of 
information systems, the affiliation o f human resources, and various training purposes). 
From basic evaluation spreadsheets, some acquirers developed entire information systems 
that enable them to make informed decisions on product standardization and branch 
staffing, and to closely monitor their implementation. Particularly striking is the 
difference in the diffusion rate of due diligence support tools: whereas 91.7% of acquirers 
developed due diligence check lists (codifying the "know-what”), only 39.6% evolved 
into a higher level of codification by developing due diligence manuals (incorporating the 
“know-how”).
With respect to the evolutionary dynamics o f the post-acquisition integration 
capability, section 4.2.3 advanced a model that calls for development of practices to 
achieve cost efficiency (the “low-hanging fruits”), and then practices to achieve revenue 
enhancement goals. Preliminary support for the hypothesized evolutionary pattern is 
shown in Table 6.1, where the sales/product integration tools and the human resources 
integration tools, which protect and enhance the generation o f new business, are typically 
created after the systems conversion tools, which are chiefly intended to achieve cost
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efficiencies by eliminating the data processing support structure and part o f the back- 
office.
The preliminary observations suggest that explanations based on the 
characteristics o f  the transaction, such as the degree o f  relatedness between the two 
organizations and the quality of the resources o f the acquired bank, cannot address the 
observed patterns. Managerial approaches to essentially the same type o f task 
(integrating an acquired bank) varied widely across periods and seemed to maintain 
stable cross-sectional differences among acquirers. The deregulation process, so relevant 
in many aspects of the banking industry, cannot shed light on that phenomenon, as 
regulatory authorities limit their role to the authorization o f the acquisitive event and do 
not have any say in post-acquisition management decisions. The liberalization o f 
interstate banking and the greater relevance o f "out-market” as opposed to “in-market” 
acquisitions might have led to lower rather than higher predicted levels o f integration 
because o f the lower degree of resource relatedness.
Another important observation is that the longitudinal process o f codification was 
only partially related to the accumulation o f tacit experiential knowledge. As shown in 
Figure 6.2, firms with comparable levels o f acquisition experience reached significantly 
different degrees o f codification, and some firms with only a few acquisition experiences 
produced manuals and other support tools comparable to those of firms with several 
times the number o f experienced events. Though statistically significant (Pearson’s 
correlation = .305, p < 5%), the correlation between codification and accumulated 
acquisition experience is less strong than expected.
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Fig. 6.2 - Codification & Acquisition Experience
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6.2 Post-Acquisition Decisions
Hypotheses HI trough H8 were tested with two logistic regressions. The two 
dependent variables, level o f  replacement and degree of integration, have very skewed 
distributions. The former follows a bimodal distribution with more than 80% of the 
frequency on the extreme values (either complete or no replacement o f the top 
management team). The latter loads heavily on the higher values as the target was either 
highly or completely integrated within the acquiring institution in 75% of the acquisitions 
recorded.
As a result of the skewness of the dependent variables, regressions could be run 
with the complete scale (acknowledging the possible effects o f skewness) or the 
dependent variables could be dichotomized and logistic regressions run without a 
significant loss of information. The logistic regressions, which are appropriate when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, are reported, although the substantive results do not 
change when the full scales for replacement and integration are used and OLS regressions
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are run. The original four-category definition o f the degree of replacement and of the 
level o f integration was converted into a dummy variable where the value 1 was assigned 
“complete replacement” and “complete integration”, and the value 0 was assigned in all 
other cases.
The means, standard deviations, and binary correlations of the variables used in 
the logistic regression models are reported in Table 6.2. The controls used are relatively 
self-explanatory and the measures refer to the guidelines provided in Chapter 5.
A five-stage model is reported for each o f the two equations. Whereas stage 1 
presents the control variables forming a “baseline” explanation, stage 2 introduces the 
two resource-based variables. Stage 3 then adds the degree o f codification o f the 
integration process, and Stage 4 includes the generalized and the two specialized 
experience trajectories built from the count o f out-market and “bad-bank” acquisitions 
completed by the same acquirer. Finally, Stage 5 introduces the more direct proxy for 
routinization of the decision process provided by the decision score (non-dichotomized) 
registered for the third acquisition preceding the one analyzed. The number o f previous 
acquisitions considered in constructing the measure is random; analyses replicating this 
proxy that use the fifth and the first acquisitions before the current one yield no 
significant differences in the magnitude and sign o f the coefficients reported. Valuer in 
parentheses are a measure o f the explanatory power o f  the single covariate, whereas the 
reported chi-square test measures the statistical significance o f the variation in fit 
obtained by adding the new group o f factors to the preceding stage.
The logistic regression model for the level o f integration (Table 6.3) provides 
evidence in favor o f both the resource-based and the knowledge-based explanations.
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Models 2, 3 ,4 , and 5 significantly improve the fit with respect to the block o f control 
variables and the preceding nested models. In particular, the degree of resource 
relatedness is associated positively with the probability o f high integration, as predicted 
in HI, whereas the quality of resources is tied significantly and negatively to the level o f 
integration (H2). The higher the degree o f relatedness and the lower the quality o f the 
resource endowment o f the target firm, the higher the probability that the acquiring firm 
will decide to integrate the acquisition completely.
The impact o f  the development o f a codified practice (the level o f knowledge 
codification, H3) on the decision to integrate the acquired firm is positive and statistically 
significant. In addition, the rough but explicit approximation of the degree o f knowledge 
accumulation provides a significant improvement in the fit o f the model with the data (x2 
= 10.05 with 1 d.f.) and an improvement in its predictive capacity (from 81.16% to 83.7% 
correct predictions).
The degree o f tacit routinization of the integration practice seems to be at least as 
important as the resource characteristics and the codified knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms in explaining the variation in the decision to integrate. The generalized 
experience trajectory and one of the two specialized ones (the number of out-market 
acquisitions previously completed) significantly affect the level of integration, but the 
routinized replication o f  past decisions has the strongest explanatory power o f all the 
predictors included in the model (R = 0.27, p < .000). Past experiences, therefore, matter 
not only because they change future behavior (i.e. more experienced banks integrate 
more, banks with more out-market acquisitions integrate less), but also because once a 
certain decisional approach is chosen, the same decision tends to be repeated even in
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contexts reasonably different from the original one. H4 is therefore strongly supported 
both for the more general operationalization based on path-dependent roles o f experience 
trajectories and for the more specific measurement based on the degree of replication of 
past decisions.
The logistic regression model for the degree o f replacement o f the top 
management team (Table 6.4) also shows very good fit with the data at every step of the 
analysis. The effect o f  the quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the acquired 
organization is strongly significant and related negatively to the replacement decision, as 
expected (H5). Interestingly, the degree of relatedness is also strongly and positively 
correlated with the replacement o f the top management team (H6). Consistent with 
Cannella and Hambrick’s (1993) findings, top management teams in highly related 
acquisitions are replaced with higher probability. Both the resource relatedness and the 
resource quality effects hold true irrespective o f the inclusion o f knowledge-based 
explanations.
The effects o f the knowledge-accumulation mechanisms, however, are 
remarkably strong and equally important. The introduction of those variables improves 
the fit with the data and the predictive power o f the model (from 76.8% to 83.0% correct 
predictions). More specifically, the degree of codification plays an important role in 
predicting a higher probability o f replacement, supporting H7. The tacit knowledge 
accumulation mechanisms, however, result in even greater explanatory power (H8). 
Interestingly, the replication effect cancels the impact o f the experience trajectories, and 
is the single strongest predictor o f  the decision to replace the top management team (R =
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.38). Its introduction in the logistic regression model not only increases the fit (x2 = 
45.17, 1 d.f.), but also improves the predictive power of the model by four full percentage 
points (from 79.7% to 84.0%).
Thus, in both decisions analyzed, the magnitude and the type of knowledge 
accumulated from previous acquisition experiences appear to be important predictors o f 
the post-acquisition integration strategy selected by the acquiring firm. In particular, the 
tacit knowledge accumulation patterns are related more to the replication o f  past 
decisions (routinization) than to the type o f acquisition experiences o f the acquiring firm 
(path-dependence).
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Table 6.2 -CORRELATION MATRIX-
VARIABLE
S
Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14
1 Level o f 
integration
.718 .450
2 Degree of 
replacement
.448 .498 .372
3 Rel. acq. size 3.%
E+2
4.49
E+3
.028 -.049
4 Acquirer’s
size
2.16
E+4
4.07
E+5
.020 -.051 -.005
5 Acquirer’s
ROA
.912 .374 -.211
***
-.139 .019 .046
6 Acquirer’s 
eff. Ratio
44.2 8.31 .202 
♦ **
-.061 -.010 -.046 -.129
7 Post­
deregulation
.671 .470 .229
**♦
.096
**
.042 .026 .071 .423
***
8 Resource
relatedness
.62 .48 .421 
♦ ♦♦
.352 -.014 .035 -.148
***
.221
***
.211
***
9 Resource
quality
-3.5
E-2
1.08 -.253 
♦ **
-.290
*♦*
-.042 .098
**
.351 -.016 -.031 -.207
***
10 Knowledge
codification
.671 .421 .183 .0% 
• *
.065 .035 .282
***
.124
*+
.671*** .049 .126***
11 Total N of 
acquisitions
11.2 1.02
E+l
.135 .053 -.017 .120
♦♦♦
.238*** .145* * * .303* * * .167*** .037 .391***
12 N of out- 
market acq.
4.99 5.57 -.148 
♦ ♦♦
.011 -.175
***
-.021 .264
***
-.065 .104
**
-.036 .050 .222
* * *
.714
***
13 N o f “Bad 
banks” acq.
2.38 2.97 .275
***
.179 -.032 -.033 .201
***
.207 .495*** .213*** -.074 .446*** .622* * * .252***
14 Integration 3 
acq. Before
2.56 .84 .475 
♦ **
.116
*♦
.026 .022 -.089
*
.235
***
.174 .201
* * *
-.062 .216
* * *
.103
**
-.196
***
.240
* * *
15 Replacement 
3 acq. Before
1.68 1.30 .258
***
.258 Oil .045 -.042 -.084
*
.202
*»»
.152
***
-.130
**
.181
***
.017 -.142
***
.291
***
.319
***
00
00
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
Re
pr
od
uc
ed
 
wi
th 
pe
rm
iss
io
n 
of 
the
 
co
py
rig
ht
 o
w
ne
r. 
Fu
rth
er
 r
ep
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
wi
th
ou
t 
pe
rm
is
si
on
.
Table 6.3 -LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS-
Dependent Variable: LEVEL OF INTEGRATION
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Relative acquisition size -.06(-.09)** -.05(.07)* -.06(.08)* -.11(-.24)*** -.11 (-.24)***
Acquirer’s size 4.36E-07 4.14E-07 4.00E-7 -9.9E-8 1.53E-8
Acquirer’s ROA -1.83(-.14)*** -1.28(-.09)** -1.73(-.13)** -1.63(-.l)** -1.15
Acquirer’s efficiency ratio .12(.20)*** .09(.15)*** .09(. 14)*** .03 .03
Post-deregulation year .01 .05 -.63 -1.23(-.06)* -.66
Degree of replacement 1.99(.29)*** 1.30(.19)*** 1.14(16)*** .84(.08)* 1.25(.15)**
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness 1.20(.19)*** l.32(.21)*** 1.08(.13)** .96(.l 1)**
Resource quality -.41(.l 1)* -.51(-.15)*** -.56(-.16)*** -.62(-.18)***
Knowledge Codification 1.94(.19)*** 2.13(.20)*** 1.66(.14)**
Experience Trajectories
Total N of acquisitions . 18(. 18)*** .13(11)**
N of Out-mkt acquisitions -.33(-.27)*** -.25(-.19)***
N of “Bad banks” acq. . 19(.07)* .18(.04)
Routinization
Integration 3 acq. Before 1.04(.27)***
Chi-square Improvement 76.73*** 15.96*** 10.05*** 39.15*** 18.62***
% Correct 80.43 81.16 83.70 86.96 88.41
N 276 276 276 276 276
Beta coefficients (R in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.4 -LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS-
Dependent Variable: DEGREE OF REPLACEMENT
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Relative acquisition size -.02 -.0005 -.0016 -.01 -.03
Acquirer’s size -9.9E-5 -8.5E-5 -9.6E-5 -.0001 -1.0E-6
Acquirer’s ROA -.23 .41 .18 -.19 -.35
Acquirer’s efficiency ratio -.13(-.24)*** -. 16(-.31 )*** -.17(-.33)*** -.15(-.25)*** -.15(-.22)***
Post-deregulation year .85(.05)* .87(.05)* .42 -.06 -.43
Level o f integration 2.25(.24)*** 2.04(.22)*** 1.9(.21)*** 1.71(.20)*** 1.91(.23)***
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness 1.59(.23)*** 1.65(.25)*** 1.59(.23)*** 1.9(.26)***
Resource quality -.46(-.15)*** -.60(-.19)*** -.54(-.17)*** -.65(-.18)***
Knowledge Codification 1.33(.l 1)** 1.24(.09)** 1.32(.08)**
Experience Trajectories
Total N of acquisitions -.04 -.0002
N of Out-mkt acquisitions . 11 (.08)** .07
N of “Failed” acquisitions .15(08)** .03
Routinization
Replacement 3 acq. Before 99( 38)***
Chi-square Improvement 89.64*** 30.25*** 5.60** 9.22** 45.17***
% Correct 72.10 76.81 77.17 79.71 82.97
N 276 276 276 276 276
Beta coefficients (R in parentheses). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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6.3 Acquisition Performance
Having explored the effect of resource-based and knowledge-based explanations 
on the type of post-acquisition decision-making behavior exhibited by the acquiring firm 
in the sample studied, we can proceed with the analysis o f  the performance o f acquisition 
processes. Table 6.5 summarizes the hypotheses from section 4.2 and the theoretical 
rationale behind each o f  them.
Table 6.5 - Hypotheses and Theoretical Arguments
EXPLANATIONS THEORY Hp. Expected Sign
Resource-Based
Resource relatedness Related diversification H9 +
Resource quality Resource deployment H10 +
Post-Acq. Decisions
Integration S true filial inertia, complexity 
Cost efficiencies and revenue 
enhancements
HI la  
HI lb +
Replacement of TMT Structural inertia 
Agency theory
H l2a
H12b +
Knowledge-Based
Knowledge
Codification
Learning and cognition H13 +
Tacit Experience 
Accumulation (local)
Tacit learning H14 +
Codification x 
Integration
Learning and cognition with 
high structural complexity
H15 +
The set o f analyses proposed was more complex than that performed for the 
integration decisions for several reasons.
1) The models estimated were inherently more complex in that they included the effect
o f the integration decisions as determinants o f the performance level. O f particular
interest was the appraisal o f whether and how those decisions interact with the
knowledge-based capability construct to influence the performance outcomes.
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2) The dependent variable, acquisition performance, assumes different meanings and is 
subject to different measurements depending on what part o f the acquisition process 
is considered. In the study, performance assessments o f the post-acquisition 
integration phase were treated separately from the accounting measures that 
incorporated information on the entire scope o f the acquisition process. The analysis 
of the former performance construct is described in section 6.3.1, the analysis o f  the 
latter is described in section 6.3.2.
3) The robustness o f the results obtained had to be addressed by replicating the analysis 
under different conditions. The main variations, for which results are reported and 
discussed were:
a) Aggregation o f multiple observations in the same year (section 6.3.2.2) to 
improve the consistency between the measurement of the explanatory variables, 
which vary for each acquisition, and the accounting measure o f the dependent 
variable, which varies only for each year.
b) Aggregation o f the observations to the firm level o f  analysis (section 6.4) to 
control for the firm effects observed in the field study. Consistency of results at 
different levels of analysis would be evidence that they are not driven by a 
systematic bias in the characteristic o f  the acquiring firm.
c) Adoption o f a different time lag in the measurement of the dependent variable 
(change in ROA two years or three years after the acquisition vs. the year before) 
to provide additional support for the stability o f the results.
The discussion of the results is therefore divided into several parts. The first addresses 
the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, subjectively assessed with
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the use o f three process indicators (section 6.3.1). Then, the performance o f the entire 
acquisition process is examined by considering the change in the acquiring firm’s 
accounting measures o f performance (section 6.3.2). Finally, a set o f  variations around 
the basic analysis o f acquisition performance is presented to address some o f its 
quantitative weaknesses and to attempt to satisfy the demands for robustness (sections
6.3.2.2 and 6.4).
6.3.1 The Performance of the Post-acquisition Integration Process
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations o f the variables used 
in analyzing the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process and the overall 
acquisition are presented in Table 6.6. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 give the results o f an OLS 
regression analysis o f the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process 
measured in two different ways. The first used a linear combination of the three 
performance indicators measured with the Phase 1 survey (for the performance o f the 
human resources affiliation, the information systems conversion, and the overall 
integration process; see Exhibit A and section 5.3.1) extracted with a factor analysis. The 
second performance measure was simply the performance assessment o f the overall 
integration process, which was one o f the three indicators used in the factor analysis.
The three performance indicators load on a single factor, extracted with a linear 
regression method and no rotation (eigenvalue = 1.75, loadings varying from .72 to .79), 
accounting for 58.4% o f the variance. As the performance indicators were measured by 
benchmarking the assessments with respect to all other acquisitions completed by the 
same acquirer, the quality o f the assessment is only as good as the magnitude o f
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experience accumulated by the respondent. Observations by acquirers with fewer than 
four acquisition experiences therefore were not included in the analysis.
Five variations o f  the basic model are reported, in which the acquisition 
experience variable assumes the value of (1) generalized experience (total number o f  
acquisitions completed before the one under consideration), (2) specialized experience in 
in-market (highly related, or horizontal) transactions, (3) specialized experience in out- 
market transactions, (4) specialized experience in good asset quality banks and (5) 
specialized experience in bad asset quality banks.
The baseline model, which includes the control variables, against which the 
results of the analyses should be judged, provides the following results.
VARIABLE Performance = 
Factor score
Performance = 
Single indicator
Acquirer’s size .0014(.003) .0020(.002)
Transaction size (% o f buyer’s assets) .0095(.005)** .0144(.004)***
# o f M&As in year 0 -.0033(.025) ,0163(.018)
F-test 1.532 4.317***
Adjusted R-squared .005 .027
d.f. residual 321 357
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (*** i and 0.05(**) level
The two models in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 improve the fit with respect to the control 
factors. The adjusted R2 statistic rises to around 9% in the factor scores specification and 
to 6.4% in the single indicator model. In terms of the explanatory power of the individual 
variables, the two sets o f analyses assign a primary explanatory role to the post­
acquisition integration decisions adopted by the acquiring firm. In particular, the
performance of the integration process measured with the linear combination o f the three
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indicators is associated positively with the level o f  integration and negatively with the 
degree o f replacement o f the top management team. The resource variables’ effect on 
integration performance is much weaker; neither resource relatedness nor resource 
quality has statistically significant coefficients. The relative explanatory power o f pre- 
and post-acquisition conditions partially changes with the single indicator specification of 
integration performance. The coefficient of the level o f  integration loses its statistical 
significance, whereas the degree of resource relatedness assumes a positive and 
significant role in determining the performance assessment o f  the overall integration 
process.
The knowledge variables have a positive impact in their codified version, 
particularly with the single indicator performance measure. The tacit accumulation of 
experience, however, does not seem to have any significant impact in any of its 
generalized and specialized specifications.
Those regression results are especially interesting when examined in light o f  the 
binomial correlation analysis in Table 6.6. The quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the 
target company appears to be correlated with higher performance if we do not take into 
account the effect of post-acquisition replacement decisions. The reason higher quality 
targets might appear to turn into more profitable acquisitions is that they tend to be 
managed with a lower level of replacement of key resources. This is a good example of 
how deceiving our conclusions can be if we do not consider carefully the role, of post­
acquisition integration decisions.
Another important observation can be made by comparing the correlation 
coefficients between the post-acquisition integration performance measures and the
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independent variables with those o f the acquisition performance accounting measure, as 
shown in Table 6.6 (columns 1 to 4). First, the performance o f  the post-acquisition 
integration process seems to be correlated only weakly with the performance o f the entire 
acquisition process. O f the three performance indicators, only the one related to the 
human resources affiliation process is correlated significantly with overall accounting 
performance (p < .05). In addition, the resource-based and knowledge-based explanatory 
factors show a much stronger association with overall performance than the one found 
with the analysis o f  post-acquisition integration performance. The quality o f the target’s 
resources, in particular, has an opposite (i.e. negative) and significant effect on overall 
performance.
The following points can be made from the analysis:
1. Subjective assessment o f the performance o f post-acquisition integration
processes, though indicative o f broad trends in the types of explanations offered 
(e.g. post-acquisition decisions vs. pre-acquisition resources), must be evaluated 
in the context o f its inherent limitations:
a) It provides only a relative assessment of the performance o f the integration 
process, as compared with all the other experiences o f  the same acquirer. 
Therefore, it should not be expected to correlate strongly with an absolute 
measure o f  performance, such as one based on accounting measures.
b) In particular, acquisition experience effects are weakened by the necessary 
exclusion o f  inexperienced acquirers and should be re-examined with an 
absolute performance measure, as reported in the next section.
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c) The analysis is highly dependent on the quality o f the respondents’
awareness o f  the consequence of their integration processes. The answers 
to the Acquiring Bank questionnaire (page 5, Exhibit B) suggest that the 
degree to which acquirers in the data set monitored the performance o f 
their integration process, though probably higher than in most other 
industries, was lower than one might expect. The percentage of acquirers 
that consistently monitored process performance is around 35% and does 
not exceed 50% even for the most basic financial performance metrics.
2. The “soft” parts o f  the integration process, involving the integration of human 
resources and the management o f eventual cultural clashes, are the most sensitive 
elements o f the performance o f the integration process, as shown by the 
magnitude o f the correlation with the accounting measure. That finding contrasts 
with the weak association between the “harder” sub-processes o f the post­
acquisition integration phase, such as the conversion o f  information systems, and 
might be viewed as a relatively surprising result because o f the emphasis given to 
the conversion o f information systems by the acquirers in the banking industry.
3. Post-acquisition integration decisions are crucial to our understanding of the 
performance of post-acquisition integration processes. In particular, the potential 
for the exploitation o f economies o f scale and scope seems to be a stronger 
(positive) effect than the (negative) effects o f structural inertia and decisional 
complexity, lending support to HI lb  as opposed to HI la. Conversely, structural 
inertia seems to be a stronger (negative) predictor o f performance than arguments
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derived from agency theory regarding the benefits o f substituting the top 
management team would predict (supporting HI2a, as opposed to HI2b).
The analysis in the next session verifies those preliminary indications with the 
benefit o f a performance measure that not only incorporates the effects o f all phases o f 
the acquisition process, but also provides an absolute criterion applicable to observations 
across different acquiring firms.
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Table 6.6 - CORRELATION MATRIX -ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE-
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14
1
Acquisition Perf. 
Ch. In ROA (3 yrs)
.0284 .725
2 Post-acq. Integral 
Perf. (factor sc.)
0.000 1.00 .107
*
3 Performance of 
integration process
.659 .946 .050 .721
***
4 Performance of 
HR affiliation
.807 .988 .160
*♦
.789 
♦ *«
.355
»**
5 Perf. of systems 
conversion
.831 .878 -.023 .782
M *
.334 .461
6 Res. Relatedness . 
(In-market acq.)
.62 .48 .168
***
-.015 .033 -.124
*♦
.016
7 Resource quality -.0354 1.08 -.III
♦
.135
***
.119
*♦
.172 
*•*
.083
*
-.207
***
8 Integration 2.639 .697 .238
»**
.019 .002 -.083
*
.065 .398
*♦*
-.221
***
9 Replacement 1.77 1.27 -.229 -.217
***
-.119
M
-.310
M *
-.018 .357
♦ M
-.318
***
.415
***
10 Stage of manuals 
development
.671 .421 .139
**
-.015 .026 -.052 .036 .049 .126
***
.161 .050
II General M&A 
experience
11.20 10.16 .036 .011 .093
*
-.075 .050 .167 .037 .116
**
-.053 .391
***
12 Experience in in- 
mkt M&A
5.955 6.802 .453
***
-.055 .054 -.118
**
.024 .257
***
-.021 .192
***
.013 .401
***
.811
***
13 Experience out- 
mkt M&A
4.996 5.571 -.097 .033 .056 -.046 .076 -.036 .050 -074 -.114
**
.222
***
.714
***
.321
***
14 Exp. in good asset 
quality banks
8.580 8.728 .158
*♦
-.018 .069 -.088
*
.053 .107
*♦
.037 .050 -.151
***
.319
*•«
.888
***
.744
***
.813
* •*
15 Experience in bad 
asset quality banks
2.383 2.976 .315 .015 .047 -.059 .040 .213
***
-.074 .199
»**
.152
***
.446
***
.622
***
.769
**+
.252*** .457***
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.7 > OLS REGRESSION - 
Dependent Variable: INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE (Factor Score)
GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
Specialized By Geography Specialized by Asset Quality
In-Market Out-Market Good Quality Bad Quality
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Relative acquisition size .13(.01)** .13(.01)** .13(.01)** .12(.01)** .12(.01)**
Acquirer’s size .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
#ofM & A s in yearO -.11 (.03)* -.06(.03) -.12(.03)* -.10(.03)* -.17(.03)**
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness ,06(.14) .07(. 14) .06(.14) .06(. 14) .06(. 14)
Resource quality .07(.05) .08(.05) .07(.05) .07(.05) .07(.05)
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level of integration .23(.12)*** .23(.12)*** .23(.12)*** .23(.12)*** .23(.12)***
Degree o f Replacement -.27(.06)*** -.26(.06)*** -.28(.06)*** -.27(.06)*** -.31(.06)***
Integration Capabilities
Knowledge Codification .11(.02)* .12(.02)* .1(02)* .12(.02)* .08(.02)
Experience Trajectories -.02(.01) -.08(.01) .02(.01) -.04(.01) .1(.02)
F test 3.986*** 4.098*** 3.986*** 4.025*** 4.180***
Adjusted R-squared .087 .090 .087 .088 .092
d.f. residual 281 281 281 281 281
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**)or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.8 - OLS REGRESSION - 
Dependent Variable; INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE (single indicator)
GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
Specialized By Geography Specialized by Asset Quality
In-Market Out-Market Good Quality Bad Quality
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Relative acquisition size .21(.01)*** .20(.01 )*** .21(.01)*** .21(.01)*** .20(.01 )***
Acquirer’s size .04 .05 .05 .05 .05
#ofM & A s in yearO -.13(.02)* -.06(.03) -.10(.02>* -.13(.02)* -.11 (.02)
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness .13(.12)** .13(12)** .13(.12)** .13(.12)** . 13(. 12)**
Resource quality ,01(.05) .01 (..05) .01 (.05) .01(.05) .01 (.05)
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level of integration ,09(.08) .08(.08) .09(.08) .09(.09) .08(.08)
Degree of Replacement -.17(.05)*** -.16(.05)** -.17(.05)*** -.17(.05)*** -.17(.05)**
Integration Capabilities
Knowledge Codification .16(.02)*** . 18(.02)*** .16(.02)*** .017(02)*** .17(.02)***
Experience Trajectories .05(.01) -.06(.01) .04(.01) .04(.01) .01 (.02)
F test 3.376*** 3.369*** 3.392*** 3.373*** 3.33***
Adjusted R-squared .064 .064 .064 .064 .063
d.f. residual 314 314 314 314 314
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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63 .2  Acquisition Performance
In this section the performance model was tested by considering the entire 
acquisition process, rather than the post-acquisition integration phase only. The main 
difference consists in adopting, as measure of performance, the change in ROA of the 
acquiring firm between the year before the acquisition and three years after the year o f 
the acquisition. That four-year time span is normally considered to be large enough to 
incorporate all relevant effects o f the post-acquisition phase, and small enough to avoid 
excessive dilution o f the main effects by exogenous events. Performance variations o f 
the entire acquiring firm offer also the advantage to incorporate eventual dilutive effects 
consequent to excessive deviations between the purchase price and the accounting value 
o f the acquired assets. Finally, as described in Chapter 5, the measure o f acquisition 
performance controlled for both industry-level and local-level variations in ROA.
The main analysis (section 6.3.2.1), performed at the transaction level o f analysis, 
was replicated by aggregating the multiple observations from the same year (section 
6.3.2.2) and then again aggregating all observations for the same acquiring firm (section 
6.4). In the process, the robustness of the model was tested with different specifications 
o f both the dependent variable and the explanatory ones.
6.3.2.1 Transaction Level o f  Analysis
A. Standard Model - Table 6.9 reports the results o f  an OLS regression analysis, which 
was analogous to the one done for the performance o f the post-acquisition integration 
process. Again the five models differed in terms o f the specification of the acquisition 
experience trajectory.
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Table 6.9 - OLS REGRESSION - (Acquisition Level of Analysis) 
Dependent Variable: CHANGE IN ROA (3 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition)
GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
Specialized By Geography Specialized by Asset Quality
In-Market Out-Market Good Quality Bad Quality
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Relative acquisition size .143(.004)*** .142(.004)*** .127(.004)** .145(.004)*** .135(.004)**
Acquirer’s size -.236(.000)*** -. 18(.000)*** -.179(.000)** -.244(.000)*** -.206(.000)***
#ofM & A s in yearO .465(.023)*** .371(.025)*** .487(.023)*** .465(.023)*** .473(.024)***
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness ,072(.095) .053(.093) .083(.095) .070(.095) .077(.095)
Resource quality -.127(.037)** -.108(.036)* -.137(.037)** -.130(.037)** -.127(.038)**
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration .20(.079)*** .198(.077)*** .181 (.080)*** .203(.079)*** .192(.079)***
Degree o f Replacement -.295(.04)*** -.306(.039)*** -.279(.040)*** -.292(.04)*** -.291(.04)***
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification .085(.014) .035(.014) .116(.013)* .086(.0l3) .094(.014)
Experience Trajectories .076(.006) .224(.011)*** -.066(.009) .089(.006) .035(.023)
F test 20.414*** 22.256*** 22.256*** 20.521*** 20.198***
Adjusted R-squared .473 .497 .497 .474 .470
d.f. residual 195 194 194 195 195
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
In addition to using the overall magnitude o f the adjusted R2 and the F-test 
statistics, the model fits can be assessed by comparing them with a “baseline'’ model 
comprising only the control variables, which provides the following results.
CONTROL VARIABLE OLS Regression of 
Change in ROA
Acquirer’s size .0031(.002)*
Transaction size (% o f  buyer’s assets) .0033(.004)
# of M&As in year 0 .139(.017)***
F-test 30.168***
Adjusted R-squared 26.1%
d.f. residual 245
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***) and 0 .10(*) level
The F-statistics in Table 6.9 remain at highly significant levels, while the adjusted 
R2 rises from 26% to values ranging from 47% to 49.7% for the complete models.
In terms of the impact o f  the individual variables on acquisition performance, the 
most striking similarity with the analysis o f  the post-acquisition integration process is in 
the coefficients o f the integration decisions, which are replicated in both their sign and 
their (statistically significant) magnitude. The level o f integration remains a positive 
factor in determining the performance of the overall acquisition process, whereas the 
degree to which the top management team is replaced is associated negatively with 
acquisition performance.
The effect o f the pre-acquisition resources is somewhat stronger than that found in
the previous analysis, but is still probably weaker than expected, particularly in
comparison with the relevance o f the post-acquisition decisions. The degree of resource
relatedness, though showing the expected positive sign, is not associated significantly
with performance, failing to support H9. The quality o f the assets o f the acquired bank is
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associated negatively and significantly with performance, providing empirical support for 
the superiority o f the resource deployment value creation mechanism as opposed to the 
“inverse learning” one (i.e., H10 is supported).
The effect o f the knowledge-based measures approximating the integration 
capability construct is less straightforward. Knowledge codification, which was weakly 
but significantly correlated with the performance of the integration process, is now a non 
significant but still positive factor, failing to support H I3. In contrast, experience 
trajectory specialized in highly related (horizontal) acquisitions shows a very strong 
positive effect on acquisition performance, supporting H I4. Hence, acquirers seem to 
learn by tacitly accumulating the wisdom generated by being exposed to a large number 
o f transactions, but only if  those transactions are highly related to each other. Consistent 
with the work o f Haleblian (1997; Haleblian & Flinkelstein, 1997), knowledge from 
previous acquisition experiences applied to unrelated domains is subject to strong transfer 
costs. Additional support for that point might be found in the negative (though non­
significant), coefficient o f  the accumulation o f out-market acquisition experience.
B. Interaction Effects - To probe these results further, the interaction effects between the 
integration decisions and the knowledge accumulation mechanisms were introduced into 
the standard model. The standardized proxies (z-scores) o f the post-acquisition decisions 
and the knowledge measures were used to model the interaction effects so that 
multicollinearity problems could be avoided. With that adjustment, the variance inflation 
factor for all variables in the models was held below 3.5 (values up to 10 are typically
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considered highly satisfactory). In addition, the tolerance factor was never below 30%, 
indicating that every variable entered into the model was non-redundant.
The results are reported in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12. The consequences o f the 
refinement are surprisingly strong. The impact o f  the main effects, in terms o f pre­
acquisition resources, post-acquisition decisions, and knowledge accumulation, does not 
vary substantively from that in the standard model but the introduction o f the interaction 
variables results in a better overall fit o f  the model with the data and a much more 
relevant and varied role for the knowledge accumulation mechanisms.
In terms o f overall fit, the adjusted R2 statistics rise above 50% (up to 58.5% in 
the case of in-market acquisition experience) with the introduction of the new set of 
explanatory variables. Because of the type and magnitude of their effects, the four 
interaction terms warrant closer scrutiny.
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Table 6.10 - GENERAL ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE -
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controls
Relative acquisition size .143(.004)*** .004(.004) .005(.004)
Acquirer’s size -.236(.000)*** -.001 (.002) -.002(.002)
#ofM & A s in yearO .465(.023)*** .141(.025)*** .128(.026)***
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness .072(.095) .106(.094) .101(.094)
Resource quality -.127(.037)** -.095(.036)*** -.101(.036)***
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration .20(.079)*** .356(.080)*** .377(.083)***
Degree o f Replacement -.295(.04)*** -.133(.042)*** -.142(.042)***
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification .085(.014) .0630103)
Acquisition Experience .076(.006) .007(.006)
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration .200(.058)*** .207(.061)***
Codification X Replacement -.1260050)*** -.121(.050)**
Experience X Replacement -.1190057)** -.1410058)**
Experience X Integration .1110075) .U4(.078)
F test 20.414*** 19.014*** 16.319***
Adjusted R-squared .473 .505 .507
d.f. residual 195 194 194
O
Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.11 - SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCE by Geographic Relatedness
IN-MARKET ACQ. EXPERIENCE OUT-MARKET ACQ. EXPERIENCE
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controls
Relative acquisition size .I42(.004)**» .003(.004) .005(.004) .127(004)** .006(.004) .005(.004)
Acquirer's size -.18(.000)*»* .000(.002) -,003(.002) -. I79(.000)** -.00l(.002) -.000(.003)
# ofM&As in year 0 ,37l(.025)*** .094( .028)♦ * * ,063(.028)** .487(.023)*** .I66(.025)*** .I6I(.025)***
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness .053(.093) .093(.089) .050(.086) .083(.095) .071 (.096) 075(.096)
Resource quality -.I08(.036)* -,09l(.034)*** -.085(.033)*** -,I37(,037)** -089(.036)** -.093(.037)***
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level of integration ,I98(.077)*** ,332(.079)*** ,303(.076)*** .I8l(.080)*** •309(,083)*** .265(.088)***
Degree of Replacement -,306(.039)*** -.I72(.040)*** -. 191(.039)*** -.279(.040)*** -. I08(.0I4)*** -.111(.041 )***
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification .035(.0I4) -.00l(.095) . 116(.013)* .089(. 102)
Acquisition Experience ,224(.0II)*** .043(.0I I)*** -,066(.009) -.0I0(.007)
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration . 187(.058)*** .212(057)*** .2I5(.053)*** .190(056)***
Codification X Replacement -,054(.050) -,058(,049) -. 150(.049)*** -.I44(.049)***
Experience X Replacement -,298(.062)*** -.279(.060)**» .030(.049) .026(.050)
Experience X Integration ,080(.09l) -.024(.093) .007(.072) .023(.074)
F test 22.256*** 22.468*** 21.917*** 22.256*** 18.237*** 15.656***
Adjusted R-squared .497 .576 .585 .497 .4% .497
d.f. residual 194 193 193 194 193 193
00
o
Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.12 - SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCE by Asset Quality of Targets 
Dependent Variable: CHANGE IN ROA (3 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition!
GOOD ASSET QUALITY ACQ. EXP. BAD ASSET QUALITY ACQ. EXPERIENCE
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controls
Relative acquisition size ,I45(.004)*** ,003(.004) .004(,004) ,I35(.004)** .005(.004) .005(.004)
Acquirer's size -.244(.000)*** -.001 (.002) -,00l(.002) -.206(.000)*** .000(.002) -.000(.002)
#ofM&As in yearO .465(.023)*»* .I37(.025)*** ,I28(.026)*** .473(.024)*** .133(.025)*** • I09(.026)***
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness .070(.095) .093(.094) .089(.094) ,077(.095) .083(.09l) .050(.090)
Resource quality -,I30(.037)** -.095(.036)*** -.102(.036)*** -.I27(.038)** -.I05(.035)*** -.09l(.035)***
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level of integration .203(079)* ♦* ,335(.079)*** .345(.083)*** .I92(.079)*** .30l(.083)*** .250(.083)***
Degree of Replacement -,292(.04)*** 124(.040)*** -. 129(,041 )** -,29l(.04)*** -. I57(.042)*** -. I8I(.042)***
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification .086(013) .078(. 101) .094(.0I4) .004(.098)
Acquisition Experience ,089(.006) .004(.O06) .035(.023) .072(.024)***
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration ,I84(,055)*** . 183(.058)*** .249(.056)*** .282(.057)***
Codification X Replacement 131(.049)*** -.125(.049)*** -.087(.05l)* -.088(.050)*
Experience X Replacement -.I2I(.056)** -. I34(.058)** -,202(.063)*** -.224(.063)***
Experience X Integration .I65(.076)** .I73(.078)** -.081 (.094) -.212(. 104)**
F test 20.521*** 19.251*** 16.366*** 20.198*** 20.657*** 19.048* ♦*
Adjusted R-squared .474 .509 .507 .47 .527 .547
d.f. residual 195 194 194 195 194 194
Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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The interaction between the degree of codification and the level o f  integration is 
probably the strongest, most unequivocal finding. Under all the specifications provided 
by the different experience trajectories, the effect is highly significant and related 
positively to the dependent variable. When coupled with high integration decisions, a 
cognitive effort aimed at extracting and codifying the knowledge tacitly accumulated is 
associated with a systematically improved ROA of the acquiring firm. However, if either 
o f the two covariates assume lower values, acquisition performance declines.
The combination o f  a high level of integration with tacit knowledge accumulation 
is typically not relevant in its performance implications. The only exception is provided 
by the experience trajectory that is specialized in the ‘‘good asset quality” type of 
acquisition, which positively influences the performance outcome. In the case of the 
accumulation of acquisition experience in poor-quality targets, the interaction term is 
surprisingly negative and significant, but that finding must be evaluated on the margin o f 
a positive and significant coefficient o f the main effect of that experience trajectory.
The interaction terms pertaining to replacement of the top management team 
negatively affect acquisition performance in all the acquisition experience scenarios, 
independently of the type o f knowledge mechanisms accompanying them. Routinizing 
and codifying those types o f  decisions appears to be hazardous in spite o f the possible 
learning effects. The replacement o f such a sensitive strategic resource as the leadership 
team is detrimental to performance, and the negative effects on performance are 
compounded when they are associated with a highly routinized and codified process.
In spite o f the statistical significance of these results, some words o f caution are in 
order. First, the discrepancies in the frequency of observation o f the (accounting-based)
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dependent variable and o f  the (transaction-based) explanatory variables are o f concern. 
Acquisitions, particularly in the banking industry, are relatively frequent events, which 
often occur at various times within one year. All acquisitions completed in the same 
year, however, will have the same measure o f the dependent variable (change in ROA). 
One way to reduce that problem is to aggregate the acquisitions announced by the same 
firm in the same year, so that both dependent and independent variables vary with the 
same “clock.” Far from being a perfect remedy, however, this “solution,” presented in 
section 6.3.2.2, merely shifts the issue to the explanatory side o f the equation. In fact, one 
must register the loss o f  measurement precision caused by the averaging o f the resource 
characteristics and the post-acquisition integration decisions across different acquisitions 
announced in the same year.
Second, unobserved heterogeneity and firm effects may be highly relevant. 
Another potential problem with the preceding analysis is the possibility that firm effects 
are influencing the results without being captured in the explanatory variables. For 
example, Banc One might have a distinctive trait that explains its success with 
acquisitions but is not captured in the firm-level variables introduced in the model (i.e., 
the capability proxies). That problem is serious because firm effects are at the core o f our 
theoretical analysis o f acquisition-specific organizational capabilities, and therefore 
cannot simply be “controlled for” with rough techniques such as firm-level dummies.
The route chosen was to test the same set o f  hypotheses at the firm level of analysis, 
where any idiosyncratic feature o f certain acquirers would be reduced in its magnitude 
(one observation) and in its possibility o f systematically affecting the results. The 
replication o f the results obtained at the transaction level with the data aggregated at the
ill
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firm level would provide, in addition to an obvious robustness test, partial protection 
from the presence o f unobserved heterogeneity in the traits o f  the acquiring firms. See 
section 6.4 for a  discussion o f the results o f the firm-level analysis performance.
Finally, robustness is a problem. The issues described above indirectly address 
robustness issues, at least in the proposed “remedies.” The baseline model was in fact 
replicated with two increasing degrees of aggregation o f the data (sections 6.3.2.2 and 
6.4). In addition, the analysis in this section implies several variations in the 
specification o f the tacit knowledge accumulation measure and the crucial introduction of 
a set of interaction effects. One additional way o f testing the robustness o f the main 
results is by varying the specification o f the dependent variable. For example, a three- 
year rather than a four-year lag could be considered in computing the change in ROA. 
Alternatively, the model was tested with two additional specifications o f the firm-level 
accounting performance: the long-term (12-year) change in ROA and the current (1996) 
levels of the same measure.
6.3.2.2 Firm/Year Level o f  Analysis
An analysis was done which replicated the one described in the preceding section 
with a dataset that aggregated the observations at the firm/year level. All acquisitions 
completed by the same acquirer during the same year were collapsed into a single 
observation. The goal o f that transformation was to enhance the consistency between the 
frequency o f observation o f the dependent variable (annual) and that of the set o f 
independent variables, which typically vary for every transaction observed.
The two resource-based measures (relatedness and quality) were replaced with the
percentage of assets acquired through in-market transactions and through the acquisition
112
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of poor-quality banks, respectively, during the particular year. The post-acquisition 
decisions were averaged to yield an approximation of the integration and replacement 
approach followed by the acquiring bank in that year. In the controls, the relative 
acquisition size was the sum o f the relative sizes of all the transactions completed in the 
same year.
The analysis incorporated the lessons learned in the preceding section and 
involved the four interaction terms between the post-acquisition decisions and the 
knowledge-based variables, as well as the same kind of model specifications along the 
five types of acquisition experience trajectories. A weighted least squares multiple 
regression method was used, where the weights were assigned by the number o f 
transactions completed during a given year.
The results reported in Table 6.13 essentially confirm the findings obtained with 
the complete dataset1 *. The fit with the data remains strong and actually improves for 
the general experience and for the good asset quality specialized experience by seven to 
eight percentage points to reach 57.5% and 58.6%, respectively. What explains the 
improvement in the fit o f those two models is the stronger positive effect o f the tacit 
knowledge accumulation mechanism, which was not significant in the previous 
specification. The interaction effects replicate the results described above, with a 
consistently significant and positive effect o f  the interaction term between knowledge 
codification and level o f integration on performance, and a negative effect o f the 
interaction term between tacit routinization and degree of replacement.
11 Note that the sign o f the coefficient for resource quality is positive and opposite to the one shown in all 
the previous analyses because o f  the inverse specification o f the measure. The quality o f the acquired 
assets hurts acquisition performance.
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Along the same lines, the post-acquisition decisions preserve intact both the sign 
and the magnitude o f  their performance effects. The resource characteristics, in contrast, 
lose more explanatory power with respect to the previous results. Resource quality, 
generally significant in the previous models, is now only marginally relevant, whereas 
resource relatedness remains positive but non-significant in its performance implications.
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Table 6.13 - WLS REGRESSIONS - Acquisition Performance (firm/year level of analysis)
Weight = N of aca. in the same year. Deo. Variable: CHANGE IN ROA 13 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition!
GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
Specialized By Geography Specialized by Asset Quality
In-Market Out-Market Good Quality Bad Quality
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Controls
Acquirer's size -.411*** -.032 -.190 -.458*** .048
Relative acquisition size .070 .054 .070 .062 .061
Resource-Based Factors
% of assets in-mkt .003 -.015 .069 .006 .024
% of assets in bad banks .127 .120 .257 .150* .156*
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration .291*** .238** .315*** .257*** .293***
Degree of Replacement -.286*** -.258** -.422*** l 00
 
! * -.401***
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification -.015 -.043 .072 -.001 -.015
Cumulative Acq Experience .310*** .229** .080 .305*** .181
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration .282*** .221** .309*** .270*** .284***
Codification X Replacement I © -.053 -.242** -.167* -.028
Experience X Replacement -.523*** -.336*** -.301 -.621*** -.318***
Experience X Integration .200* .108 .242 .270** .017
F test 11.844*** 12.375*** 6.652*** 12.319*** 8.993***
Adjusted R-squared .575 .590 .417 .586 .500
d.f. residual 96 95 95 96 96
Standardized beta coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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6.4 Organizational Performance
The claim was made in Chapters 3 and 4 that the creation of organizational 
capabilities can be studied by measuring both the way in which and the extent to which 
firms accumulate knowledge from previous experiences. If that were the case, we should 
expect organizational performance to improve in a stable way once those capabilities are 
developed and utilized.
The robustness o f  the findings obtained from the analysis o f the acquisition 
performance models was then evaluated by testing a similar model with the data 
aggregated at the firm level. Such replication provided some protection against the 
possibility that strong firm-level effects undetected in the specification o f the model may 
eventually influence the relationship between the dependent and the measured 
independent variables.
The approach adopted to aggregate the transaction-level measures to the firm 
level was identical to the one used in the firm/year-level analysis. However, the 
aggregation process was brought to the extreme end, where only one observation per 
acquiring bank was recorded.
Because of the scarcity o f degrees o f freedom, it was necessary to select a
parsimonious model by eliminating some of the independent variables used in the
previous versions. The first “cut” was made to the control variables (i.e., the size o f the
acquiring firm and the relative size o f the transaction(s)). It was not likely to hurt the
quality o f the analysis because o f the marginal relevance of the coefficients o f those
variables in the previous analyses (see Tables 6.10 through 6.13). The selection of the
knowledge-based variables was more delicate. The criterion chosen was to select the
116
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measures that best fit the data in the previous analyses: the accumulation o f in-market 
acquisition experience for the tacit capability-building component, and the interaction 
between knowledge codification and the level o f  integration. Several other specifications 
o f the model, with or without interaction terms and with different proxies o f the 
knowledge codification construct, were performed with either similar or worse results. 
Notable among the results of the alternative specifications are the positive and significant 
correlation shown in Table 6.15 between the percentage o f  assets purchased with high 
degrees o f codification (more than six o f the 11 tools) and the short-term firm 
performance measures.
Table 6.14 reports the results o f  four OLS regression analyses of the 
“parsimonious” model defined above and Table 6.15 reports the means, standard 
deviations, and Pearson correlations o f the variables used in the analysis, as well as some 
of the most important alternative covariates. The variation among the four models 
proposed is now provided by the definition of the dependent variable. The first two 
models used the average o f the short-term change in ROA between the year before and 
years two and three after the acquisition. The other two models regressed a longer-term 
performance measure: the 10-year change in ROA (1987/96) and the most current 
performance levels (1996 ROA). The coefficients are reported in their standardized form 
to facilitate the comparison among different measurements of the dependent variable.
117
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 6.14 - OLS REGRESSION - Organizational Performance 
Dependent Variables: Short-term and long-term change of ROA
VARIABLE ROA Ch.
+3 vs. -1
ROA Ch.
+2 vs. -1
ROACh
1987-96
ROA 1996
Resource-based Factors
% o f  assets in bad banks .316* .243 .031 .010
% of assets in-mkt .147 .059 .432*** .280*
Post-acq. Decisions
Replacement -.173 -.141 -.256 -.552***
Integration .275 .304* .424** .747***
Integration Capability
Acq. experience (local) .421** .414** .327** .192
Codification X integration .040 .128 .489** .501***
F test 2.992** 3.012** 4.216*** 5.971***
Adjusted R-squared .278 .280 .343 .460
d.f. residual 31 I 1 .. 37 35
Standardized Beta coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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TABLE 6.15 - CORRELATION MATRIX - FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 ROA change 
(+ 2 vs. -1 years)
-.0445 .2986
2 ROA change 
(+3 vs. -1 years)
-.0347 .4027 .935 
♦ * ♦
3 ROA 19% -.026 .2662 .702**•
.702
***
4 ROA change 87-96 -.0231 .5146 .668 .724 
♦ ♦♦
.693
*♦*
5 % assets invested in 
“bad" banks acq
.315 .346 .324
*
.326
*
.080 .084
6 % assets invested in 
in-market acq
.5%9 .3349
.010
.094 -.063 .252 -.004
7 Replacement 2.1441 .8067
.101
-.052 -.281
*
-.138 .206 .381
**
8 Integration 2.600 .5669 .391
*♦
.350 
♦ *
.385
**
.163 -.153 .065 .123
9 General acquisition 
experience
13.02 12.31 .206 .131 .245 .180 -.024 -.357
**
-.439*** .179
10 Experience in in­
market acq.
6.756 7.538 .529
***
.470
**♦
.464 
♦ ♦♦
.493
*♦*
-.082 -.130 -.244 .197 .743***
11 Experience in out- 
markct acq.
4.022 5.408 .048 .006 -.013 -.114 -.133 -.535 
♦ **
-.601
»»*
-.133 .481
***
.262
12 Experience in 
“good" banks acq.
7.704 8.756 .369 
♦ *
.332
**
.322
**
.296
*
-.175 -.340 
♦ ♦
-.587
***
.018 .746
***
.784
***
.758
***
13 Experience in “bad" 
banks acq.
2.863 2.977 .352
**
.246 .207 .194 .057 -.240 .012 .157 .550 .723
***
.245 .432
***
14 Codification 
(# of tools)
6.340 3.185 .014 .09 .001 .007 -.106 -.282
♦
-.211 .104 .305
*»
.275 .368
*+
.389
***
.281
*
15 % of assets bought 
with > 6 tools
28.74 39.83 .229 .362 
♦ ♦
.163 .164 .067 -.398
**
-.285
*
.060 .353
**
.301 .296
*
.380
**
.213 .671
***
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The results o f each o f the four regression models broadly confirm the signs o f the 
performance effects obtained in the previous analysis. Their magnitude and statistical 
power, however, vary both with respect to the previous results and among the four 
models reported.
The short-term performance models confirm the primary role o f localized, tacit 
knowledge accumulation mechanisms, whereas the codification process fails to affect 
organizational performance significantly even when interacting with the level o f  
integration. The post-acquisition integration decisions maintain the sign o f their 
performance effects, but their magnitude is only marginally significant for the level o f 
integration (with the two-year ROA lag) and not significant for the degree of 
replacement. The degree o f relatedness also is not statistically significant, but on 
performance of resource quality the negative influence is confirmed. One explanation for 
the weaker fit is the lack of degrees o f freedom due to the aggregated data and missing 
data for some of the respondents. The impression is confirmed by the fact that the 
adjusted R2 statistic is still around 28%, and that the addition of only six degrees o f 
freedom to the long-term performance models significantly improves the statistical 
significance of the individual variables and the fit of the entire model.
The long-term performance models provide a much clearer picture o f the 
relevance o f the acquisition-based explanations for the success o f  the competitive 
interaction in this industry context. First, the overall model fits the data much better, with 
F-tests rising from around 3 to 4.2 and 6.0, and adjusted R2 increasing to 34.3% for the 
10-year change in performance and 46% for the 1996 performance. The individual 
variables also have generally stronger t-statistics, with the exception o f resource quality
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and, surprisingly, tacit acquisition experience. The latter remains significantly associated 
with the 10-year change in ROA, but does not influence current performance in a 
statistically significant way. In both long-term performance models, the knowledge- 
based measure that reflects the crucial role o f capability building is the interaction 
between knowledge codification and level o f  integration. The standardized coefficient of 
that measure is the largest in the 10-year change in performance model (.489). and is 
even larger (.501) in the current performance model.
The two post-acquisition decisions have large, significant coefficients in the 
current performance model. The positive effects o f the level of integration account for a 
change of .747 standard deviations from the mean of ROA in 1996, and the negative 
effect o f the replacement o f top managers decreases ROA .552 standard deviations, for an 
increase o f 1 standard deviation in the explanatory variable. The influence o f the 
resource-based factors on the long-term performance of the acquiring firm is somewhat 
surprising given the type of results obtained at the acquisition level o f analysis. Resource 
quality becomes almost irrelevant, whereas the degree of relatedness turns out to be a 
significant explanation, particularly in the case of the 10-year change in ROA. Possibly 
the acquiring firms that concentrated on in-market acquisitions rather than market 
extension ones had the worst performance levels in the 1980s, but achieved the best 
performance improvements over time because o f the superior learning dynamics afforded 
by that type of acquisition. Conversely, out-market acquisitions might have been 
completed more frequently by well-performing acquirers, and the potential for 
performance improvement over the years was therefore correspondingly lower.
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from the results o f  the analysis. The first is 
that the key findings obtained at the acquisition level o f  analysis are essentially 
replicated, which demonstrates their robustness to changes in model specification and to 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the accumulation o f wisdom from 
previous acquisition experiences seems to be a crucial element for both short-term and 
long-term performance in the banking industry. That observation supports the conjecture 
advanced in Chapter 3 that the accumulation of knowledge in both tacit and codified form 
can explain the creation and evolution o f organizational capabilities. It also supports the 
claim that the study o f  those knowledge accumulation processes is crucial for gaining an 
improved understanding of the roots of competitive advantage.
6.5 Putting It All Together
A summary outline o f the analyses performed and the key findings derived from 
them follows.
1. The explanation of the type of post-acquisition decisions adopted by acquiring
firms supports the theoretical modeling:
1.1. The degree o f resource relatedness, proxied by the geographic overlap of 
the network o f branches, positively influences the level o f integration and 
the degree o f replacement o f the top management team.
1.2. The quality o f target’s resources, proxied by its prior performance, 
negatively influences the same integration decisions.
1.3. The codification o f acquisition experience raises the probability of a high
level o f  integration and of high replacement o f top managers.
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1.4. For the tacit knowledge accumulation mechanisms, a distinction was made 
between path-dependence and routinization effects:
1.4.1. Path-dependence effects are relevant in explaining the level of 
integration. A high level of generalized acquisition experience 
positively affects integration, whereas a high level o f experience in 
non-local (market expansion) acquisitions actually reduces the 
probability o f a high integration decision, ceteris paribus.
1.4.2. Routinization effects are the strongest predictors o f both 
integration decisions. The decision taken in the context o f an 
acquisition completed at any time before the current one strongly 
predicts the current one, ceteris paribus.
The type o f post-acquisition decisions adopted by the acquiring firm chiefly 
determines the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, measured 
with ex-post qualitative assessments o f different sub-processes:
2.1. The degree to which the acquired firm is integrated with the acquirer’s 
organization enhances performance.
2.2. The replacement o f the top management team o f the acquired firm hinders 
performance.
2.3. Pre-acquisition resource characteristics have no statistically significant 
effect on the linear combination of the three performance assessments, 
whereas the degree o f relatedness positively influences the perception of 
performance o f the overall integration process (single indicator).
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2.4. Knowledge codification is associated positively but weakly with post­
acquisition performance. No effect o f  tacit experience trajectories on 
qualitative performance assessments was detected in the data.
3. The subjective performance assessments, however, are weakly related to the 
performance of the overall acquisition process, as measured by the variation in 
accounting performance o f the acquiring firm. O f the three assessments, only the 
performance o f the human resources affiliation process has a statistically 
significant correlation with the accounting measure.
4. Once the performance o f the entire acquisition process is taken into consideration 
through the use o f  accounting measures, results change substantially:
4.1. The quality o f  resources is associated negatively with performance. The 
degree o f relatedness maintains a positive but non-significant effect.
4.2. The post-acquisition decisions confirm the strong influences identified 
above (see 2.1 and 2.2).
4.3. Tacit knowledge accumulation positively affects acquisition and firm 
performance, but only if highly localized (i.e., experience in in-market 
acquisitions). Transferring tacit knowledge to unrelated domains implies 
the assumption of risks of incorrect generalization (transfer costs).
4.4. Knowledge codification does not affect acquisition performance with the 
standard model specification (i.e., with only the main effects).
5. The introduction o f interaction terms among integration decisions and knowledge 
accumulation mechanisms improves the fit o f  the model with the data and reveals 
several significant effects:
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5.1. The interaction term between the degree o f knowledge codification and 
the level o f  integration systematically improves acquisition performance 
under all the acquisition experience scenarios. The cognitive effort 
produced to make sense of the lessons learned in previous acquisition 
experiences and to incorporate them into ad-hoc tools seems to be 
associated with stronger performance, but only if  the effort is associated 
with high integration decisions. When associated with a low integration 
approach, the codification effort might produce unnecessary levels of 
bureaucratization o f the integration process in its decision-making and/or 
its implementation stages.
5.2. The interaction term between the replacement o f the top management team 
and the accumulation o f acquisition experience negatively influences 
performance. The routinization of that decision is therefore hazardous in 
spite o f its potential for organizational learning effects, and might actually 
worsen performance levels, ceteris paribus.
6. The model seems to be robust to different specifications:
6.1. Aggregating observations in the same year to gain consistency between 
the measures o f the independent variable and the accounting numbers;
6.2. Aggregating observations to the firm level o f analysis to reduce the 
exposure to firm effects not included in the treatment o f acquisition- 
specific organizational capabilities;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6.3. Adopting a different time lag in the measurement of the dependent
variable (change in ROA two years or three years after the acquisition vs. 
the year before)
7. At the firm level o f  analysis, the long-term performance of the acquiring firm is 
strongly influenced by the type of integration decision adopted in its acquisition 
activity, and by the accumulation of acquisition experience in both tacit and 
explicit form. The limitations to the effectiveness o f  the two knowledge 
accumulation mechanisms (see 4.3 and 5.1) apply also to the explanation o f long­
term firm performance, both in its static (current level) and dynamic (10-year 
variation) specification.
8. The data analyzed, then, support the claim that knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms translate into the creation o f organizational capabilities useful for the 
improvement o f process outcomes and o f short- and long-term firm performance.
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7. DISCUSSION
What do the study findings mean for the underlying theories? How might they 
improve our theoretical understanding of the ways firms develop capabilities from 
heterogeneous and infrequent events? How might they advance the discourse on whether 
and how firms can create value through M&A activity? How could the results affect the 
way managers ought to think about undertaking such endeavors?
This chapter assesses the potential contributions o f the study to the emerging 
“knowledge-based view” of the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant 1996). It first 
highlights how the findings might further the debate on the underlying theories 
(evolutionary economics and organizational learning), then applies the newly derived 
wisdom to the issue o f whether and how value is created from acquisition processes. 
Further, because o f the relevance o f the M&A phenomenon in the corporate world, some 
observations are made about the lessons practitioners might derive from the study results. 
The chapter concludes by providing some words o f caution on the limitations inherent in 
the research design adopted and the results obtained.
7.1 Implications for the Knowledge-Based View of the Firm
This dissertation represents perhaps the first empirical test of Nelson and Winter’s 
ideas on process routinization to be performed at the process level of analysis. Further, 
the test was conducted in a context in which the theory is least likely to be applicable, 
where low task frequency and low task homogeneity heavily tax the power o f routine- 
based explanations. In such extreme settings, the theory must be amended in some
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important respects, but it proves to be a strong and robust explanation for both 
organizational decision-making and performance outcomes.
7.1.1 The Virtues of Codification
The first adjustment pertained to the role o f knowledge codification in the development 
o f organizational capabilities. Under “normal” circumstances, the creation o f written 
tools embodying the collective understanding o f what is supposed to be done under what 
conditions does not necessarily provide any material benefit to the performance outcomes 
o f the process under analysis. A key finding o f the study is that, under conditions o f low 
frequency and homogeneity o f the task, knowledge codification can actually be 
particularly helpful. It can help explain how firms make decisions and, most importantly, 
aid our attempts to explain the performance o f those processes. In particular, the results 
on the performance implications o f codification under the condition o f high complexity, 
namely that codification does not affect performance directly but through its interaction 
with the level of integration, are inherently interesting. Higher levels o f integration of 
acquired firms imply higher degrees o f complexity in the implementation of post­
acquisition processes, which would then enable the codification mechanisms to show 
their positive effects on performance through the development o f an ad-hoc integration 
capability. As outlined in Chapter 3, the rationale for that result depends less on the 
protection codified tools provide against the decay of organizational memory than on the 
processes by which the codes are created. Those processes entail the production o f a 
collective, coordinated cognitive effort, which constitutes a crucial element in our 
understanding of how organizational capabilities are created.
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The introduction o f  the cognitive element into the standard evolutionary 
economics discourse, which has been built on tacit knowledge accumulation mechanisms, 
is itself an important refinement o f  the theory. Such emphasis is consistent with Gavetti 
and Levinthal's (1997) simulation work on cognition in rugged landscapes, which models 
the cognitive element as the reduction o f the number o f dimensions by decision-makers 
during a search process in complex (i.e., where firm attributes are highly interdependent) 
environments. In the context studied, the creation o f a post-acquisition integration 
manual or a computer-based staffing model assumes a similar role: it simplifies the 
reality of a multidimensional decisional space and thereby facilitates the decision-making 
and eventually the implementation process. It is intriguing to observe that, far from 
swinging the agent away from the optimal decisional path, that process might actually 
enhance the probability o f its success in search tasks, as well as in post-acquisition 
integration processes.
7.1.2 The Limits of Codification
The data analyzed in the study show some clear limitations to the effectiveness o f  the
knowledge codification process. The degree o f  knowledge codification directly affects
neither acquisition nor firm performance. Its influence on both dependent variables
comes in two forms; (I) through the effect on the type o f post-acquisition integration
decisions selected by the acquiring firm and (2) through the performance implication of
its interaction with the level o f  integration. The interpretation that could be given to
those results is that the degree of knowledge codification translates into a positive force
for task and organizational performance only under the condition of high levels o f
activity or use of the underlying knowledge. In other words, codifying an integration
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process characterized by a low level o f  integration is not only futile, but can actually 
harm the performance o f  the process itself, perhaps because o f the excessive bureaucratic 
load put on the acquiring organization. At low levels o f integration, a group of expert but 
“non-codified” integration managers may well perform better than an equally expert 
group that invests in and relies on a large set o f manuals and electronic support tools.
7.1.3 Limits to Tacit Knowledge Accumulation
As reported in Chapter 6 (Tables 6.9 through 6.12), acquiring firms appear to 
benefit from the tacit accumulation o f knowledge from previous acquisition experiences. 
Two findings are particularly relevant for evaluating the limitations o f tacit knowledge 
accumulation in the context studied:
1) Tacit knowledge accumulation is highly “local.” Experience from previous 
acquisitions completed in dissimilar contexts does not accumulate in an effective way 
(i.e., it does not contribute to the construction o f an organizational capability). Only 
the accumulation of experience in homogeneous contexts, such as acquisitions in 
similar geographic areas, can enable the firm to improve on previous performance 
without the support o f  a full-blown cognitive effort and independently o f how much 
the tacitly developed practices have been codified.
2) Tacit knowledge accumulation is detrimental to performance when applied to
particularly sensitive decisions. The data show that in addition to having a negative
main effect on performance, the replacement of the top management team is
associated significantly with lower quality o f outcomes when it occurs with high
levels of tacit experience. Although the interaction effect between codification and
replacement is also negative, its smaller magnitude (see Table 6.13) indicates that the
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cognitive processes underlying the degree of codification afford some protection from 
the errors associated with applying routinized behaviors where deliberate cognition is 
necessary.
The last point introduces another important amendment to our current understanding o f 
routinization and codification processes. There might be a set o f  decisions that ought to 
be considered neither routinizable nor codifiable. Many decisions, such as the degree of 
integration, must be supported by a  high level of codification and routinization to 
overcome the inherently negative effects o f structural and decisional complexity (see 
section 4.1.1). Other decisions, the replacement o f the top management team might be an 
example in point, should be driven primarily by deliberate considerations based on the 
characteristics of pre-acquisition resources. When routinized, such decisions tend to have 
a negative effect on performance. The difference between the first and second types of 
decisions is not at all clear and is beyond the scope of the study but the finding shows the 
relevance o f the question and highlights it as warranting further exploration.
7.1.4 Routines and Capabilities
As a partial consequence of that line o f reasoning, one could use the empirical evidence 
uncovered in the study to speculate and attempt to pinpoint more firmly the relationship 
between organizational routines and organizational capabilities. In dynamic contexts, 
routines are to be seen as constituting both a positive and a negative determinant o f the 
process of creating organizational capabilities in dynamic environments. The elements 
that determine which sign can be assigned to the causal relationship can be summarized 
with the following list o f preconditions (Figure 7.1 is a diagram o f the arguments):
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Fig. 7.1 - From Routines to Capabilities
Routines Capabilities
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Stability of personnel. The first element pertains to facilitating the tacit accumulation of 
knowledge in the minds o f the individuals involved. To the extent that the group of 
individuals operating the routine is relatively stable in its composition for a sufficient 
amount of time, experiences from past executions can accumulate in the individuals’ 
memories and be shared with the other group members. The sharing fosters a common 
understanding and expertise in the execution of the routines.
Monitoring In the more explicit forms o f knowledge accumulation, effective feedback 
mechanisms are the first prerequisite for the group o f individuals operating the routine to 
become aware o f either the absolute or relative (compared to relevant competitors) 
quality o f their routine. The degree to which monitoring mechanisms are developed and 
consistently used within an organization is a second necessary (Sabel, 1994), albeit not
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sufficient, condition for routinized behavior to turn into organizational capabilities, as it 
supports the correct functioning of the following two mechanisms.
Cognition. It consists o f  a collective effort to examine the performance feedback from 
past experiences and to generalize abstract causal mechanisms correlating decisions and 
implementation actions with the quality o f the performance feedback. The aim is then to 
at least partially reduce the level of causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) and to 
facilitate the generalization from heterogeneous experiences by an in-depth study o f  the 
little empirical evidence available. It also identifies the necessary modifications to the 
current routines that are supposed to correct or improve the expected performance levels 
in future experiences. The cognitive activity is manifested, for example, in post-event 
debriefing sessions where the decisions made and the implementation steps taken are 
recalled, and the performance outcomes are identified and discussed. It is bounded by the 
natural limitations o f  human rationality and by the necessary degree of speculation and 
conjecture about the types and magnitudes o f cause-effect relationships. However, the 
presence and the effectiveness o f these collective learning mechanisms should afford a 
material advantage for organizations that are attempting to turn current routines into 
organizational capabilities, subject to the existence and effectiveness o f performance 
monitoring systems.
Codification In many cases, the cognitive activity needs to be enhanced and supported 
by the explicit codification o f the newly generated wisdom. That process entails the 
development o f new manuals, blueprints, or specialized support systems, or the updating 
o f current ones. In addition, to the extent that the post-event debriefing efforts described 
above generate written documentation of the decisions and performance implications of
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the experience; one can consider that output a form o f codified knowledge. Codification 
can facilitate the transformation of routines in capabilities as the process through which 
the codes are created and updated force the organization to make a fuller use o f the 
performance monitoring systems and to produce a deeper cognitive effort to penetrate the 
causal ambiguity tying actions with performance during experienced events.
7.1.5 Codification and Codifiability
One final lesson from the data pertains to the relationship between process codification 
and knowledge codifiability. Given a certain degree o f codifiability (Winter, 1987;
Kogut & Zander, 1992) of the knowledge underlying a certain process, the study shows 
that firms typically do not codify their process to the full extent possible. Some firms 
codify more than others that have comparable levels o f  experience (see Table 6.1 and 
Figure 6.2) because they are willing to allocate more time and effort to the codification 
process. In the model on long-term organizational performance, the statistical 
significance o f the interaction term between codification and integration assigns strategic 
relevance to die decision to invest time, effort, and resources to generate the desired level 
of codification. That strategic aspect of knowledge codification, and its likely 
consequences for the creation of organizational capabilities, might constitute one more 
crucial link between the organizational learning and strategic management literatures, and 
may provide fertile ground for future research. Further, it might indicate the existence o f 
an “optimal” degree of codification of a certain practice, given a certain degree of 
codifiability o f its underlying knowledge, where the location of the optimum is
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influenced by task features such as its complexity (number and interdependence o f its 
sub-tasks, causal ambiguity etc.).
7.2 Implications for the M&A Theory
The first question that anyone, scholar or practitioner, asks about mergers and 
acquisitions is whether firms consistently create value from them. The predominant 
evidence from studies o f stock price reactions shows no creation of abnormal returns, on 
average, from the perspective o f the acquiring company’s shareholders (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983; Franks, Harris & Titman, 1991; Loderer & Martin, 1992). Some studies 
actually show a systematic value destruction from acquisition activities, which Agrawal, 
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) quantify as 10% o f the acquirer’s market value over five 
years.
The data gathered in the study are not exceptions to that empirical regularity. 
Table 7.1 summarizes the means and the two-tailed t-tests o f the various performance 
measures available at both the acquisition and the firm levels o f analysis.
Table 7.1 -  Tests for the deviation from 0 of the mean of performance distributions
MEASURE Mean Std
Dev
N t-
statistic
P-
value
Acquisition Level
Ch. in ROA (3 yrs after) .0284 .7255 291 .669 .504
Ch. in ROA (2 yrs after) .0450 .6683 371 1.298 .195
Ch. in ROA (1 year after) -.0175 .4300 448 -.861 .390
Firm Level
Ch. in ROA (3 yrs after) -.0347 .4027 39 -.538 .594
Ch. in ROA (2 yrs after) -.0445 .2986 40 -.942 .352
Ch. in ROA (1 year after) -.0545 .2361 44 -1.531 .133
Ch. in ROA 1987-1996 -.0231 .5146 46 -.304 .763
Avg. ROA 1991-1996 .0170 .1826 46 .630 .532
ROA 1996 -.0263 .2662 44 -.655 .516
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Though the signs vary with the level o f analysis and the particular time horizon 
adopted, none o f  the means shown is statistically distinguishable from zero. One 
observation of note involves the comparison of the means o f the short-term changes in 
ROA (two and three years after the acquisition) at the two levels o f  analysis. The means 
for the acquisition level are positive in sign, whereas those at the firm level, resulting 
from the aggregation o f all the observations per firm, are negative. The explanation is 
that the frequency o f M&A experience, which is irrelevant in the aggregated case where 
every acquirer accounts for only one observation, improves the acquirer’s ROA and 
therefore produces a higher (and positive) average at the acquisition level o f analysis. 
The finding can be viewed as partial evidence that experience matters when firms 
conduct acquisition activity.
Another hint from the economics and finance literature comes from some of the 
most recent studies which have taken a longitudinal view of the problem o f the location 
of the mean of the performance distribution. Schleifer and Vishny (1994), for example, 
found a significant difference in the value-creation record between mergers in the 1960s 
and those in the 1980s, with the latter seeming to outperform the former. Along similar 
lines, Loderer and Martin (1992) found that “negative performance in the second and 
third year after the acquisition is most prominent in the 1960s, and to a lesser extent in 
the 1970s, but not in the 1980s” (p. 70). The explanation for acquisition under­
performance, then, may not be some inherent value-destruction quality o f mergers and 
acquisitions, as implicitly suggested by the literature, but instead a general lack of 
capability to manage those activities, a capability that has been developing slowly at the 
population level over the decades.
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This study seems to provide initial support for that learning-based explanation of 
acquisitive behavior and performance. Shifting the attention from the average to the 
variance o f  the distribution o f  acquisition performance, it focuses first on explanatory 
variables related to the characteristics o f  the two firms involved in the acquisitions. The 
theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.3) then adds a second class of 
explanations, the types o f decisions made by the acquiring firm after completion o f the 
acquisition (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Shanley, 1994). The analyses show that 
certain types of integration decisions systematically outperform others. An integration 
strategy formed by the combination o f  a high level o f integration and a low degree of 
replacement of the key resources o f  the target firm, or convergence (see Figures 4.2 and
7.2), should outperform all other approaches. One way to verify that effect in concrete 
terms is by using the coefficients o f  one o f the models estimated and computing the 
variation of the dependent variable for the various permutations offered by the two post­
acquisition integration decisions studied. Figure 7.2 reports the results o f such 
computations in the case of the coefficients estimated with the model showing the best fit 
with the data, the one using the accumulation o f in-market acquisition experience (Table 
6.11; the other experience trajectories yield qualitatively similar results). The value 
codings for the explanatory variables follow.
•  Integration was coded 3 (complete) for high and 2 (partial) for low.
•  Replacement was coded 3 (complete) for high and 0 (all retained) for low.
•  All the other variables were entered at their mean values
The dependent variable was measured in terms of the difference between the 
ROA three years after the acquisition and the ROA one year before. Also, the two values
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were computed as the difference between the acquirer’s ROA and the average ROA in its 
geographic area. The entries in the table are the acquirer’s change in net earnings levels 
(the product o f ROA with total assets) over four years, minus that o f its key competitors.
Fig. 7.2 - Value Creation and 
Post-Acquisition Strategies
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Degree of 
Replacement
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The use o f a convergence strategy by the average bank in the sample, with $26.4
billion in assets and managing the “average” acquisition ($2.14 billion in assets, see
Table 5.1), improves the bank’s net earnings by $145.4 million more than its competitors.
This translates into a creation o f  competitive value totaling 58.9% o f the average
purchase price o f $ 246.7 million over the three year period. At the opposite extreme.
managing an acquisition by using a restructuring approach (total replacement and
incomplete integration) results in a $85.8 million loss, compared with the earnings
variation of competitors.
Finally, as a third explanation for the variance o f acquisition performance, the
framework introduces the notion o f a specific integration capability that the acquiring
firm might develop. That proposal represents the core argument of the study, and appears
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to be generally supported by the analysis o f the data gathered. Acquiring firms seem able 
to fine-tune their integration practices progressively, thereby developing idiosyncratic 
(tacit) routines and codified support tools which, under the conditions specified above, 
generate systematically superior results. In a scenario analysis similar to the one 
described above, an average acquirer will lose an average $40.7 million at its first 
attempt, whereas an acquirer with 10 in-market acquisitions already completed will earn 
$73.5 million more than its competitors during the next three years, all others conditions 
being equal. Importantly, the selection of adequate strategies and the development of 
superior practices appear to afford both short-term and long-term performance benefits.
The issue of systematic value creation, however critical, is not the only one 
addressed in the research that ought to be of core interest to M&A and corporate strategy 
scholars in general. The data allowed a comparative assessment of the explanatory power 
of the three classes of exogenous variables identified in the performance framework.
From the analyses reported in Chapter 6 (see section 6.5 for a summary o f the main 
results), hypotheses involving the resource-based primitives o f performance, which are 
frequently invoked by strategy scholars and are so far the only ones subject to large-scale 
empirical testing, generated only limited support. The leading role, in terms o f the 
magnitude of the effect on performance, is taken instead by the two post-acquisition 
integration decisions in a strong and complex partnership with the measures 
approximating the two knowledge accumulation mechanisms.
Moving from classes o f explanations to the specific effects of the individual 
variables, the analyses suggest the importance of the particular contribution o f each of the
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two resource-based and the two integration decision constructs introduced in the models. 
The degree o f relatedness, even with all the methodological caveats necessary (see the 
discussion below in section 7.4), hardly ever shows significant magnitude. In contrast, the 
quality of the resources in the acquired unit shows relatively consistent and significant 
effects on performance, with a negative sign that might seem surprising. The negative 
influence o f resource quality on performance essentially suggests that firms should not 
try to search for the best performers from which to eventually import and absorb best 
practices. Rather, the best way to create value in acquisitions is to deploy current 
resources and capabilities from the acquirer to the target (Capron, Doussage & Mitchell, 
1997). There might be a capability explanation for that result, too, however, according to 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). They suggest that the creation o f value from inverse 
learning is much more complex, and presumably empirically rare, as it requires a 
complete revision of the typical conquering attitude that most acquirers have when 
approaching the integration process. Another explanation, equally plausible, is that 
pricing dynamics eliminate value creation potential to a greater extent in the case o f high- 
quality targets, than in the case o f low-quality ones. In that view, buyers consistently 
overpay for their acquisitions o f high-quality targets, overestimating their ability to 
recuperate the high premia paid in the absence of sufficient room for generating synergies 
from cost efficiency and restructuring processes (Sirower, 1997).
The last result seems to lend empirical support to the “market for corporate 
control” view of M&As, whereby top management teams act as a policing device in their 
search for under-performing concerns by replacing the inept managers, realigning the 
incentive systems, and generating “quick” and copious value. That view, however, is not
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consistent with the other core result o f the analyses, the one concerning the negative 
performance implications o f the replacement o f the acquired unit top management team 
(confirming the result o f  Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). How does one reconcile the two 
contrasting results? One possibility is to move away from the market metaphor and 
consider mergers and acquisitions as essentially internal investment activities. In that 
view, the potential for value creation is given by the characteristics of the investment, 
including the price and the features o f the assets purchased, but the concrete realization 
o f the value potential is determined entirely by the acquirer’s post-investment managerial 
decisions and implementation capabilities. Though the quality o f the purchased assets is 
a key determinant o f  the value creation potential, the substitution o f key resources within 
the target firm is part o f  the value capture process, which, according to the data analyzed, 
might end up disrupting more than the acquirer intends to fix. The challenge, then, seems 
to be to extract the value potential from the combination of the two organizations without 
yielding to the “superiority complex” that the market-for-corporate-control metaphor 
evokes.
The other “high intervention” post-acquisition decision, related to the level of 
integration, has diametrically opposite effects. Not only does it directly and positively 
influence performance, but it also further enhances the creation of value from acquisition 
processes when coupled with high levels o f knowledge codification. The negative 
implications due to structural inertia and process complexity considerations are 
apparently compensated for by the benefits the acquiring firm derives from cost 
efficiencies and, eventually, revenue enhancement opportunities consequent to the 
achievement of higher degrees o f integration. The finding lends support, then, to some
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preliminary evidence unearthed in the strategic management literature (Datta & Grant, 
1990; Shanley, 1994), and appears to redefine the negative performance implications 
discovered in the human resources and organizational behavior literature (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Atrachan, 1990; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991; Joyce-Covin et al. 1996) as 
necessary costs suffered on the way to the achievement o f the benefits from 
organizational integration.
Overall, the analysis o f the data gathered in the study points to the advantages o f 
the simultaneous consideration o f diverse classes of explanations corresponding to 
different phases o f the process and to longitudinal evolutionary processes related to 
organizational learning mechanisms. The measurement challenges are proportionately 
large, however, and a thorough test of the theoretical framework will necessitate much 
more work.
7.3 Managerial Implications
Some of the conclusions obtained from the data analysis are relevant not only to 
scholarly debates in the field of management, but also to the evolution of the quality of 
decision-making and implementation processes among managers and management 
consultants. This section is a brief overview of some o f the study’s possible implications 
for the management o f acquisition processes. The presentation is divided into three parts, 
following the groups of primitives considered in the performance framework (Figure
4.2): pre-acquisition characteristics o f resources, post-acquisition integration decisions, 
and the creation of an integration capability.
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7.3.1 Target Selection
One broad indication from the study results is that the issue of selecting the 
'“right” target should receive a different type of emphasis. In terms of the magnitude o f 
effect on acquisition performance, the characteristics o f the target firm are less relevant 
than the type o f integration decisions made after the completion o f the transaction, and 
not as critical as the development o f a capability specialized in the management o f the 
transition phase. That is not to say the issue should not receive an adequate degree of 
managerial attention, but the attention should be distributed wisely among all three 
drivers o f acquisition performance.
In terms o f what characteristics to prioritize in the target selection process, 
another perhaps counterintuitive finding is that the quality of the resources might be a 
more relevant issue than the degree of similarity of the target’s resources to the 
acquirer’s. Relatedness, though an important antecedent o f  the potential for exploitation 
o f economies o f scale and scope, comes at a price that might have been underestimated in 
past treatments o f the problem. It raises the stakes for the integration phase, as a large 
portion of the value creation potential might be paid out at the negotiation table, and the 
remaining part has to be ““deserved” by the acquiring firm through superior performance 
in the integration process.
A more important screening criterion seems to be the room for improvement of 
the target’s current performance, as most o f the gains acquirers typically are willing and 
able to achieve come from the pursuit o f cost efficiencies within the acquired 
organization. The acquisition of superior performers requires the creation o f value over 
and above the higher premium paid, which seems to be possible only through the
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effective use o f the opposite mechanism for value creation (i.e., the transfer o f superior 
practices from the target to the acquirer, or '‘inverse learning”). According to the data 
gathered, however, that condition is rarely satisfied, as the acquisition o f high-performing 
targets is associated with lower levels o f performance after control for all the other 
conditions measured in the study.
The lesson, then, might be that acquiring firms systematically overestimate their 
own willingness and/or ability to leverage the resources and capabilities within the 
acquired organizations to create value from the improvement o f their own performance.
It also confirms some o f the qualitative impressions from the field study: most o f the 
acquirers interviewed would not consider changing their own systems or products or 
practices when they acquired a target with objectively superior features.
7.3.2 Post-acquisition Integration
Identifying the type o f integration approach to follow after completion o f the 
transaction is a crucial step toward achievement o f performance objectives in both 
theoretical and managerial terms. The study provides additional empirical evidence for 
that argument. As reported in section 7.2, the selection of one particular combination of 
the two decisional dimensions studied can signify the difference between creating and 
destroying a substantial amount o f wealth.
The approach that dominates the menu of integration strategies identified in 
section 4.1 is characterized by a high level o f  organizational integration and a low degree 
o f replacement o f the top management team. Figure 7.2 reports some quantifiable 
measures, based on the tested models, o f the performance implications o f that consensus- 
based approach.
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From a managerial standpoint, however, the key challenge seems to be to 
combine the set o f  indications with the selection criteria summarized above. Managing 
the acquisition o f a poor, or even average, performer without automatically taking the 
shortcut o f replacing the top management team might not be a trivial feat. One possibility 
would be to avoid the conundrum and stick to a non-replacement approach, which could 
become part o f  a routinized integration practice. However, such approach might turn into 
a hazardous simplification because routinizing or codifying this particular type of 
decision compounds its negative impact on performance.
That dilemma offers a good example o f  how the three classes o f explanation are 
interdependent: low quality targets should be managed with a high replacement approach, 
which does not, however, need to be routinized. There is no simple solution. A careful, 
deliberate assessment of the personal qualities o f the top managers for each one of the 
acquisitions considered seems to be an unavoidable necessity.
7.3.3 Integration Capability
The most important piece of learning that the research offers for managers, 
however, stems from its core motivation. The goal o f the study was to explore and 
possibly explain how firms can create and develop organizational capabilities specialized 
in the management o f post-acquisition integration processes. That task is very complex 
from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, but accomplishing it is crucially 
important for managers and their advisers.
First, the analysis supports the claim that such capabilities can actually be
constructed through the tacit accumulation o f direct experience in the management of
integration processes. Yet, it also suggests that such experience usually is not sufficient
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and must be combined with a cognitive effort entailing the explicit rationalization and 
codification o f the lessons learned from the (generally) few experiences. Firms can learn 
how to manage highly infrequent, complex, and heterogeneous tasks only by investing 
time, energy, and resources in their efforts to understand the scarce evidence. The 
creation o f support tools in either paper or electronic form is also useful for the protection 
such tools provide against the loss o f institutional memory and for the diffusion of the 
crystallized wisdom.
The second important lesson from the data is that, however useful for the 
construction of institutional capabilities, knowledge routinization and codification are 
double-edged swords that should be used with discretion by managers who are fully 
aware of their limitations. Certain decisions, for example, should not be made subject to 
routinization processes, as the benefits from easing the cognitive load might be 
outweighed by the detrimental effects of applying lessons tacitly absorbed in certain 
domains to inherently different contexts. Rationalizing and codifying on the basis o f too 
small a sample or with insufficient managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) entails the risk o f 
accumulating “superstitious” learning (Levitt & March, 1988), risk that is compounded 
by the presence of strong path dependencies in those types o f decisional processes.
One final normative indication from the results is that firms should develop a 
portfolio of integration routines from which the discriminating acquirer can select the 
most opportune one according to the specific characteristics o f the M&A context 
considered. Some of the banks that participated in the survey were working toward a 
similar goal by developing, for example, distinct integration routines for smaller as 
opposed to larger bank acquisitions, and for non-bank versus bank targets. That approach
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appears to combine the benefits o f a routinized implementation process with those of a 
cognitive effort in the development of the codified routines, as well as the deliberate 
decision-making process influencing the selection o f what routine to trigger, based on the 
specifics o f the acquisition context.
7.4 Limitations of the Study
The study had two main limitations to the generalizability o f its results. First, the
research design restricted the types o f events studied to either horizontal or market
extension types o f  M&A, therefore allowing only a limited variation o f  the resource
relatedness construct. Hence, the study did not incorporate the full explanatory power o f
the relatedness hypothesis. However, the dimension along which the construct operated
in the study, essentially the geographic overlap o f the network o f facilities, provided
sufficient variability for the underlying value creation mechanism (the exploitation of
economies of scale) to operate. In-market acquisitions are driven, in theory as well as
practice, by the opportunity to cut the cost structure o f the acquired firm and thus realize
the “synergies” that are supposed to justify the premiums paid. Out-market (market
extension) acquisitions are forced to rely, at least in part, on other (i.e., "softer”) value
creation mechanisms, typically considered more weakly correlated with performance.
Therefore, the problem with the relatedness measure in the study is not so much lack of
consideration o f diversified acquisitions, but the limited degree o f correlation with the
other measures o f  similarity gathered through the Phase 2 survey. The degree o f market
relatedness, in terms o f  geographic overlap as well as customer segments served, does not
correlate well with the internal measures o f resource relatedness deduced from the degree
of similarity in information systems, human resources practices, operating procedures,
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etc. (see section D.2 in Exhibit D). That finding is not novel for researchers who study 
the varied dimensions o f  organizational relatedness, and supports the claim that the 
product market and the organizational dimensions o f  the construct should not be 
confounded and their association taken for granted (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Datta, 
1991).
The second limitation is in the generalizability o f the results to different industry 
contexts. Some o f  the observations from both the fieldwork and the statistical analysis o f 
the survey data might be specific to the commercial banking industry, or at least to the 
service sector. For example, the primary role o f information system conversion might be 
a consequence o f the specific type of information-based products provided by the 
banking industry. Similarly, the strong predisposition to codify the integration procedures 
could be caused by an industry-based cultural bias favoring detailed codification (i.e.. 
bureaucratization) o f internal procedures. If this were the case, however, the hypothesis 
of positive performance implications of the degree o f  codification might be harder, not 
easier, to support in the industry context studied. Those issues can be resolved only 
through replications o f  the study in different industries; o f particular interest would be the 
study of the theoretical framework in contexts characterized by high technological 
change (electronics or telecommunications, for example), or by different patterns of 
customer demand (e.g. consumer vs. industrial products). The fundamental patterns 
found in the study have been observed, however, in a number of case studies in very 
different contexts such as white goods (Electrolux), industrial products (Cooper 
Industries), and retailing (The Limited).
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More worrisome than the generalizability problems are operational issues related 
to measuring the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process and the limited 
number o f degrees o f freedom available for the analysis o f  short-term firm performance. 
Subjective performance assessment generally does not allow a good quality o f inter-firm 
comparison, as what is considered satisfactory by a certain acquirer (e.g., a relatively 
inexperienced one) might not be by another. The ideal solution would be to gather either 
accounting or process performance data from the acquired entity standpoint but such data 
are usually very difficult to obtain because acquirers themselves do not collect them. 
However, the acquisition performance measures used, based on the acquirer’s accounting 
data, are highly generalizable and “perform” very well in spite of the fact that the average 
acquisition is only a small fraction o f the acquirer’s assets.
Finally, the limited number o f observations at the firm level o f analysis was due 
to participant attrition between the first and the second rounds o f the survey. Also, three 
o f the respondent banks were privately held and only part o f their financial data was 
obtainable. Other problems include missing data, particularly on the asset size of the 
completed acquisitions. That limitation works against the hypothesis-testing effort, 
however, as the low number o f observations implies that the standard deviation of the 
estimated coefficient is typically overestimated with respect to the theoretical population. 
As both the stability and the magnitude of the coefficients are reduced, assessments of 
their statistical significance are overly conservative. In other words, for variables that are 
associated significantly with firm performance, the magnitude o f the effect is likely to be 
maintained even with larger sample sizes. In contrast, it is not possible to determine
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whether non-significant impacts occurred because o f  either the small sample size or an 
effective lack o f explanatory power.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The objective o f  the study was to build on evolutionary economics and 
organizational learning theories to explore the effect o f both tacit and codified knowledge 
accumulation mechanisms on the development o f an administrative capability specialized 
in the management o f post-acquisition integration processes. To assess the extent to 
which that objective was reached, it is useful to compare the types o f  results expected 
from the application o f varied theoretical discourses with the outcomes o f the set of 
statistical analyses reported here.
Figure 8.1 shows the extent to which the theoretical framework advanced in 
chapter 4 is supported empirically. The thickness o f the arrows indicates the strength of 
the impacts. Table 8.1, then, summarizes the theoretical arguments made for the 
hypotheses tested and the extent to which they are supported empirically at the 
acquisition and the firm levels of analysis.
Fig.  8.1 - Research  Results
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Table 8.1 - Expected Performance Impacts and Empirical Results
VARIABLES THEORY Hp. Exp.
Sign
Integration
Process
Perf.
Firm
Perf.
Resource-Based
Resource reiatedness Related diversification H9 + Ns Ns
Resource quality Resource deployment H10 - - -
Post-Acq. Decisions
Integration Inertia and complexity 
Cost efficiencies and 
revenue enhancements
HI la 
HI lb +
+ +
Replacement o f 
TMT
Structural inertia 
Agency theory
H l2a
H12b +
• -
Knowledge-Based
Knowledge
Codification
Learning and cognition H13 + Ns Ns
Tacit Experience
Accumulation
(local)
Tacit learning H14 + + +
Codification x 
Integration
Learning and cognition 
w/ structural 
complexity
HI5 + + +
The study findings provide confirmation o f the descriptive power of some 
theories, as well as some surprises.
1) Both the strengths and the limitations o f knowledge accumulation and codification
mechanisms in their ability to explain acquisition and firm performance were
explored. Acquisition experience accumulates tacitly, affording significant gains in
organizational performance after acquisitions, but only if  the past experiences are
localized into well-known domains and are therefore highly homogeneous. The
codification of such experiences into specialized support tools can, in turn, materially
affect the performance of acquisition processes and the long-term performance o f the
acquiring firm, but only if those tools are employed in acquisitions characterized by
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high degrees of integration. Otherwise, the disadvantages o f excessive 
bureaucratization might overcome the benefits o f developing an integration 
capability.
2) A relatively surprising result is the difference in explanatory behavior shown by the 
structural inertia hypotheses in determining the performance effects of the two post­
acquisition decisions. The results for level of integration are associated positively 
with the performance o f the acquisition process, implying that, in the study context, 
the potential for exploitation of economies o f scale and scope overcomes the 
necessary disruptions during the integration process. In contrast, the aggressive 
replacement o f key resources within the acquired organization, particularly if 
embedded in human capital, negatively affects acquisition performance, lending 
credit to the concerns raised in the literature about the organizational and human 
resources impacts of acquisition processes. That finding supports some recent 
empirical results obtained by strategy scholars (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Shanley, 
1994).
3) Finally, the lack of support for the relatedness hypothesis (H9) is also somewhat 
surprising; despite the limited scope determined by the research design, the 
juxtaposition of purely horizontal with market extension acquisitions should have 
shown significant performance implications. Acquirers in the banking industry 
affirm that in-market acquisitions allow the extraction of cost efficiencies o f up to 
70% of the target’s pre-acquisition cost structure, versus a 20% to 30% range in the 
case of market extensions. Closer examination of the hypothesis suggests several 
explanations for the “nonresult.” First, the benefits o f relatedness are relatively
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transparent to the seller and might be priced out during negotiations (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987; Bamey, 1988). Second, most o f the organizational costs incurred 
to extract the benefits from highly related acquisitions are hidden within the ordinary 
cost structure o f the acquiring firm, and therefore might not be given full account by 
acquirers. In addition, however relevant, relatedness provides only the potential for 
value creation; if the capability to realize such potential is not adequately developed, 
knowledge-based and process-based explanations might become more powerful 
primitives o f performance than resource-based ones.
Overall, the data show that the combination o f knowledge accumulation processes, both 
tacit and explicit, with the opportune set o f integration decisions can explain a significant 
portion of the variability in the performance o f both single acquisition processes and the 
entire acquiring firm.12
The study was an empirical exploration o f the explanatory power o f routinization 
and codification mechanisms at the process level o f analysis. The findings provide only a 
preliminary indication of the importance o f these knowledge-based explanations for our 
understanding of how organizations evolve and succeed. The many possible expansions 
o f such line o f research include:
• Replicating the study in different industry contexts. The banking industry might be a 
good approximation of the service sector, but is structurally different from sectors 
characterized by fast technological evolution, heavy commitments in production 
capacity, or fluctuating consumer behavior.
12 See Tables 6.10 through 6.14
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
•  Exploring the role of the relatedness hypothesis by extending the analysis to product 
diversification and, eventually, unrelated acquisitions. It would also be important to 
produce a more finely grained measurement o f relatedness based on internal resource 
and organizational characteristics. Finally, the relatedness question should be 
extended to cultural issues with the study of cross-border acquisitions.
• Testing the descriptive power o f evolutionary economics and organizational learning 
theories in empirical contexts different from acquisition processes. Other areas in 
which application of similar knowledge-based arguments might provide significant 
contributions include the performance o f joint-ventures and strategic alliances, 
internal reorganization and restructuring processes, and new product development 
processes.
If confirmed in other settings, the evidence uncovered in the study could help the 
field of strategic management to understand better how organizational learning and 
decision-making processes interact to create sustainable rents through superior 
manipulation o f internal resources. With the capability-based view of competitive 
advantage, strategic management researchers might undertake a set of new challenges. 
For instance, they could study the circumstances under which a certain decision or 
implementation process is profitably routinizable and codifiable, and research how firms 
can exploit the advantages of such cognitive simplifications. Retaining and focusing the 
power o f deliberate analysis for only the contexts in which it is advisable to invest 
managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) and cognitive power (Gavetti & Levinthal, 1997) 
appears to be a highly promising and relatively unexplored area o f investigation in the 
quest for the roots o f firms’ competitive advantage.
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9. EXHIBITS
9.1 EXHIBIT A -  ACQUISITION HISTORY PROFILE
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BANK ACQUISITIONS HISTORY PROFILE OF
U l
Acquired Bank State Year Coordinator*4 Price Assets" In/Out" 1 Bank11” 1 Change” " lntegrw Tot S‘u HRS" DPS"
11 Coordinator: Last name o f  Ihc person who coordinated the post-acquisition process
14 Price paid. S in  Million.
15 Total asset* purchased. $ in Million at the time o f the agreement to purchase
16 In/Out. Whether the acquisition is considered In the Market (enter IN) or Out o f the Market (enter OUT)
17 Bank. Type o f bank acquired: enter "-2” if  Bankrupt, "-I” i f  a poor performer, “0” if  average, “+1” if  good performer, “+2” if  outstanding
11 Change. The extent to which the executive leadership o f  the acquired benk has been changed after the acquisition: enter “0” if  no substantial change, "I” if  some 
changes, “2” if  many changes, ‘'3” if  virtually all the top management team was changed.
19 Integration. The extent to which the systems, procedures and products were aligned or centralized: enter "0” if few or no features were integrated, "I” if  selected 
systems, procedures and problems were integrated, “2” if  many but not all systems, procedures and products were integrated, “3” if  all systems, procedures agtd products 
were completely integrated.
The last 3 columns ask you to evaluate the performance o f  the post-acquisition integration proces, compared with the average o f  all the other completed acquisitions: 
enter "-2" i f  M any Problem, " -I"  i f  Some Problem, "0" i fAverage, "+ l" ifO K , "+2” i f Great.
20 Tot S. Overall performance o f the acquisition compared to the others made. The extent to which the objectives o f the acquisition have been achieved.
21 H RS. Performance o f  the “affiliation" process. How human resources o f  the acquired bank reacted and cooperated during the transition phase.
22 OP S. Performance o f Ihc DP systems conversion ( if done) Consider the timeliness, the training provided, the troubleshooting and the normalization period.
9.2 EXHIBIT B - ACQUIRING BANK QUESTIONNAIRE
I. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUIRING INSTITUTION
This first section requires you to provide some basic information about your bank, as o f today.
Geographic Coverage.
Total number o f  branches #
Number o f  counties with at least one branch #
Number o f  regions in which the bank is organized #
Number o f  states with at least one branch #
Number o f  branches outside the original state #
Operational Sites. In how many sites are the following activities carried forward ?
T o d a y  ? In  1990 ?
Check processing #_________  #________
Data processing #_________ #________
Phone center #______  #
Loan Portfolio. Please, assess the relative “weight” of the following types of loans, according 
their dollar size and their earning capacity ( enter percent, adding up to 100%).
Size E a rn in g s
Commercial/corporate lending  %  %
Consumer/retail lending  %  %
Mortgage/real estate  %  %
Other  %  %
TOTAL 100 % 100 %
M&A Importance. How is M&A activity currently reported in the corporate communication 
documents (annual reports etc.) of your bank ? (check one)
□  The most important operating element for the realization of strategic objectives.
□  Among the top three elements for the realization of the strategic objectives
□  An important but not prioritary element
□  An activity being considered only on an opportunistic basis
□  Reported as an extraordinary event, with limited or no strategic emphasis
M&A Structure.
Which of the following structures are currently in place in order to deal with acquisition 
processes (check as many as applicable).
□  M&A Department
□  Corporate Development (M&A, planning etc.)
□  Finanical/administrative function (specialized group led by CFO or Controller)
□  No structure, acquisitions are handled on a case-by-case basis
□  Other (explain)____________________________________________________
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2. INFORMATION ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Support Documents and Models. For each o f the following document, manual or quantitative 
model, please check whether it is currently being used by your institution. If yes, please assess 
the year in which it was created and how frequently it has been significantly updated since then. 
Documents/Manuals No Yes When ? Never Rarely Frequently Always
Due Diligence check-list □  □  19_____
Due Diligence manual □  □  19______
Systems conversion manual □  □  19______
Affiliation/integration manual23 □  □  19______
Systems training manual24 □  □  19______
Products training manual25 □  □  19______
Other______________________ □  □  19______
Quantitative Models (computer-based)
Financial evaluation □  □  19______
Staffing models □  □  19______
Product mapping26 □  □  19______
Training/Self-training packages □  □  19______
Project management27 □  □  19______
Other □  □  19
Q □ □ a
□ □ a □
□ □ □ □
a □ □ □
a □ □ □
a □ a □
□ □ □ □
Q □ a □
a □ □ □
a □ □ □
a □ □ □
□ □ a □
□ □ □ □
At what level of detail are financial projections made, staffing needs assessed and product 
portfolio analyzed ? (check one for each column)
Projections Staffing Portfolio
At the aggregate level (the whole bank) □  □  □
At a large group level (lines of business, functions) □  □  □
At a small group level (loan types, departments) □  □  □
At the individual level (single product, branch) □  □  □
According to past acquisition experience...
Out of every 10 situations in which a contact or discussion is initiated, 
how many result in a nonbinding bid ? #
Out of every 10 nonbinding bids, how many result in a Due Diligence phase ? #
Out of every 10 due diligence phases, how many result in a closed transaction ? #
Bidding. Please divide the acquisitions completed to this date in the following categories.
How Many ?
Private, one-to-one negotiation __________
Semi-private negotiation, 2 or 3 competing bidders __________
Auction process run by an investment bank or the seller itself __________
Auction process run by a regulatory agency (FDIC, RTC, etc.) __________
TOTAL (as in the acquisition history profile)_________________________
23 Manual describing all the procedures necessary to accomplish the desired level o f integration between 
the two organizations. It usually covers issues such as human resources, accounting, audit, CRA etc..
24 Manual describing how to train the D.P. users at the acquired company. A “train-the-trainer” tool
25 Manual describing how to train the sales-force at the acquired company (platform people, product 
specialists etc.)
2 Allows thorough comparison o f the features o f the acquired bank’s products with those o f  the acquirer.
27 Assigns tasks, requirements and deadlines, allowing careful planning and control o f  complex projects.
159
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Action Planning Is a formal “process management” document with detailed tasks, 
responsibilities and deadlines usually produced ? □  Yes □  No
If yes, when is the action plan usually finalized, with respect to the time of the announcement ?
#  weeks □  ...before... or □ ... after... the announcement.
To what extent does the acquired bank have any say in the formation of the action plan ?
None Critical
□ □ □ □ □
Consider now a “typical” type of bank recently acquired by your institution....
Who does what ?. For each of the acquisition process phases, please assess the type of 
responsibility, if any, held by each of the following individuals or functions. Enter 
“L”, as in Leader, the one who coordinates and bears the main responsibility for the 
decisions/ourcomes
“A”, as in Approver, the one who ratifies the Leader’s actions and bears the ultimate 
responsibility
“D”, as in Doer, the one who actually executes the actions required by the process 
“H” as in Helper, the one who lends the necessary support or advice to the Doer
Selec
tion
Negotia
tion
Due
Dilig.
Planning Transiti
on
Board of Directors
C.E.O.
C.F.O. (or controller)
Corporate Development Exec.
Staff of M&A specialists
Lines of Business Executives
Staff Functions (HR, D.P., legal etc.)
Sponsor/Champion of transaction
Heads of Task Forces (if formed)
Steering Committee (formed ad hoc)
Regional Leader (CEO, controller)
Regional Representatives
How many people in total ? approx
How many members of the transition team were also in the due diligence team ? #
How many members of the transition team had been in previous transition teams ? #
Process Times. Please provide your best estimate o f the times required for the following 
processes as o f the first acquisition experiences had, as o f  the most recent ones, and what your 
objectives are for the future transactions.
Past Present Future
Due Diligence (# o f business days)______________________ #_____ #______  #______
Planning for transition (# o f  weeks)______________________#_____ #______  #______
Evaluation/selection o f human resources (# o f weeks)______ #_____  #______  #______
From announcement to start o f systems conversion (weeks)#  #______  #______
Systems conversion (start to conversion day, # o f weeks) #_____ #______  #______
From conversion day to complete normalization (weeks)___ #____  #______  #______
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POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION STRATEGY.
Following you will find the description o f several approaches which, according to our previous 
research, represent viable alternatives as general guidelines for post-acquisition management 
processes. Please select which one is the best description o f the approach which your bank 
wouldfollow in a “typical ” acquisition, as o f today, as o f 5, and as o f 10 years ago (enter the 
relevant number).
# ___ Today # ____  1990 # ____  1985
Scenarios:
1 The acquired bank maintains the organizational structure, systems, processes and 
leadership as it was before the acquisition. The acquiring bank limits its intervention to 
the coordination of high level strategies, and to periodical monitoring of performance.
2 The systems and processes o f the acquired bank are restructured in order to ensure its 
long-term viability, but they are not necessarily integrated with the equivalent elements 
of the acquiring unit. The process is carried forward by the old management under the 
general supervision of the acquirer.
3 Most support functions (like systems, HR, accounting, legal etc.) are integrated or 
centralized with those of the acquiring bank. The leadership of the acquired bank is 
usually unchanged and will preserve substantial autonomy on business generation, 
pricing, product portfolios and so on.
4 The acquired bank is entirely integrated within the structure of the acquiring bank. The 
top management is substantially renewed and the organizational structure is significantly 
altered to accommodate the acquiring bank’s requirements. No attempt is usually made 
to screen and eventually keep the best practices in the acquired organization.
3 The complete integration of the two organizations is achieved through a careful selection
of at least some of the comparable resources (products, practices, HR etc.). For example, 
a thorough re-hiring process will include employees from both banks in overlapping 
geographical areas. The top management team is carefully evaluated and top performers 
are retained, motivated and eventually promoted to new positions within the acquiring 
organization.
Strategic Priorities. What do you care most when you manage acquisitions ? Please rank the 
following objectives in order of importance. Assign a number from I to 5, where I is the top 
priority.
Rank#
Enhance revenue generation of acquired unit_____________________________ _____
Cut fixed costs and obtain quick efficiency gains _____
Select and retain the highest possible quality of people _____
Gain access to business intelligence (new clients, products, systems) _____
Improve policies and procedures to enhance long-term efficiency _____
Implementation Priorities. Similarly, rank the following criteria in order of importance for the 
successful execution of the acquisition plans. Assign a number from 1 to 6.
Rank#
Ensure consensus with the top management of the acquired bank _____
Closely monitor and minimize the error rates (misposted transactions etc.) _____
Ensure consensus among all the employees of the acquired bank _____
Minimize changes and disruptions during the transition phase _____
Minimize the process times (to convert systems, select HR etc.) _____
Closely monitor the quality of training programs _____
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3. INFORMA TION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF ACQUISITIONS
No Yes Past Present Future
□ □ % % %
□ □ % % %
□ □ % % %
□ □ % % %
How many years after the integration of the acquired bank is financial
performance formally monitored ? (enter “0 " ifnot monitored) # ____
Is there a formal process for the comparison of projections with actual performance ? (Y/N)____
Performance Evolution. This is perhaps the most important question in the entire survey. It is 
criticalfor us to understand the evolution o f the performance levels at your institution. Please 
make your very best effort to answer thoroughly and carefully.
For each of the following performance measures of the post-acquisition process, please assess 
whether it is usually monitored. Also, enter your best estimate of the levels of each variable 
(even if not consistently monitored) after the first acquisition experiences, after the most recent 
ones, and what your target levels are for the future transactions. Enter “NI” if you have No Idea 
of these quantities. Monitored ?
Financial Performance 
Shareholders’ Dilution after 2 years 
% of fixed costs cut after 2 years28 
Variation of ROA 2 years after the acquisition 
Actual vs. Budget difference of ROA (2 years after)
Process Cost Measuresr2’
Systems conversion cost (S in ‘000) □  □ _____ $____ $___ $
Training costs ($ in ‘000) □  □  $____ $___ $
Total integration process cost (including all other items) □  □  $____ $___ $_
Process Quality Measures
Unexpected write-offs (% of loans in excess of plans) □  □   %  % _____%
Deposit run-offs (% of closings/month in excess of avg.) □  □
% of misposted transactions 1 month after conversion □  □
# of troubleshooting calls/week 1 mo. after conversion □  □
# of client complaints/week 1 month after conversion □  □
Areas of Improvement. Following is a list of the most common problems experienced during 
bank acquisition processes. Please assess the degree of improvement in your institution’s 
acquisition process, necessary to reach the best possible acquisition performance.
The need for improvement in our acquisition process is None Minimal Fair Major Critical 
Preventing deposits run-offs □  □  □  □  □
Assessing portfolio quality to prevent unexpected write-offs □  □  □  □  □
Generating new business for the acquired entity □  □  □  □  □
Minimizing mistakes while converting D.P. systems □  □  □  □  □
Increasing gains from cuts to fixed costs □  □  □  □  □
Improving existing procedures (operations, control etc.) □  □  □  □  □
Improving customer satisfaction □  □  □  □  □
Improving precision in evaluating the quality of HR □  □  □  □  □
Shortening times of transition phase □  □  □  □  □
Minimizing costs of the transition phase □  □  □  □  □
Retaining high quality managers and employees □  □  □  □  □
Ensuring cooperation from the target □  □  □  □  □
Importing superior practices/products from acquired unit □  □  □  □  □
% % %
% % %
# #
# # #
28 Consider an in-market acquisition with average geographical overlap.
29 Consider the average size o f the banks purchased by your institution
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9.3 EXHIBIT C -  PHASE 2 QUESTIONNAIRE -  GENERAL PART
A. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUIRED INSTITUTION
The purpose ofthis section is to gather information on some o f the most important 
characteristics that the acquired unit had at the time o f the acquisition.
Object. Which o f  the following more accurately describes the object o f the transaction ?
□  Merge the assets o f two similar entities, defined as “merger o f  equals”
□  Purchase o f control o f  a multi-bank holding company
□  Purchase o f control o f  a commercial bank
□  Purchase o f control o f  an S&L or a credit union
□  Purchase o f selected assets (branches, deposits etc.)
Location. Where is the acquired unit headquartered ? (check one o f the following)
□  In the same county where the acquiring institution is headquartered
□  In a county where the acquiring institution had a local presence
□  In the same state, but in a county where the acquiring institution had no presence
□  In a different state, where the acquiring institution had already a presence
□  In a different state, where the acquiring institution had no presence
Operating Effectiveness. Please assess the effectiveness level o f the following operating 
functions, relative to those o f the Acquiring Unit, as o f the time before the acquisition (check the 
most appropriate box).
Much Much
Operating Functions Worse Worse Similar Better Better
Credit underwriting policies □ □ □ □ □
Operations (back-office) □ □ □ □ □
Administration (accounting, audit) □ □ □ □ □
Marketing & Advertising □ □ □ □ □
Customer service (i.e. tellers, phone) □ □ □ □ □
Quality o f  Resources. Similarly, assess the quality level o f  the: following resources.
Much Much
Resources Worse Worse Similar Better Better
Commercial/corporate loan portfolio □ □ □ □ a
Consumer/retail loan portfolio □ □ □ □ □
Facilities/location □ □ □ □ □
Information systems/D.P. □ □ □ a □
Human resources □ □ □ □ □
Reputation/image □ a □ □ □
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Ownership Structure.
Yes No
Were the shares of the acquired institution publicly traded ? □  □
If no, was it family-owned or controlled ? □  □
If yes, was the ownership of the acquired institution widely diffused? □  □
Was the top management of the acquired institution a significant shareholder ? □  □
Had the acquired unit ever purchased or merged into other banks before ? □  □
If yes, approximately how many acquisitions had it completed ? # _______
Similarity. What was the degree of similarity between the acquired and the acquiring unit before 
the acquisition, according to the following elements ?
No Almost
Similarity the Same
Products/services offered a □ □ □ □
Geographic markets served (branch overlap) □ □ □ □ □
Customer segments served □ □ □ □ □
Underwriting policies a □ □ □ □
Operating procedures (back-office) □ □ □ □ □
D.P. systems (technology, telecom etc.) □ □ □ □ □
Human resources practices (compensation etc.) □ □ □ □ □
Management style □ □ □ □ □
Key Figures. Please provide the following information about the acquired unit, as of the time 
before the agreement to purchase (S in Million, please consult your project file).
Book Value $
Market Value (if listed) $
Price paid: $______ in cash + $______ in stock and other = $
Net Interest Income (last 12 months before acquisition)30 $
Non-interest Income (same as above) $
Non-interest expense (same as above) $
Earnings before taxes and extraordinary items (same as above) $
Number of Full Time Equivalents #
Total number of branches purchased #
Loan Portfolio. Please, assess the relative “weight” of the following types of loans, according to 
their dollar size and their earning capacity ( enter percent, adding up to 100%).
Size Earnings
Commercial/corporate lending % %
Consumer/retail lending % %
Mortgage/real estate % %
Other % %
TOTAL 100% 100%
30 If income statement numbers are not available for the last 12 months before acquisition, use last quarter 
or last year (please state which one you use). Make sure that they all have the same time basis.
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B. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Idea Generation. Which of the following sources introduced the idea of purchasing the acquired 
institution ? (check as many as applicable)
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
Holding Company Level Consultants
Board of Directors □ Investment bank □
Chief Executive Officer □ Legal advisors □
Other Senior Executives □ Auditing/accounting firm □
Strategic Planning Group. a Management consultant □
M&A Group a Other
Local/Regional Bank Level Acquired company itself □
Chief Executive Officer □ Government agency □
Other Senior Executives □ Public knowledge □
Staff functions □ Other □
Acquisition Motives. Check the degree of relevance of the following acquisition motives for the 
transaction considered, (check the most appropriate box)
Major
Irrelevant Motive
Increase market presence in an attractive area □  □  □  □  □
Reduce costs or risks of entering a new market □  □  □  □  □
Achieve economies of scale in operations capacity □  □  □  □  □
Access market experience in a certain type of products □  □  □  □  □
Enhance revenue generation (cross-selling etc.) □  □  □  □  □
Utilize the acquiring unit's personnel, skills or
technology to improve operations of the acquired unit □  □  □  Q □
Utilize the acquired unit's personnel, skills or
technology to improve operations of the acquiring unit □  □  □  □  □
Protect existing customer base or market position from 
potential erosion due to competitors’ aggressive actions □  □  □  □  □
Take advantage of opportunities offered by government 
agencies to reduce costs or risks of acquisition activities □  □  □  □  □
Restructure or divest poor-performing elements of the 
otherwise undervalued acquired unit □  □  □  Q □
Previous Relationship. Which of the following describes the relationship between the two 
institutions before the acquisition ? (check as many as applicable)
□  No relationship
□  Minority participation
□  Seats on the board of directors
□  Cooperation agreement (on specific products, markets etc.)
□  Correspondent bank
□  Shared operations (check processing, D.P. services, etc.)
□  Personal relationships among top executives
□  Other (specify)  _________________________________
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Bidding. Which of the following more accurately describes the negotiation environment ?
□  Private negotiation with the acquired unit, no other bidders
□  Multiple bidder situation, but no formal auction.
□  Auction process run by the Acquired Unit, or its agent (investment bank etc.)
□  Auction process run by a government agency (FDIC, RTC etc.)
□  Other (specify)  ________________________________________
Negotiation
Which of the following was the key counterpart during the negotiation process ? (check I)
□  Key shareholders) □  Board □  CEO □  Top management team
How many weeks did the negotiation process last ? (approx.) #__
Milestones. Please, provide the time of the following events in terms o f number o f weeks from 
the public annoxmcement o f the transaction.
How many weeks after the public announcement....
did the due diligence process start ?_________________________________ #________
did the due diligence process end ?__________________________________ #________
was the definitive agreement to purchase signed ?_____________________ #________
was the acquisition officially approved by regulators ?_________________ #________
did the systems conversion process start, if  it did ? #________
were systems completely converted, if they were ? #________
did the identity o f  the acquired unit change, if it did ? #________
was the post-conversion/integration emergency period over ?___________ #________
C. DUE DILIGENCE
Disclosure. To what degree was a complete disclosure of data possible due to confidentiality 
issues or legal impediments on the part of the seller ?
No Problem Very Difficult
□ □ □ □ □
Output. Which of the following best describes the type of output originated by the Due Diligence 
process ? (check as many as applicable)
□  Verbal discussion of all the findings among the members of the Due Diligence team and 
with the top management of the Acquiring Unit
□  Written reports submitted by all the key areas summarizing the findings
□  Cost and revenue projections computed by all the key areas
□  Mapping of the DP systems, including plans for conversion
□  Mapping of products/markets, including suggestions for keep/change decisions
□  Evaluation of HR quality, with preliminary staffing plan of each branch
□  Complete business plan for the transition phase
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Price Variation. What is the percent change applied to the offered purchasing price as a 
consequence of the completion of the Due Diligence process ? (specify + or -)  %
Expectations about transition period as of the end o f Due Diligence.
How many weeks after the announcement was final closing expected to happen ? #__
Were any expectation formed as to the systems conversion date ? □  Yes □  No
If yes, how many weeks after the announcement was the planned conversion date ? #__
Was an approximate forecast of the integration costs made ? □  Yes □  No
If yes, how much was the overall post-acquisition integration expected to cost ? ($ .000) $___
D. AFTER THE DUE DILIGENCE PHASE
Leadership Change. Was the person in charge of the following functions at the acquired unit 
still in place after the acquisition ? If not, was (s)he laid off? Was (s)he replaced with an officer 
from acquiring unit, from the acquired unit, with someone newly hired, or was the position 
simply canceled ?
Same Person ? Laid off ? Replaced with someone from....
Yes No Yes No B u y e r S e lle r New N o one
Chief Executive Officer □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Chief Operating Officer □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Chief Financial Officer □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Head of Retail Banking □ a □ □ □ □ □ □
Chief Credit Officer □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Head of Operations □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Head of D.PVTechnology □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Head of Corp. Development □ □ □ □ □ • □ □ □
Head of Human Resources □ □ □ □ a □ □ □
Alignment of Products and Procedures. To what extent have the following elements of the 
acquired organization been aligned (i.e. changed towards similarity) with those of the acquiring 
unit?
Products/Procedures Not at all Completely
Features o f deposits products □ □ □ □ □
Features o f commercial loan products □ □ □ □ □
Features o f consumer/retail loan products □ □ □ □ a
Lending policies and procedures □ □ □ □ □
Human resources policies (compensation etc.) □ □ □ □ □
Operating procedures (servicing, execution) □ □ □ □ □
Accounting/Audit systems □ □ □ □ □
D.P./telecom systems □ □ □ □ □
Consolidation of Functions. To what extent have the following functions/departments of the 
acquired organization been consolidated within those of the acquiring unit ?
Functions/Departments
Credit lending department 
Operations department (back-office) 
D.P./technology department 
Marketing/Customer support 
Human resources 
Accounting/audit 
Legal department
Not at all
□
a
a
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
a
□
□
□
□
□
a
□
Completely
□
□
a
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
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I f  all (or nearly all) the answers to the previous two questions have been “N ot a t a ll”, please 
turn to the next section to assess the A cquisition Performance. Otherwise proceed with the 
following question.
Business Plan.
In case it was not done before, was a business plan produced in this phase ? □  Yes □  No
If yes, at what level o f detail were financial projections made, staffing needs assessed and 
product portfolio analyzed ? (check one for each column)
Projections Staffing Portfolio 
At the aggregate level (the whole bank) □  □  □
At a large group level (lines o f business, functions) □  □  □
At a small group level (loan types, departments) □  □  □
At the individual level (single product, branch) □  □  □
A fter the Transition Phase. Were any o f the following initiatives taken in order to summarize 
the lessons learned during the acquisition process ? (check as many as applicable)
A formal brainstorming session on lessons learned was held □
Each of the business lines and support functions submitted a written report □
Each of the business lines and support functions verbally reported to top-executive □
A detailed document was written with input from all the relevant players □
Models and manuals were created and, if existing, significantly updated □
Other (exp lain)_________________________________________________________  □
None of the above Q
Adoption/Transfer Back. To what extent have any o f  the following elements o f the acquired 
institution been transferred and/or adopted within the acquiring institution ?
Never Very
Happened Frequently
Products on the deposits side □ □ □ □ □
Products on the commercial loans side □ □ □ □ □
Products on the consumer loans side □ □ □ □ □
Lending policies, evaluation practices □ a □ a □
Operating procedures (back-office) □ □ □ □ □
D.P./telecom systems or procedures □ □ □ □ □
Managerial talent (people transferred to acquirer) □ a □ □ □
E. ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
The following question is probably the single most important item of the questionnaire.
This information is generally not available from call reports, and we must rely on your 
willingness to cooperate to the success o f this research effort.
By all means, do consult the acquisition file with the projections made in the business plan or 
during the pre-closing phase. For the actuals, please make an effort to collect them. If 
impossible, please provide your best estimate and put an "E " after the number.
I f  you have an assistant gathering the numbers, please check their quality and their consistency 
with the projections. Thank you very much for your time and effort on this one.
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Projected vs. Actual. Please provide the following information about the projections and the 
actual figures as of one and two years after the acquisition (S in million, except %.).
Projections A ctual
Year I  Year 2 Year I  Year 2
Total Assets_______________ _______  _______ _______ _______
Total Deposits_____________________ _______ _______ ______
Total Loans _______ _______ _______ _______
Non-perf. Loans31 _______ _______ _______ _______
Book Value________________ _______ _______ _______ ______
Net Interest Income _______ _______ _______ _______
Charge-offs _______ _______ _______ _______
Non-interest Income _______ _______ _______ ______
Employment Expenses_______ _______ _______ _______ ______
Other non-interest Expenses _______ _______ _______ ______
Net Earnings _______ _______ _______ ______
# of Full-time Equivalents _______ _______ _______ ______
# of Branches ______
Process Costs. What was the final cost of the following items of the post-acquisition process, and 
how much did they differ from the expectations/business plan ?. (S in thousands, except where %>)
Actual (+ or -) % Diff.
Branch conversion/closing/upgrading $ _______     %
Systems conversion (excI. systems training) $ _______    %
Human resources (excl. training) $ _______    %
Training costs (incl. systems) $ _______    %
Marketing initiatives $ _______    %
Other costs (specify)___________________________  $ _______     %
TOTAL $ _______   %
External Support. Please assess whether any of the following types of advisors or contractors 
have been used during the various phases of the process, and their approximate cost.
Yes No (S
Investment banking (selection, negotiation etc.) □ □ $
General consulting (management, marketing etc.) □ □ s
Accounting/auditing □ □ $
Systems/technology specialists (conversion) □ □ $
Training specialists □ □ $
Press. What was the general reaction o f the local press to the human resources practices 
adopted during the post-acquisition integration phase, if any ?
No Very
Reaction Negative Enthusiastic
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
31 90 days, even if accruing
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Unexpected Problems. Here are listed some of the most typical areas in which problems are 
experienced during the transition phase. Please assess the relevance of each of them to the 
acquisition considered, with respect to the pre-acquisition expectations.
Less/ More/
Compared to expectations.... Lower In Line Higher
Quality of loan portfolio was □ □ □ a □
New business generation was □ □ □ a □
Deposits run-offs were □ □ □ □ □
Quality of facilities was □ □ □ □ □
Quality of D.P. systems was □ □ □ □ □
Gains from cuts to fixed costs were □ □ a □ □
Improvements in procedures were □ □ □ □ □
Improvements in control systems were □ □ □ □ □
Improvements in customer satisfaction were □ □ □ □ □
Quality of human resources was □ □ □ a a
Willingness to cooperate was a □ □ □ □
Retained managers leaving were □ □ □ □ a
Retained employees leaving were □ □ □ □ a
Your View. Please assess your level of agreement with the following statements, keeping as a 
benchmark all the acquisitions made by your bank until today.
Strongly Strongly
Compared with the other acquisitions.... Disagree Agree
The unit selected was the best possible target Q □  □  □  □
Negotiated price/terms were the best possible □  □  □  □  □
Negotiations were smooth and relaxed □  □  □  □  □
Due diligence was as accurate as possible □  □  □  □  □
Consensus among the two management teams was high □  □  □  □  □
Middle management was extremely cooperative □  □  □  □  □
The systems conversion was flawless □  □  □  □  □
Human resources were effectively integrated □  □  □  □  □
The impact on customers was positive □  □  □  □  □
Performance improvements were satisfactory □  □  □  □  □
Best resources/practices were transferred to acquirer □  □  □  □  □
Overall, this acquisition was a success Q □  □  □  □
COMMENTS. Please feel free to add any issue regarding activities and consequences of the 
acquisition process, that you deem important and that has not been addressed.
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9.4 EXHIBIT D -  CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
Exhibit D provides the details for the analysis o f construct validity o f the Phase 1 
measures performed with the use o f multiple indicators measured with the Phase 2 
survey. See Chapter 5 for a description of the research design and Section 5.4 for a 
summary of the analyses presented below.
D.l Resource Quality
The General Part questionnaire of the Phase 2 survey contains 11 indicators of the 
quality of the target’s resources and practices, assessed in comparison with the quality of 
the corresponding features o f  the acquiring firm (see page 1 of the questionnaire in 
Exhibit C). A factor analysis of these indicators (principal components method, no 
rotation) results in the identification of two factors (Eigenvalues > 1). The first factor 
loads on the relative quality o f all the features o f the acquired firm, and the other 
distinguishes the quality o f the loan portfolio and the related underwriting practices from 
the quality of all the other organizational features probed. The factor loadings, the 
Eigenvalues, and the percentage of variance related to each factor are reported in the 
table below.
Furthermore, Table D.l reports the bivariate correlations among the Phase 1 and 
the Phase 2 measures o f resource quality. While the Phase 1 proxy of resource quality 
(target’s pre-acquisition profitability) correlates significantly with only 8 o f  the 11 Phase 
2 indicators, the remaining three (quality of the marketing function, o f customer service, 
and of the location of facilities) are also weakly correlated with the rest o f  the measures.
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These correlational patterns ensure a good centrality o f  the Phase 1 scale with respect 
the assessment o f the overall quality construct.
FACTOR LOADINGS -RESOURCE QUALITY-
Factors
Phase 2 M easures Quality Loan portfolio
Consumer loan portfolio .373 .689
Commercial loan portfolio .656 .461
Credit underwr. Policies .613 .498
Administration / audit .788 -.063
Human resources .694 -.040
Information systems .671 -.427
Marketing & advertising .711 -.178
Location / facilities .608 -.181
Operations (back-office) .736 -.332
Reputation / image .663 .215
Customer service .531 -.306
Eigenvalues 4.637 1.438
% o f  Variance 42.1% 13.1%
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Table D.l - CORRELATION MATRIX -RESOURCE QUALITY (Phase I and 2)-
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Quality Phase 1 .0755 1.00
2 Credit underwr. 
policies
2.111 .7181 .424
*++
3 Human resources 2.717 .6006 .302
**
.252
*
4 Information
systems
2.491 .8463 .295
**
.284
**
.465
***
5 Marketing & 
advertising
2.537 .8176 .110 .282
♦♦
.502
***
.422
***
6 Location / facilities 2.815 .7542 .139 .248
*
.344
**
.287
**
.470
***
7 Consumer loan 
portfolio
2.38 .79 .263
*
.394
***
.306
**
.015 .190 .121
8 Commercial loan 
portfolio
2.17 .70 .530
***
.606
***
.349
**
.277
**
.275
+*
.242
*
.369
***
9 Operations (back- 
office)
2.491 .6181 .302
**
.321
**
.347
**
.678
***
.421
***
.401
***
.098 .354
***
10 Reputation / image 2.667 .6729 .367***
.390
***
.421
+**
.263
*
.400
*+*
.471
***
.304
**
.404
***
.378
***
11 Customer service 2.870 .5510 .199 .180 .347**
.345
**
.325
**
.395
***
.116 .207 .357
***
.187
12 Administration/
Audit
2r537 .7194 .363
***
.430
***
.541
***
.480
***
.463
***
.326
**
.149 .541
***
.606 .416
***
.369
***
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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D.2 Resource Relatedness
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the degree o f variation in the resource relatedness 
construct has been kept low by design in order to allow for a better study o f  the creation 
o f integration capabilities in relatively homogeneous acquisition contexts. The 
dimension chosen in response to the prevailing criterion used by the banking industry is 
not, however, a good representation o f the complex construct of organizational 
relatedness. Both the factor and the correlation analyses (see Table D.2) show that the 
distinction between "in-market” and “out-market” acquisitions relates to the 
characteristics o f the market served by the two firms. Yet, this relationship does not 
imply that the two firms are also similar in terms of internal features, such as systems, 
procedures, and management style. In a way, this result speaks to the significance of the 
distinction advanced by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) between product market and 
organizational relatedness. However, the following factor analysis o f  the eight Phase 2 
indicators does show that all of these variables, including geographic overlap and 
similarity o f customer segments served, load on the same main factor, which can be 
interpreted as the "relatedness” construct. The same analysis, then, highlights the 
difference o f the two external resources (geographic location of the two branch networks 
and the similarity in customer segments served) with respect to the other internal 
measures o f resource relatedness.
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FACTOR LOADINGS -RESOURCE RELATEDNESS-
Factors
Phase 2 Measures Relatedness External vs. 
Internal factors
Geographic markets .365 .727
Customer segments .682 .507
D.P. systems (technology) .773 vO
Human resources practices .639 -.279
Operating procedures .692 -.493
Underwriting policies .625 .046
Products / services offered .798 .089
Management style .592 .172
Eigenvalues 3.459 1.289
% o f Variance 43.2% 16.1%
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Table D.2 - CORRELATION MATRIX - RESOURCE RELATEDNESS-
VARIABLES Avg Std I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Relatedness Ph. 1 .470 .500
2 Customer segments 3.000 1.079 .191
3 D.P. systems 
(technology)
2.491 1.069 -.136
*
00
4 Geographic markets 2.179 1.295 .707
*+*
.469
***
.109
5 Human resources 
practices
2.800 .7552 .049 .291
**
.422
***
-.008
6 Operating
procedures
2.750 .9195 -.233
*
.220 .710
***
.084 .430
***
7 Underwriting
policies
2.400 .8735 -.001 .263
**
.400
***
.245
*
.264
+*
.372
*+*
8 Products / services 
offered
3.056 .8107 .099 .593
***
.594
***
.309
**
.395
+**
.467
***
.356
9 Management style 2.339 .7453 -.118 .407
***
.305
**
.124 .348
***
.206 .363
***
.371
***
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) evel
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D.3 Level of Integration
The level o f integration construct has been measured in the second part o f  the 
survey with two different questions probing for an assessment o f the degree to which the 
key features and procedures o f the two firms have been aligned and centralized. The 15 
items, which generally show a strong correlation with the Phase I measure (see Table
D.3), consistently load on one main factor (Eigenvalue = 9.27). They can also be further 
broken down between the alignment and the centralization part of the definition o f the 
level o f integration (see Definition 3 in Chapter 4). The third factor is more difficult to 
interpret, but is o f nominal importance, as the Eigenvalue is barely above 1 and the 
variance covered is minimal (6.7%). In terms o f correlational evidence, 2 o f the 8 
alignment measures, those referring to HR policies and to the lending procedures, do not 
correlate with the Phase 1 measure, while all 7 centralization measures show strong 
correlational ties (see Table D.3).
FACTOR LOADINGS - LEVEL OF INTEGRATION -
Phase 2 Measures Integration Alignment vs. 
centralization
Factor 3
Alignment audit/ accounting .778 .384 .163
Alignment consumer loans .889 .234 -.267
Alignment D.P. systems .895 .352 .131
Alignment HR policies .556 .795 -.078
Alignment oper. procedures .928 .290 .072
Alignment comm, loans .885 .164 -.010
Alignment deposit products .783 -.134 -.512
Alignment lending procedure .596 .725 -.002
Centralization audit function .829 -.344 .307
Centralization lending dept .649 -.419 .265
Centralization D.P. dept .833 -.430 -.257
Centralization HR function .807 -.410 .310
Centralization legal dept .680 -.100 .423
Centralization marketing dept .767 -.432 -.202
Centralization operations .807 -.443 -.266
Eigenvalues 9.271 2.651 1.006
% o f Variance 61.8% 17.7% 6.7%
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Table D.3 - CORRELATION MATRIX 
INTEGRATION (Ph. I) vs. ALIGNMENT and CENTRALIZATION (Ph. 2)
V ariables A vg Sid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 IS
1 Phase 1. Level 
of integration
2.469 .8921
2 Alignment 
HR policies
4.481 1.094 .067
3 Align, oper. 
procedures
4.333 1.213 .368 
♦ *
.772
*♦*
4 Align loans 
commercial
4.333 1.000 .379 .711 .948
**♦
5 Align deposit 
products
4.111 1.423 .414
**♦
.547 .820 .833
6 Alignment 
lending proced.
4.518 1.004 .169 .936
*♦*
.784
***
.729 
♦ **
.579***
7 Align audit/ 
accounting
4.509 .9927 .342
**
.821
**♦
.867 
♦ ♦♦
.819
***
.614
***
.838
***
8 Align loans 
consumer
4.222 1.192 .416 
♦ ♦♦
.755 
♦ ♦♦
.926 
♦ **
.907
***
.886
***
.768
***
.764
***
9 Alignment 
D.P. systems
4.222 1.327 .441 .795 .902 
♦ **
.854
**♦
.686*** .846*** .881*♦« .863
10 Centralization 
audit function
4.667 .9316 .498
***
.086 .501
***
.442 
♦ **
.455
***
.108 .258
*
.408
***
.397
*+*
II Centralization 
lending dept
3.963 1.554 .457
«**
.155 .567
♦**
.571
***
.557
♦**
.254 .352
***
.534
***
.471*** .695***
12 Centralization 
D.P. dept
4.648 1.067 .528
***
.051 .369 .343
*♦
.499
***
.068 .246
*
.419
*»*
.389
***
.487
***
.356
***
13 Centralization 
HR function
4.463 1.059 .511
♦**
.178 .597
***
.595
***
.566
***
.231
*
.368
»»*
.530
***
.489 .924
***
.848
***
.431
***
14 Centralization 
legal dept
4.67 .9500 .543
***
.266
*
.584 .490
**»
.377
*»
.367
*»
.466
***
.505
***
.621
***
.710
***
.441
***
.549
***
.633
***
13 Centralization 
Marketing dept
4.259 1.216 .515 
♦ ♦♦
.245
*
.644 .640
***
.735
***
.305
**
.455 .688
***
.537
***
.677*** .734*** .639*** .770*** .454•**
16 Centralization
Operations
4.481 1.128 .539
♦♦♦
.114 .584
♦♦♦
.553
***
.753
***
.158 .317
**
.634*** .494*** .658*** .581*** .770 .663*** .532*** .829*+»
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D.4 Replacement of the Top Management Team
The correspondence between the Phase 1 and the Phase 2 measure o f the 
replacement construct has to be assessed in a slightly different way, as the latter survey 
prompts for a list of binary measures related to the effective retention o f 9 top 
management positions. The first index o f the Phase 2 decisions was constructed by 
summing up the dummy variables, as this is the straightforward sense o f the question 
asked in the Phase 1 survey (“the extent to which the executive leadership o f the acquired 
bank has been replaced after the acquisition”). The results, however, are consistent with 
those described for the other constructs. As shown in the table below, all the measures 
load on the main factor, which represents 64.5% o f the variance, and, once extracted, 
shows a significant correlation with the Phase 1 scale. The factor analysis also identifies 
a second factor that (weakly) discriminates between the top two functions and the other 
ones, in terms o f their specific replacement patterns.
FACTOR LOADINGS -REPLACEMENT-
Factors
Position Replacement Top two positions
Chief Executive Officer .738 .562
Chief Operating Officer .720 .582
Head o f Retail Banking .816 .159
Chief Credit Officer .702 .065
Chief Financial Officer .901 -.056
Corporate Development .841 -.327
D.P. /  Technology .856 -.228
Human Resources .833 -.325
Head o f Operations (back-office) .800 -.272
Eigenvalues 5.809 1.026
% o f  Variance 64.5% 11.4%
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Table D.4 - CORRELATION MATRIX -REPLACEMENTS-
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Replacement - PHASE 1 1.75 1.30
2 Chief Credit Officer .28 .46 -.408
***
3 Chief Executive Officer .44 .50 -.597 .520
***
4 Chief Financial Officer .30 .47 -.551
***
.586
***
.766
***
5 Chief Operating Officer .39 .49 -.664
***
.549
***
.875
***
.786
***
6 Corporate Development .14 .36 -.370
+*
.694
***
.465
***
.816
***
.397
**
7 D.P. / Technology .24 .43 -.608
***
.477
***
.633*** .810*+* .623+** .679***
8 Human Resources .28 .45 -.514
+**
.655
***
.594
**+
.822
***
.594
***
.815
+*♦
.733
***
9 Operations .33 .48 -.605
***
.494
***
.616
***
.734
***
.632
***
.612
***
.883
*♦#
.655***
10 Head o f Retail Banking .45 .50 -.528
***
.641
***
.742
**♦
.758
***
.671
*+*
.600*** .659*** .694*** .589
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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D.5 Post-acquisition Integration Performance
The performance measures gathered with the Acquisition History Profile have 
been analyzed using two sets o f assessments generated by the Phase 2 survey. The first 
set calls for a judgment on the performance of the various parts o f  the integration process, 
as compared with initial expectations, while the second benchmarks similar types o f 
assessments with all the acquisitions experienced by the same acquirer. Bivariate 
correlations between the three Phase 1 measures and all the Phase 2 indicators are 
presented in Table D.5 and D.6.
The two measures o f  performance, which refer to specific sub-processes (i.e. the 
integration of the workforce and the conversion o f the information systems), have been 
contrasted with a subset o f these Phase 2 indicators that point towards similar constructs. 
Eight o f them have been identified for the human resources integration, while five were 
identified for the systems conversion process. The results o f the factor analyses support 
the representativeness of the Phase 1 scale. The HR affiliation process items load on 
three factors.
FACTOR LOADINGS -PERFORMANCE HR AFFILIATION-
Factors
Phase 2 Variables Affiliation Retention Only HR
HR effectively integrated .548 -.122 .569
HR quality .684 .014 .513
Target’s will to cooperate .705 -.111 .203
Consensus among TMT .849 .048 -.380
Cooperation of middle managers .829 .087 -.172
Smooth negotiation .731 -.009 -.472
Retention employees .004 .913 -.018
Retention managers .028 .909 .144
Eigenvalues 3.208 1.697 1.046
% o f  Variance 40.1% 21.2% 13.1%
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The first one points towards the overall performance construct, the second one singles out 
the issue o f retention of employees and managers, while the third one, which has a less 
clear interpretation, appears to emphasize the “core” HR affiliation issues with respect to 
conflict and retention issues.
The five Phase 2 items dealing with value creation mechanisms based on the 
pursuit o f cost efficiencies load on two factors. The first one speaks directly to the 
performance issue, while the second one discriminates the benefits to be derived from the 
conversion o f the information systems from the more general improvements in internal 
procedures and in the control systems. The Phase 1 performance assessment of the 
smoothness o f the systems conversion process correlates in a significant way with the 
Phase 2 assessments regarding the degree to which improvements in operating 
procedures (Pearson’s index = .403) and in information systems (P = .373) and in 
customer satisfaction (.445) were better than expected. It also correlates well with 
respect to the comparisons with the performance of all the other completed transactions 
not just in terms of systems conversions process (Pearson’s correlation = .405) but also in 
terms o f HR affiliation (.413), customer impact (.453) and overall performance 
improvements.
FACTOR LOADINGS - PERFORMANCE-COST EFFICIENCIES -
Factors
Phase 2 Variables Cost efficiencies D.P. conv. only
Smooth systems conversion .511 .493
DP system quality .257 .806
Cost efficiency .527 -.366
Procedures improvements .869 -.023
Improvement control Systems .818 -.302
Eigenvalues 2.029 1.118
% o f Variance 40.6% 22.4%
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Tabic D.5 - CORRELATION MATRIX 
-POST-ACQIHSITION PERFORMANCE - Benchmark: pre-acquisition expectations
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15
1 Overall 
integration 
process (Ph. 1)
.6531 1.217
2 HR affiliation 
(P h .1)
.5714 1.118 .639
»**
3 D.P. systems 
conv. (Ph. 1)
.7273 1.020 .715 .586 • *«
4 Target willing 
to cooperate
3.075 1.071 .194 .280
*
.222
5 Gains from cost 
efficiency
3.000 .6262 .229 .048 .225 .058
6 Deposit run­
offs
3.000 .9100 -.398*•* -.297*• -.238 .078 .270
7 Quality o f D.P. 
systems
2.961 .4411 .114 .115 -.050
.038
.000 .144
8 Quality o f 
facilities
3.000 .3885 .164 .272• .184 .275•* .079 -.053 .256•
9 Quality o f 
human res.
2.852 .7113 .420
»*•
.439 .385
««
.548
♦♦♦
.043 -.233 .104 .068
10 New business 
generation
2.813 .8704 .527
***
.331 
♦ *
.313 
• •
.138 .212 -.595
«*•
.031 .223 .442
•«*
II Quality o f loan 
portfolio
2.660 .8975 .317
♦♦
.205 .020 .303
*♦ .165
-.303
»•
.034 .219 .068 .368
*♦»
12 Improvement in 
procedures
3.019 .4996 .447 .376
*•*
.403 .147 .310 
• *
-.293
«♦
.180 .098 .383
*•»
.271
«* .114
13 Retention o f 
employees
2.926 .8208 -.001 -.033 .016 .030
.075
.050 .263
•
.118
.084 .125
.017 -.091
14 Retention o f 
managers
2.889 .8165 .029 -.119 .023 .078 .301 
• •
-.025
.118 .059 .126 .162 .027
-.184 .635
15 Improvement 
customer satisf.
2.943 .7183 .320 ♦ * .259 .445**♦ .258 .345*« -.443 .010
.068 .356
*»*
.353
•««
.029 .497
*»* .201
-.238
*
16 Improvement 
control systems
3.038 .4369 .449
*«•
.284
«
.373
•*
.212 .248
»*
-.191 .004 .337 
• *
.264
•
.169 .030 .613
***
.114 .118 .135
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table D.6 - CORRELATION MATRIX 
-POST-ACQIJISITION PERFORMANCE - Benchmark: past experiences
VARIABLES Avg Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13
1 Overall integralion 
process (Phase 1)
.6531 1.217
2 Human resources 
affiliation (Phase 1)
.5714 1.118 .639 
♦ ♦♦
3 D.P. systems 
conversion (Ph. 1)
.7273 1.020 .715
* * *
.586
4 Acquired firm was 
best possible target
3.641 1.058 .625
***
.232 .400
**♦
5 Consensus among 
TMTs
3.358 1.002 .267 .434 
♦ ♦♦
.145 .232
6 Cooperation of 
middle management
3.207 .9478 .270
+
.414 .075 .152 .690***
7 Impact on customers 3.377 .9452 .285*
.278
*
.453
**♦
.196 .281 
♦ ♦
.319
**
8 Accuracy of due 
diligence
3.774 .9332 .336 
♦ ♦
.375
**♦
.204 .325
**
.459
***
.272
**
.339
**
9 Effectiveness of HR 
integration
3.396 .9269 .396
• * *
.337
* *
.413 .344 ] 
**
.279
**
.320
*»
.550
* **
.328
* *
10 Transfer of best 
resource/practices
3.040 1.049 .240 -.031 .193 .141 .026 .162 .426
***
.264
*
.220
II Smoothness of 
negotiations
3.519 1.019 .257
♦
.325 
♦ ♦
.058 .322
*♦
.738 
♦ ♦♦
.549
* * *
.306
**
.470
M *
.281
M
.116
12 Performance
improvements
3.528 .9924 .555
*♦ *
.374 
♦ **
.551 
♦ ♦♦
.459
M *
.347
**
.351 
♦ ♦♦
.603
* * *
.505 .583 .398
* * ♦
.336
**
13 Best possible price 
and terms
3.577 1.126 .503 .347 
♦ *
.396
*♦
.652
**♦
.374
***
.194 .330
**
.532
* * *
.345
**
.378
» * *
.520
* * *
.572
* * *
14 Flawless systems 
conversion
2.960 1.124 .370
**
.231 .405
*♦*
.124
■ n  / * \  I
.314
**
.270
*
.571
* * •
.256 .667
**•
.454
***
.282
**
.547
0 * 0
.256
*
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F. & Mandelker, G. N. 1992. The post-merger performance of 
acquiring firms: A re-examination o f an anomaly. The Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1605- 
1621.
Anand, J. & Singh, H. 1997. Assets redeployment, acquisition and corporate strategies in 
declining industries. Strategic Management Journal, 18 (Summer Special Issue): 99- 
118.
Amburgey, T. A., Kelly, D. & Barnett, W. P. 1993. Resetting the clock: The dynamics o f 
organizational change and failure. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 51-73.
Arrow, K. J. 1962b. Economic welfare and the allocation o f resources for invention. In 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. R. Nelson. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Arrow, K. J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton.
Astrachan, J. H. 1990. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Employee Anxiety: A Study of 
Separation Anxiety in a Corporate Context. New York, NY: Praeger.
Atkinson, A. & Stiglitz. J. 1969. A new view o f technical change. Economic Journal,
79: 348-355.
Baker, G. & Montgomery C. 1997. Conglomerates and LBO associations: a comparison 
of organizational forms. Unpublished paper. Harvard Business School.
Barney J.B. 1986. Strategic factor markets: expectations, luck, and business strategy. 
Management Science, 32: 1231-1241.
Barney J.B. 1988. Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: Reconsidering 
the relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 9 (Special Issue): 71-78.
Buono, A.F. & Bowditch, J.L. 1989. The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Burgelman, R. A. 1991. Intra-organizational ecology of strategy making and 
organizational adaptation: theory and field research. Organization Science. 2: 239-262.
Cannella, A. A. Jr. & Hambrick, D. C. 1993. Effects of executive departures on the 
performance o f acquired firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 137-152.
185
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Capron L., Dussauge P & Mitchell W. 1997. Resource redeployment following 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions in Europe and the United States, 1988-1992. 
Working Paper Series 98/68/SM, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France
Castanias, R. P. & Helfat, C. E., 1992. Managerial and windfall rents in the market for 
corporate control. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 18: 183-184.
Chandler A. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American 
Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chatteijee, S. 1986. Types o f synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions on 
merging and rival firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7: 119-139.
Chatteijee, S. & Lubatkin, M. Schweiger, D.M. & Weber, Y. 1992. Cultural differences 
and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human capital. Strategic 
Management Journal, 13: 319-344.
Clark K. & Fujimoto T., 1991. Product Development Performance. Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston, MA.
Cohen, W. M. & Bacdayan, P. 1994. Organizational routines are stored as procedural 
memory: Evidence from a laboratory study. Organization Science, 5(4): 554-568.
Cohen, W. M., Burkhart R., Dosi G., Egidi M., Marengo L., Warglien M. & Winter S. 
1996. Routines and other recurring action patterns o f organizations: contemporary 
research issues. Working paper IIASA 96-25 (March), also o f Santa Fe Institute (Nov. 
1995).
Cohen, W. M. & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 35: 128-153.
Cormier, S. & Hagman, J. 1987. Transfer of Learning: Contemporary Research and 
Applications. Academic Press Inc: San Diego.
Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Datta, D. K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: effects o f post­
acquisition integration. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 281-297.
Datta, D. K. & Grant, J. H. 1990. Relationships between type o f acquisition, the 
autonomy given to the acquired firm, and acquisition success: an empirical analysis. 
Journal of Management, 16(1): 29-44.
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Dierickx, I. & Cool, K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability o f competitive 
advantage. Management Science, 35(12): 1504-1511.
Dosi, G. 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: A suggested 
interpretation o f  the determinants and directions o f  technical change. Research Policy, 
11(3): 147-162.
Fowler, K.L. &  Schmidt D.R. 1989. Determinants o f  tender offer post-acquisition 
financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 10: 339-350.
Franks, J., Harris R. & Titman S. 1991. The post-merger share price performance o f 
acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 29: 81-96.
Gavetti, G. & L evinthal, D. 1997. Looking forward and looking backward: cognitive and 
experiential search. Unpublished Working paper, The Wharton School.
Goldberg, W. H. 1983. Mergers: Motives, Modes, Methods. Aldershot: Gower.
Grant, R. M. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory o f the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special Issue): 109-122.
Haleblian, J. 1997. Understanding acquisition performance: The role o f transfer effects. 
Unpublished paper. University of California at Riverside.
Haleblian, J. & Finkelstein, S. 1997. The influence of organization acquisition experience 
on acquisition performance: a behavioral learning theory perspective. Administrative 
Science Quarterly (forthcoming).
Haspeslagh, P.C. & Farquhar, A.B. 1994. The acquisition integration process: a 
contingent framework. In: G. Von Krogh, A. Sinatra & H. Singh (eds). Managing 
Corporate Acquisitions: A Comparative Analysis: 414-447. London, UK: McMillan 
Press.
Haspeslagh, P.C. & Jemison, D.B. 1991. Managing Acquisitions. New York: Free 
Press.
Haveman, H. A. 1992. Between a rock and a hard place: Organizational change and 
performance under conditions of fundamental environmental transformation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 48-75.
Haveman, H.A. 1993. Organizational size and change: diversification in the savings and 
loans industry after deregulation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 20-50.
Healy, P.M., Palepu K. & Ruback R. S. 1992. Does corporate performance improve after 
mergers? Journal of Financial Economics, 3 1: 135-175.
187
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Helfat, C.E., 1994. Evolutionary trajectories in petroleum firm R&D. Management 
Science, 40(12): 1720-1747.
Henderson R.M. & K. B. Clark, 1990. Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration o f 
existing product technologies and the failure o f  established firms. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 35: 9-30.
Hogan, E.A. & Overmyer-Day, L. 1994. The psychology o f mergers and acquisitions. In: 
C.L. Cooper & E.T. Robertson (eds.). International Review of Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology: 249-281. London, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Iansiti, M. 1995. Technology integration: Managing technological evolution in a 
complex environment. Research Policy, 24(4): 521-542.
Jarrell, G. A., Brickley J. A. & Netter J. M. 1988. The market for corporate control: The 
empirical evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2:49-68.
Jemison, D.B. & Sitkin, S.B. 1986. Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective. 
Academy of Management Review, 11: 145-163.
Jensen, M.C. & Ruback, R. S. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific 
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11: 5-50.
Joyce-Covin, T., Sightler, K. W., Kolenko, T .A., Tudor R.K. 1996. An investigation of 
post-acquisition satisfaction with the merger. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 
32(2): 125-142.
Kitching J. 1967. Why do mergers miscarry? Harvard Business Review, 45(6): 84-102.
Kogut B & Zander U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3): 383-397.
Krishnan H.A., Miller A. and Judge W.Q. (1997). Diversification and top management 
team complementarity: is performance improved by merging similar or dissimilar teams ? 
Strategic Management Journal 18: 361-374.
Leonard-Barton, D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing 
new product development. Strategic Management Journal. 13 (Summer Special 
Issue): 111-125.
Levitt, B. & March, J. G. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 
14: 319-340.
188
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Lippman, S. & Rumelt, R. 1982. Uncertain instability: An analysis of inter-firm 
differences in efficiency under competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (Autumn): 
418-438.
Loderer, C. & Kenneth, M. 1992. Postacquisition performance of acquiring firms. 
Financial Management, Autumn: 69-79.
Lubatkin, M. 1987. Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management 
Journal, 8: 39-53.
Manne, H. G. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy, 73-74: 110-120.
March J.G. & Levinthal D. 1993. The myopia o f learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14: 95-112.
March J.G. & Simon H. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.
March J.G., Sproull L. S. & Tamuz M, 1991. Learning from samples of one or fewer. 
Organization Science, 2(1): 1-13.
McGrath, R. Gunther. Venkataraman, S. and McMillan, J. 1994. The advantage chain: 
Antecedents to rents from internal corporate ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 
9(5): 351-369.
Mirvis, P. H. 1985. Negotiation after the sale: the roots and ramification of conflicts in an 
acquisition. Journal of Occupational Behavior, 6:65-84.
Nahavandi, A. & Malekzadeh, A. R. 1988. Acculturation in mergers and acquisition. 
Academy of Management Review, 13(1): 79-90.
Nelson, R. & Winter, S. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nonaka, I 1994. A dynamic theory of knowledge creation. Organization Science, 5(1), 
14-37.
Nunnally, J. C. 1978. Psychometric Theory. (2nd ed.). New York, MacGrow-Hill Book 
Company.
Ocasio, W. 1997. Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18 (Summer Special Issue): 187-206.
Pablo, A.L. 1994. Determinants o f acquisition integration level: A decision-making 
perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4): 803-836.
189
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pablo, A. L., Sitkin, S. B. & Jemison, D. B. 1996. Acquisition decision-making 
processes: The central role o f  risk. Journal of Management, 22(5): 723-746.
Penrose, E.T. 1959. The Theory of Growth of the Firm. New York: Wiley.
Pilloff, S. J. & Santomero, A. M. 1997. The value effects o f  bank mergers and 
acquisitions. In Mergers of Financial Institutions (ed.) Y. Amihud and G. Miller. Irwin 
Professional Publications, New York (forthcoming).
Polanyi, M. 1962. Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-critical Philosophy. New
York: Harper Torchbooks.
Polanyi, M. 1966. The Tacit Dimension. New York: Anchor Day Books.
Porter, M. 1987. From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard Business 
Review, (5): 43-59.
Ravenscraft, D.J. & Scherer, F.M. 1987. Mergers, Sell-offs, and Economic Efficiency.
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Rhoades, S. A. 1994. A summary of merger performance studies in banking, 1980-93, 
and assessment o f the “operating performance” and “event study” methodologies.
Rogers, E. 1980. Diffusion of Innovation. New York, Free Press.
Romanelli, E. & Tushman, M. L. 1994. Organizational transformation as punctuated 
equilibrium: an empirical test. Academy of Management Journal, 37(6): 1141-1166.
Rumelt, R. P. 1974. Strategy, Structure and Economic Performance. Division of 
research. Graduate school o f  business administration. Harvard University.
Rumelt, R.P. 1984. Towards a strategic theory of the firm. In: R.B. Lamb (ed.) 
Competitive strategic management: 556-570. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rumelt, R.P., Schendel, D. & Teece D. 1991. Strategic management and economics. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12: 5-29.
Rumelt, R.P., Schendel, D. & Teece D. 1995. Fundamental Issues in Strategy. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
Sabel C. 1994. Learning by monitoring. Unpublished working paper. Massachusetts 
Institute o f Technology.
190
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Sanchez, R. & Mahoney, J. T. 1996. Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge management 
in product and organization design. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special 
Issue): 63-76.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
Schweiger, D. M. & DeNisi, A. S. 1991. Communication with employees following a 
merger: A longitudinal field experiment. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 110- 
135.
Seely Brown, J. & Duguid, P 1991. Organizational learning and communities of practice: 
Toward a unified view o f  working, learning and innovation. Organization Science,
2(1): 40-57.
Seth, A. 1990a. Value creation in acquisitions: A re-examination o f performance issues. 
Strategic Management Journal, 11: 99-115.
Seth, A. 1990b. Sources o f  value creation in acquisitions: An empirical investigation. 
Strategic Management Journal, 11: 431-446.
Shanley M.T. 1994. Determinants and consequences o f post-acquisition change. In: G. 
Von Krogh, A. Sinatra & H. Singh (eds). Managing Corporate Acquisitions: A 
Comparative Analysis: 391-413. London, UK: McMillan Press.
Shanley M.T. 1998. Integrating mergers and acquisitions: lessons from other industries 
and implications for health care management. Unpublished working paper, Northwestern 
University.
Shelton, L.M. 1988. Strategic business fits and corporate acquisitions: Empirical 
evidence. Strategic Management Journal, 9(3): 279-88.
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. 1994. Takeovers in the 1960s and the 1980s: Evidence and 
implications. In R. P. Rumelt, D. A. Schendel and D. J. Teece (eds.), Fundamental 
Issues in Strategy: 403-422. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Shleifer, A. & Summers, L.H. 1989. The breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In A. 
Auerbach (ed.), Corporate Takeovers: 33-67. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Singh, A. 1975. Takeovers, economic natural selection and the theory o f  the firm: 
Evidence from the postwar United Kingdom experience. The Economic Journal, 85 : 
497-515.
Singh, H. & Montgomery, C.A. 1987. Corporate acquisition strategies and economic 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 8(4): 377-86.
191
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Sirower, M. L. 1997. The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition 
Game. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Szulanski, G. 1993. Intra-firm transfer of best practice, appropriative capabilities, and 
organizational barriers to appropriation. Academy of Management Best Papers 
Proceedings, 47-51.
Szulanski, G. 1997. Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer o f  the best 
practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special Issue): 
27-44.
Teece D.J., Pisano G. & Schuen A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities o f and strategic 
management, Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533.
Thompson J.D. 1967. Organizations in Action. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Tushman, M. L. & Romanelli, E. 1985. Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis 
model of convergence and reorientation. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7 : 171- 
222 .
Walsh, J. P. 1988. Top Management Turnover Following Acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(2): 173 - 183.
Walsh J. P. & Ellwood J.W. 1991. Mergers, acquisitions and the pruning of managerial 
deadwood. Strategic Management Journal, 12(3): 201-217.
Weick, K. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley.
Wemerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 5(2): 171-180.
Weston, J. F. & Chung K. S. 1983. Some aspects of merger theory. Journal of Midwest 
Finance Association, 26: 1-33.
Winter, S. 1987. Knowledge and competence as strategic assets. In D. J. Teece (ed.),
The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal: 159-
184. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Winter, S. 1995. Four Rs for profitability: rents, resources, routines and replication. In 
C.A. Montgomery (ed.), Resource-based and Evolutionary Theories of the Firm: 
Towards a Synthesis.* 147-178. Norwell, MA.
192
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Zander, U. & Kogut, B. 1995. Knowledge and the speed of transfer and imitation of 
organizational capabilities: an empirical test. Organization Science, 6(1): 76-92.
Zollo, M. 1996. An evolutionary model o f post-acquisition integration decisions and 
performance. Best paper proceedings o f the Academy o f Management (electronic 
version). Cinncinnati, OH.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
&  &
w
IMAGE EVALUATION 
TEST TARGET (Q A -3 )
'/.■
<O
{/ <<?•<> b ,«* v  *%
6»
150m m
IIV W G E . In c
1653 East Main Street 
Rochester, NY 14609 USA 
Phone: 716/482-0300 
Fax: 716/288-5989
0 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All flights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
